Lectures on moral philosophy

LECTURES ON
MORAL PHILOSOPHY

JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D., LL.D.

IFrom the painting by Charles Wilstm Peale]

EARLY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS

LECTURES ON
MORAL PHILOSOPHY

BY
JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D., LL.D.

PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OP NEW JERSEY

Edited under the Auspices of
The American Philosophical Association

BY

VARNUM LANSING COLLINS

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
1912

PREFATORY NOTE

As this book is the first of a proposed series of reprints
of works of early American philosophers, a word may be
said as to the general plan of which it forms a part.

Projected by the American Philosophical Association,
the series is to be published under the Association's au-
spices by the institutions with which the authors of the
works chosen were more particularly affiliated. Thus, this
volume bears the imprint of the Princeton University
Press ; and it is hoped to issue in due course, at Columbia
University President Johnson's "Elements of Philosophy",
at Harvard University the Dudleian "Lectures on Natural
Religion", at Yale University selections from the philo-
sophical writings of the elder Jonathan Edwards, and
elsewhere other works of similar character, representative
of the deeper currents of American thinking in the early
period. Much of this thinking is at least respectable, and
some of it significant and important ; but knowledge and
appreciation of it seem at the present day to be remark-
ably lacking. The aim then of this series is to develop a
consciousness of the historical background of our native
American philosophy, especially among those who, as
teachers and students of philosophy, are heirs of the tra-
dition, and therefore should also be its keepers.

34.1523

INTRODUCTION

President Witherspoon's memory rests in the keeping
of several classes of readers. Those who concern them-
selves with our Revolutionary history — and they form
the largest group — know him as the Scottish Presbyterian
clergyman who became president of Princeton, an active
patriot, a member of the Continental Congress, and a
signer of the Declaration of Independence. Students of
early American academic history, on the other hand, find
in their field frequent witness to his educational inspira-
tion— for example, he signed the bachelor diplomas of
thirteen college presidents, to say nothing of teachers
of lesser prominence. Likewise, those who are acquainted
with the annals of American Presbyterianism are aware of
Dr. Witherspoon's influence in framing the present con-
stitution of that church ; and finally, he holds a place in
the slender company of early American philosophers be-
cause it was during his regime, and through his teaching,
that Princeton became the home and fountain-head of
Scottish realistic philosophy in America. Behind all this,
moreover, one catches echoes of a brave career on the
other side of the Atlantic ; and one is driven to wonder
then what manner of man this many-sided Scotsman was
who, with life two-thirds spent, yet could come to a new
country and, within the swift compass of a quarter of a
century, leave on its history an impress .so broad, so deep,
so unimagined. And it is this question that these prelim-
inary pages will try to answer.

viii Introduction

Sprung from stock that was largely ecclesiastical John
Witherspoon was destined for the church before he had
learned his letters. A precocious boy, with gifts carefully
fostered in the sober atmosphere of his father's manse, he
was able to read his Bible at the age of four, and, after a
grammar school preparation, to matriculate at Edinburgh
University in February 1736 — a few days after his thir-
teenth birthday. Here he spent the next seven years of
his life, receiving his degree in 1739, and his licensure in
1743. He had been occupying his first charge, that of
Beith in Ayrshire, barely half a year when he proved that
he was already one of those men whose eager sympathies
and quick enthusiasms will never let their lives be hedged
in by the mere offices they happen to be filling. For, soon
after the outbreak of the Rebellion of 1745, he raised a
company of volunteers and marched away to aid in repell-
ing the Young Pretender's invasion. The company was
disbanded before it saw any active service, but its fledg-
ling leader was not to be completely thwarted. In his
veins was racing an atavistic strain of fighting blood, the
blood of ancestors who bore the wooden "spon" or spear,
whence came the family name. And at the battle of Fal-
kirk accordingly, accompanied by his faithful beadle, he
appeared as a spectator. But he lingered too long; the
beadle had neglected to divest himself of his weapons;
and when the day was done the worthy pair, protesting
stoutly but in vain, found themselves swept up by the
Pretender's forces and held as prisoners of war. Mr.
Witherspoon's experiences at Castle Doune, where he was
confined, were such that he never fully recovered his
health. His next appearance at a scene of conflict was to

Introduction ix

be on the less perilous but not less exciting floor of the
General Assembly ; and there not as a spectator.

The Scottish Church at this period was in the midst of
a struggle between two parties known as the Moderate
and the Popular. Moderatism voiced the new spirit of
the age, the new element of liberalism permeating the
Church. It was, moreover, as Scottish historians have
pointed out, an ecclesiastical policy whose chief feature
was the absolute enforcement of the aristocratic law of
patronage, whereby in practical disregard of parishioners
concerned, church livings were at the disposal of pktrons.
The Popular party, on the other hand, was the conserva-
tive and strictly orthodox party. It earnestly combatted
the decline of personal religion and the relaxation of the
old standards of faith and conduct, which it claimed were
results of the rising tide of liberalism; and it opposed
strenuously the undemocratic features of the patronage
law. With this party Mr. Witherspoon identified himself,
and speedily became its leading champion. All of his early
publications owe their inception to this struggle, his
anonymous "Ecclesiastical Characteristics" (1753), a bit-
ing satire on the Moderates, being the best known and
passing through several editions, although his "Essay on
Justification" (1756), his "Serious Enquiry into the
Stage" (1757), directly inspired by the famous "Doug-
las" controversy, and a group of doctrinal sermons print-
ed in 1758 and republished in a three volume edition in
1764, with an important additional "Essay on Regenera-
tion", savored more of his calling and won for him repu-
tation as a dauntless defender of personal piety and simple
evangelical truth.

X Introduction

Mr. Witherspoon remained at Beith 12 years and then
was called to the growing manufacturing town of Paisley
where he stayed until his transatlantic move, refusing dur-
ing this period calls to Rotterdam and to Dublin and not
being permitted by the General Assembly to accept one
from Dundee. His twenty years of Scottish ministry
were years of aggressive give and take, years of devoted
service to his people, years of intellectual ripening; but
they may not detain us here. It must suffice to say that
his rank in the church became firmly established even
though he was on the losing side of the fight against
Moderatism. St. Andrews conferred on him the honor-
ary degree of Doctor of Divinity ; his essays and sermons
were reviewed in London and Edinburgh as often as they
appeared ; they were translated into Dutch ; his reputation
crossed the Atlantic; and when in 1766 the presidency of
the College of New Jersey at Princeton became vacant he
received a unanimous invitation from the Trustees of the
college to fill the place. Unwillingly declining the call at
first, and then finding it his duty to accept when it was
repeated, he reached America in August 1768.

It has been alleged that Doctor Witherspoon left Scot-
land only too gladly, because of a lawsuit and the hot
activity of ecclesiastical opponents. But consideration of
the documents and of his own words and character makes
it perfectly clear that he crossed the ocean in no sense a
fugitive, but solely because he could not ignore what he
believed to be a distinct and imperative call to greater use-
fulness ; it was a vision whose beckoning he could not dis-
obey. He left Scotland reluctantly ; and American though
he became, he never forgot the land of his birth, the land

Introduction xi

where his early associations clung, where his old parish-
ioners dwelt, and where his forefathers and his parents
and two of his little children were sleeping in quiet low-
walled churchyards.

In electing this Scotsman the Trustees of Princeton
chose better than they knew. The college, direly in need
of a broad-minded, strong guide, at once responded to the
call of his vigorous presence. He was in his prime; a
new life in a new world lay before him ; and he faced his
untried task with all the enthusiasm and energy that had
marked his Scottish career. Promptly taking into his
hands a situation intrinsically difficult, and one which
church politics had made delicate, he revealed a grasp of
its possibilities unexpected of one who was not only a
stranger in the country but who confessedly lacked all ex-
perience in academic administration. For this lack he
atoned partly by remarkable powers of adaptability, but
chiefly by the sheer force of a personality that was gifted
with rare good sense and seasoned with the ever-saving
salt of humor. While he fully sympathised with the atti-
tude that chose to consider Princeton a "school of pro-
phets" wherein young men were to be prepared for the
colonial ministry, he increased the potentiality of the insti-
tution by making plain his further belief that the duty ot
any college, and especially of this one, was to prepare its
students to fill not only sacred but also secular positions of
colonial leadership. Beginning with the grammar school in
the college he at once introduced the latest European meth-
ods; and then by degrees he broadened and strengthened
the curriculum of the college itself in historical, literary,
and scientific lines, and he made special effort to attract

xii Introduction

men back for graduate study. The Revolutionary War
paralysed the finances of the institution and shattered all
his plans ; but the prominence of his graduates in the Rev-
olutionary and formative periods of American life, in the
early educational history of the South and Southwest and
in the post-Revolutionary history of the church in Amer-
ica is eloquent testimony to his energising influence.

And while he Was thus infusing new blood into the col-
lege he was himself assimilating a host of new impres-
sions gained on the frequent tours he at once began to
make up and down the colonies to secure funds and to
win pupils. There is nothing in his writings to indicate
that he had any very definite opinions on American politi-
cal affairs before he came to this country. But he did not
take long to form them. He subsequently declared that
one would become an American more easily by living in
America three months than by reading about it three
years. His own metamorphosis began early and is not
difficult to trace in the essays and sermons of his Ameri-
can period ; and he made no secret of that metamorphosis.
When the Continental Congress was called to meet at
Philadelphia in September 1774, he represented his coun-
ty at the New Jersey Convention for the election of dele-
gates to that Congress; and when the Congress met, al-
though not a member, he identified himself conspicuously
with the progressive party.

Already occupying in American Presbyterianism a posi-
tion commensurate with the reputation he had brought
with him from Scotland, when the Synod of New York
and Philadelphia found itself compelled in 1775 to take
official notice of approaching warfare, he was appointed

Introduction xiii

chairman of the committee that drew up at the Synod's
behest the Pastoral Letter to the congregations within its
bounds, a document which came from his pen and which
has remained one of the most striking utterances of the
period.

He had seen early the inevitability of independence;'^,
single-handed he had boldly made the first public effort I
to quicken the pulse of New Jersey on this the supreme/
question of the hour, and he had borne his share of the I
labor of identifying the colony with the party advocating )
independence. Elected a member of the Committee of
Correspondence of Somerset County, New Jersey, he i>e-
came its chairman, and in the following year (1776) was
elected to the New Jersey Provincial Congress, where he
played a prominent part not only in unseating British rule
in the colony, but also in the dramatic deposition of Wil-
liam Franklin, New Jersey's last royal governor. Small
wonder is it then that the Provincial Congress at this junc-
ture, well aware that the question of independence was
before the Continental Congress for final settlement, elect-
ed him (June 1776) one of its five representatives in the
senior body, with definite instructions to vote for inde-
pendence. He arrived at Philadelphia in time to witness
the passage of the resolution of independence and of the
declaration of that independence; and he signed the en-
grossed Declaration in the following August. In Con-
gress he remained through 1782 with but one break, the
year 1780.

The full story of President Witherspoon's Congression-
al service has yet to be written. His British birth and
training, his engaging personality, the position of intcl-

xiv Introduction

lectnal leadership that the presidency of the Colleg-e of
New Jersey gave him, his ecclesiastical eminence, the pub-
licity that had clung to his name ever since his arrival on
American shores, the tempered earnestness and calm ma-
turity of his views, all helped to win for him respectful
hearing even if those views were sometimes unpopular.
How he was regarded in general by his colleagues may be
estimated by the fact that scarcely a month passed during
the six years of his service without his being appointed to
some fresh special committee. In addition, he served on
three important standing committees, the Committee on
Clothing for the troops, the Board of War, and the Com-
mittee on Secret Correspondence. Moreover, in commit-
tee work of the more humanitarian sort his breadth of
view and his sense of equity were constantly enlisted, as
for instance in the investigation of the physical condition
of the troops and the treatment of prisoners, in proposals
looking toward a humaner conduct of the war, and in the
adjustment of controversies like that over the hospital
service, or of graver crises like the mutiny of 1781 ; and
when Congress concerned itself with less secular things
his holy calling usually led to his selection as spokesman,
and thus it was that many, if not most, of the proclama-
tions of Congress for thanksgivings, fast-days, and days
of prayer, were written by him.

As soon as he entered Congress he declared his dis-
approval of the expensive system of supplying the army
by commission and he did not rest until he had contrived
to have a contract system substituted. He earnestly op-
posed each succeeding emission of paper money, and it is

hitrodiiction

XV

said hazarded his popularity by the streiuiousiiess of his
opposition. His speeches in Congress on financial mat-
ters formed the basis of his "Essay on Money" a volume
prepared and published (1786) at the urgent request, so
we are told, of the very group of men who had been his
strongest opponents in Congress, but who had lived to see
the error of their ways revealed by the financial chaos in
which the Confederation found itself speedily involved —
a chaos which he had predicted in unmistakable terms. He
criticised the system of requisition on the states to meet
national necessities, and he had no patience with the in-
efficiency of the method for collecting the state quotas.
He was fearless in his criticism and was hardly willing to
wait for time, the great justifier, to bring about the adop-
tion of his views.

Profiting by past contact with a wider world than that
of most of his colleagues, and fresh from a reading of
the latest authorities on histor}^ and political science, read-
ing he had been compelled to do in preparation for his
college lectures, he had perhaps given riper and more re-
cent attention to those subjects than the majority of Con-
gressmen ; and in addition to this theoretical study he had
seen service in practical politics. But he did not confine
to the floor of Congress his expressions of seasonable ad-
vice. His first group of "Druid" essays in the Pennsyl-
vania Magazine, for example, were in reality timely pop-
ularising discussions of very pertinent phases of what men
call international law.

In the Confederation as constituted he had but little
faith ; he deplored the petty jealousies that would not per-
mit the states to give Congress adequate authority ; he in-

xvi Introduction

sisted that the control of foreign commerce, for instance,
and of the revenue derived therefrom should lie with Con-
gress; he constantly pleaded for a stronger central gov-
ernment, and happily he lived to see his wish fulfilled and
to vote at the New Jersey Convention of 1787 for the rat-
ification of the federal Constitution.

But however critical of the Confederation President
Witherspoon may have been, no American born and bred
could have had greater faith than he in the future of the
country. Here was no faint dreamer whose dreams, be-
cause of their faintness, could never come true. On the
contrary he believed simply, and therefore the more ear-
nestly, that the struggle in which the colonies were en-
gaged was being controlled by the Power that controls all
human destinies, that it was a struggle on which was
staked not alone the future of the whole western world
and the happiness and moral welfare of restless millions
yet to come, but that in a far wider sense "the cause of
justice, of liberty, and of human nature" was in the bal-
ance. Naturally in British circles at home and abroad,
and especially in Scotland, he was the subject of scathing
denunciation ; he was satirised in verse ; he was burned in
effigy. But he steadfastly refused to see any possible out-
come of the struggle other than the one it eventually
reached, and his unswerving confidence was a tower of
strength in dark hours, and in days of success a spur to
braver effort.

Against Great Britain he never harbored any bitter-
ness. "You shall not hear from me", he said in his great
Fast-Day sermon of May 1776, "You shall not hear from

Introduction xvii

me in the pulpit what yon have never heard from me in
conversation; I mean railing at the King personally, or
at his ministers and the parliament and people of Great
Britain". At worst they were misguided by deluded or
scheming advisers; and although by 1775 he had never
a moment of doubt that separation between Great Britain
and her colonies was inevitable, one may catch here and
there in his words a distinct note of regret that it had to
be, a sense of the seeming pity of it all.

And he gave to his adopted country not alone his own
service. Scores of young men went out from Princeton
filled with his courage, his hopes, his ideals. His three
sons served in one capacity or another in the war, and
James, the eldest and the most promising, was killed at
the battle of Germantown. Surely Doctor Witherspoon's
allegiance could not have been more absolute.

While in Congress, he did not relinquish his direction
of the college. He attended every meeting of the Board
of Trustees and presided at every Commencement, and the
newspapers of the day contain his frequent notices of
term openings, his plain hints to schoolmasters, his homely
advice to parents and students ; and every time he felt that
he could properly be absent from his seat he rode back to
Princeton and his classes.

War had laid heavy hands on the college. Its chief
building, Nassau Hall, was ruined in being used as bar-
racks and hospital by British and Americans in turn, and
the student body was scattered for some months in the
winter of 1776-77. As soon, however, as the enemy left
New Jersey the president set about repairing the building
and gathering around him once more his undergraduates.

xviii Introduction

Teaching went bravely on, but it was years before the in-
stitution recovered from the material set-back it had re-
ceived; and however satisfying the moral gain and the
prestige it won during his administration, its greatest
president never saw the realization of some of his most
cherished plans.

On leaving Congress finally in 1782 President Wither-
spoon had intended to spend the remainder of his days
at Tusculum, his estate on the outskirts of Princeton, con-
tinuing his college lectures, preaching in his regular turn
in the college chapel and presiding on public occasions as
the official head, but turning over to his son-in-law. Pro-
fessor Samuel Stanhope Smith, the laborious details of
the management of the institution. But he was not per-
mitted to return to private life. In 1780, the year he was
out of Congress, he had been elected to the New Jersey
Council or Senate, and in 1783 his county sent him to
the State Assembly. His stay was short, for the Trustees
of the college, in desperate effort to raise money for re-
pairs and to replace the resources wiped out by the war,
had foolishly decided to send him to Great Britain to seek
financial aid, an expedition of which he had heartily dis-
approved and whose only redeeming feature was the op-
portunity it gave him to visit once more the scenes and
friends of former days. In every other respect the trip
proved a complete failure.

His greatest and in a sense his only achievement still
lay before him. It had become apparent that the Presby-
terian Church in America had outgrown its colonial or-
ganization and to Doctor Witherspoon's lot it now fell

Introduction xix

to direct the framing of the new order. It took four years
for the reconstruction to be consummated in the forma-
tion of the first General Assembly ; and then, as the most
conspicuous Presbyterian in the country as well as the
guiding spirit through the process of reorganization, he
was appointed to preach the opening sermon at the meet-
ing of the first Assembly (May 1789), and to preside as
the first moderator. This unquestionably must be consid-
ered the climax of his career. For he had been too busy
with life to create any visible monument for future fame ;
rather was his monument to be sought in the characters
of his younger contemporaries. He was growing old ; he
had lived his life as it came, generously, eagerly, com-
pletely, a teacher and a maker of men — to the youthful
generation an inspiration, to the older a wise counsellor.
But he himself had written no great book, had dictated
no imperishable state document, had founded no philoso-
phical system; he was scarcely a great scholar; even his
political service had been only incidental service, given
because it seemed to be the immediate duty of the day.
But through all his life's complexity he had never forgot-
ten, nor even slighted, his permanent duty to the church ;
and had there been any pride of self in his heart he
would have felt it on that May morning of his reward. It
was characteristic of the man to preach on such an occa-
sion a sermon whose keynote was humility — the same
sermon in fact that he had used when he preached for the
first time in his Princeton pulpit, twenty-one years earlier.
His last years were clouded by financial embarrassment,
by ill health and by the loss of his sight. There are pa-
thetic glimpses in the records of his being led up into his

XX Introduction

pulpit, — of his feeling his way along the hall at Tuscu-
lum. He died suddenly on November 15, 1794, and he
lies in the Presidents' Lot at the Princeton Cemetery.

Genial in company, full of anecdote, rich in experience,
and modest in all that concerned himself, he was every-
where a welcome guest. As head of the College he was a
firm but discriminating disciplinarian, with a sense of
humor and a generous side to his nature — generous not
only in temper but in material things — that endeared him
to his students. His sincerity was his greatest quality.
He seems to have been lacking in aesthetic appreciation ;
art and poetry and even the beauty and mystery of nature
seem to have had but little appeal for him. The so-called
accomplishments were in his sight mere wasteful energy,
and skill of every kind was reprehensible unless it served
some useful end. His point of view was entirely utilitar-
ian. For instance, he would not have flowers in his gar-
den; he was interested only in vegetables and in raising
stock ; and a fall of rain, when needed by his crops, would
set him humming Isaac Watts. But if horticulture was
one of his hobbies, another was the purification of the
English language as spoken in America, and still another
was the encouragement of Scottish immigration, and it
was owing to the last that financial difficulty fell upon
him.

A heavily built man of medium height, he is neverthe-
less said to have possessed to a remarkable degree the in-
definable quality we call presence. His voice was poor,
and he was no orator. Castle Doune had ruined his ner-
vous system and he deliberately schooled himself to the
repression of all emotion in public speaking. His reputa-

Introduction xxi

tion as a speaker — and there were no empty pews when he
preached — rested entirely on his simple impressive ear-
nestness, the clarity of his thought, and his excellent style.

It has already been hinted that President Witherspoon
was not a creative philosopher ; the leisure that reflection
postulates had never been his. Nevertheless, to him be-
longs the distinction of being the first college head in
America to set forth in his classroom lectures a definite
system of ethics. On his arrival at Princeton he found
the tutors and thinking men in college eagerly supporting
the idealism of Berkeley, and upon them he mercilessly
fell with argument and ridicule until he had driven Berk-
leianism out of Nassau Hall. In its place he substituted
the realism of Thomas Reid and the Scottish common
sense school, a philosophy not unknown in Princeton be-
fore he came, but which for the next twenty-five years, by
lecture and conversation, he was to hammer home and
so firmly entrench on the congenial soil of the New
World that, in its general features at least, it became
not only the traditional philosophy of the Princeton school,
but in the opinion of many thinkers pre-eminently the
philosophy of America. Of his lectures the printed rei
mains are but an inadequate version, but imi)erfect
though they are, they indicate his place in the historj' of
American thought.

Besides lecturing on Moral Philosophy, which included
Jurisprudence and Politics, President Witherspoon
taught French and Hebrew, heard recitations in his
favorite classical authors, and carried on courses in
Divinity, in History, and in Eloquence, a general
term which included Oratory and Criticism. No

xxii Introduction

edition of his lectures appeared during his Hfe-time and
he seems to have intended that they should remain un-
published. He certainly did not intend them to be pub-
lished unrevised, and a year or two before his death he
therefore destroyed most of his manuscripts. His lectures
on Moral Philosophy and on Eloquence would have dis-
appeared at that time had it not been for undergraduate
transcripts. He had written a sort of syllabus of these
lectures of which each student was required to make his
own copy. These copies were then used as text-books,
and their common origin obviously accounts for the simi-
larity of those that are still extant. At recitation the
President would amplify the bare statements of his sylla-
bus. He followed the same method in his other courses,
but no transcripts have come down. Of the lectures on
Moral Philosophy the Library of Princeton University
owns three undergraduate copies, made in 1772, 1782,
and 1795 respectively. In explanation of the last date it
should be stated that the Witherspoon lectures were con-
tinued in use after their author's death. A fourth copy
is owned by the Presbyterian Historical Society.

They have appeared in the following editions : ( i ) in
the first edition of the "Works" issued by the Woodwards
of Philadelphia in 1800; (2) in the second edition of the
"Works" published by the same firm in 1802; (3) issued
separately first in 1810 by the Woodwards and called
"Woodward's Third Edition"; (4) reissued in 1822 by
the Woodwards; and (5) and (6) in the two Edinburgh
editions of the "Works" put out in 1804-05 and 181 5 re-
spectively.

The text here reprinted is that of the first edition

hitrodiictioii xxiii

(1800) whicli has been compared with the 1810 aiul 1822
reprints and with the three Princeton transcripts. The
latter are referred to in the footnotes as A, B, and C,
respectively, following their chronological order. To have
noted every difference l:>etw^een the manuscripts and the
printed versions would have encumbered the pages of this
reprint uselessly, and the present editor has therefore en-
deavored to confine attention to those variants only which
seem significant as modifications of opinion, or which
alter or restore the sense. Most of the alterations are
possibly traceable to changes made by the lecturer from
time to time ; the rest are clearly due to undergraduate
misreadings of the original from which the copies were
made, and — if one may say so without impertinence — to
lack of editorial sagacity on the part of Doctor Ashbel
Green, who prepared the "Works" for the press. There
is little other excuse for leaving uncorrected sentences
which obvious corruptions had rendered meaningless.
Practically the only corrections in later editions are those
of the simplest typographical errors.

The best biographical sketches of President Wither-
spoon are found in Sanderson's "Biographies of the
Signers", Sprague's "Annals of the American Pulpit",
and Maclean's "History of the College of New Jersey".
The Reverend D. J. Woods, in the only life of President
Witherspoon that has so far appeared, "John Wither-
spoon" (1906), adopts the topical method. The Diction-
ary of National Biography contains an unbiased sketch,
though not without errors. A sympathetic chapter on the
President's political writings is in Moses Coit Tyler's
"Literarv Historv of the American Kevohition" ; aufj Pro-

xxiv Introduction

fessor I.Woodbridge Riley, in his "American Philosophy :
the Early Schools," has made a definitive study of Wither-
spoon's influence in giving Scottish realism an abiding
home in America. An extended biography is approach-
ing completion by the editor of the present reprint.

The President's portrait was painted by Charles Wilson
Peale. A copy is in Independence Hall at Philadelphia,
another is owned by Princeton University, and two others
are in private possession. The original is believed to be
the one reproduced as the frontispiece of this volume,
and is owned by President Witherspoon's great-great-
grandson, General Alfred A. Woodhull, of Princeton.
The remains of Dr. Witherspoon's library, and
what is believed to be the most complete set of his pub-
lished writings, are in the Library of Princeton Univer-
sity. Inasmuch as this reprint of the "Moral Philosophy"
does not seem to be the place for a complete bibliography
of its author's writings, a chronological check-list only has
been prepared, and will be found on a subsequent page.

In conclusion, the editor would acknowledge his in-
debtedness to Professor H. N. Gardiner, of Smith Col-
lege, and to Professor I. Woodbridge Riley, of Vassar
College, for their cordial interest and helpful suggestions
in the preparation of this volume, and to General Alfred
A. Woodhull, of Princeton, for his courteous permission
to use as a frontispiece his copy of the Peale portrait of
his distinguished ancestor.

Princeton, N. J., February, iqt2. V. L. C.

CHECK LIST OF THE PUBLISHED WRITINGS
OF PRESIDENT WITHERSPOON

1. Disputatio philosophica [De mentis imniortalitatej.

Edinburgh, 1739.

2. Answers to the reasons of dissent from the sentence

of the reverend Commission of the General As-
sembly. Edinburgh, 1752.

3. Ecclesiastical characteristics. Glasgow, 1753.

2d edition, Glasgow, 1754; 3d edition, Glasgow,
1754; 4th edition, Glasgow, 1755; 5th edition,
Edinburgh, 1763; 6th edition, London. 1765;
7th edition, Philadelphia, 1767; new edition,
Edinburgh, 1845; [Dutch translation] Rotter-
dam, n. d. but probably 1763.

4. Essay on the connexion between the doctrine of jus-

tification . . . and holiness of life. Glasgow,

1756.

2d edition, Edinburgh, 1756; 3d edition, Lon-
don, 1765; [Dutch translation] Utrecht, 1764.

5. Reasons of dissent from a vote of the General As-

sembly. [Edinburgh, 1757.]

6. Serious enquiry into the nature and effects of the

stage. Glasgow, 1757.

Reprinted. New York, 1812; also Edinburgh,

1876; [Dutch translation] Utrecht, 1772.

7. Absolute necessity of salvation through Christ. Ed-

inburgh, 1758.

2d edition [not found.]

Note: The 2d edition contained ".\n inquiry into the
scripture meaning of charity," being the expan-
sion of a footnote in the ist edition.

xxvi Introduction

8. Prayer for national prosperity and for the revival

of religion inseparably connected. London,
1758.

9. Case of the Magistrates and Tov^n-council of Pais-

ley, the Minister and Session of the Laigh
Church, and the Minister of the High Church
. . . [against] the Presbytery of Paisley. [ Ed-
inburgh (?), 1758.]

10. Charge of sedition and faction against good men.

Glasgow, 1758.

Reprinted, Belfast, 1759; also Boston, 181 1.

11. Trial of religious truth by its moral influence.

Glasgow, 1759.

12. Case of the Town-session of Paisley. Appellants

from a sentence of the Synod of Glasgow and
Ayr. [Edinburgh (?), 1 76 1.]

13. Seasonable advice to young persons. Glasgow,

1762.

14. A serious apology for the Ecclesiastical Character-

istics. Edinburgh, 1763.

15. Practical treatise on regeneration. London, 1764.

2d edition, [not found] ; 3d edition, [ not
found] ; 4th edition, [not found] ; 5th edition,
London, 181 5; [Dutch translation] Groningen,
1776; [French translation] Toulouse, 1850.

16. Essays on important subjects. London, 1765. 2

vols.

Note: These "Essays" and the "Treatise on regenera-
tion" of 1764 are usually bound and lettered as
a three volume set, of which vol. 3 is the "Re-
generation".

Introduction xxvii

17. History of a corporation of servants. Glasgow,

1765-

18. The nature and extent of visible religion. Edin-

burgh, 1768.

19. Sermons on practical subjects. Glasgow, 1768.

Reprinted, Edinburgh, 1804.

20. Practical discourses on the leading truths of the

Gospel. Edinburgh, 1768.
Reprinted, Philadelphia. 1770; 2d edition, Lon-
don, 1792.

21. Address to the inhabitants of Jamaica ... in behalf

of the College of New Jersey. Philadelphia,
1772.

22. Pastoral letter from the Synod of New York and

Philadelphia to the congregations under their
care. [Philadelphia( ?), 1775.]

23. The Dominion of Providence over the passions of

men ... to which is added an address to the
natives of Scotland residing in America. Phila-
delphia, 1776.

2d edition, Philadelphia, 1777; 3d edition, Glas-
gow, 1777; 4th edition. London, 1778.

24. Address to the natives of Scotland residing in Amer-

ica. London, 1778.

Note: A reprint of the address added to the sermon
on "The Dominion of Providence."

25. The humble confession of B. Towne. ] Philadel-

phia, 1778?]

26. Essay on money as a medium of commerce. Phila-

delphia. 1786.

xxviii. Introduction

27. Draught of a plan of government and discipline [for

the Presbyterian Church in America]. Phila-
delphia, 1786.

28. Book of discipline and government of the Church of

Scotland. [Philadelphia, 1786.]

29. Christian magnanimity . . . With an address to the

senior class. Princeton, 1787.

30. Sermons by James Aluir. [Edited by Dr. Wither-

spoon.] Princeton, 1787.

31. An address to the senior class of students. Paisley,

1788.

Note: A reprint of the address in the sermon on "Chris-
tian magnanimity."
^2. Sermon on the religious education of children.
Elizabeth-town, 1789.
Reprinted, Paisley, 1790; also Glasgow, 1802.

33. The Holy Bible. Trenton, 1791. [Preface by Dr.

Witherspoon.]

2d edition, Trenton, 1807.

34. A series of letters on education. New York, 1797.

Reprinted, Bristol, 1 798 ; also ( four letters only,
instead of five) Glasgow, 1799; also Southamp-
ton, 1808; also (with Letters on Marriage)
Andover, 181 7; also (with additions) Salem,
N. Y., 1822.

35. Sermons ... a supplementary volume. Edinburgh,

1798.

36. Works. Philadelphia, 1 800-1 801. 4 vols.

Note: Planned as three volumes, the fourth was added
(1801) too late to make the proper change in the
title pages of the other three.

2d edition, Philadelphia, 1802. 4 vols.

Introduction xxix.

37. Miscellaneous works. Philadelphia. 1803.

Note: A reprint, with new title page, of the fourth
volume of the "Works".

38. Select works. London, 1804. 2 vols.

39. Works. Edinburgh. 1804-1805. 9 vols.

Reprinted, Edinburgh, 181 5. 9 vols.

40. Lectures on moral philosophy and eloquence. Wood-

ward's third edition. Philadelphia, 1810.
Reprinted, Philadelphia, 1822.

41. Essay on justification, and a treatise on regeneration.

Edinburgh. 181 5.

[2d edition], Glasgow, 1823; 3d edition, Glas-
gow, 1830.

[Preface to the first editio)i.]

IN JUSTICE to the memory of Dr. ll'itherspoon, it
ought to be stated that he did not intend these lectures for
the press, and that he once compelled a printer who, witli-
out his knowledge, had undertaken to publish them, to
desist from the design, by threatning a prosecution as the
consequence of persisting in it. The Doctor's lectures on
morals, notwithstanding they assume the form of regular
discourses, were in fact, viewed by himself as little more
than a syllabus or compend, on which he might enlarge
before a class at the times of recitation; and not intend-
ing that they shoidd go further, or be othenvise consid-
ered, he took freely and without acknoivledgement from
un-ifers of character such ideas, and perhaps e.x-pres.uons,
as he found suited to his purpose. But though these
causes would not permit the Dr. himself to give to the
public these sketches of moral philosophy, it is believed
that they ought not to operate so powerfully on those into
whose hands his papers have fallen since his death. Many
of his pupils whose eminence in literature and distinction
in society give weight to their opinions, have thought
that these lectures, with all their imperfections, contain
one of the best and most perspicuous exhibitions of the
radical principles of the science on ivhich they treat that
has ever been made, and they have very importunately
demanded their publication in this edition of his works:
Nor is it conceived that a compliance with this demand,
after the explayuition here given can do any injury to the

Dr's. reputation. And to the writer of this note it does
not seem a sufficient reason that a very valuable work
should be consigned to oblivion, because it is in some
measure incomplete, or because it is partly a selection
from authors to whom a distinct reference cannot now be
made.

LECTURES ON
MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Moral Philosophy is that branch of Science which
treats of the principles and laws of Duty or Morals. It
is called Philosophy, Ijecause it is an inquiry into the na-
ture and grounds oi moral oblioation by reason, as dis-
tinct from revelation.'

Hence arises a question, is it lawful, and is it safe or
useful to separate moral philosophy from religion? It
will be said, it is either the .same or different from
revealed truth; if the same, unnecessary — if different,
false and dangerous.

An author of New England,- says, moral philosophy is
just reducing infidelity to a system. But however specious
the objections, they will be found at bottom not solid.^ —
If the Scripture is true, the rliscoveries of reason cannot
be contrary to it;' and therefore, it has nothing to fear

^ MS. A : Moral Philosophy is that Branch of Science treating of
the Principles. Laws, & Duties of Man. It is so called because it
treats of the Grounds of obligation by Nature, as distinct from
Revelation.

"MS. C adds footnote: President Edzvards. See his dissertation
on Virtue. The reference presumably is to "The nature of true vir-
tue," the second of the elder Edwards' "Two dissertations", i)ublish
ed in one volume at Boston in 1765.

' MS. A omits this sentence. * MS. A omits from this point to /
do not know in the next paragraph, and instead reads : // the
Scripture be true, no discovery of Reason can be contrary, & Rea
son serves to illustrate .- con firm it: But us infidels endeaviur

''i'''' Moral Philosophy

from that quarter. And as we are certain it can do no evil,
so there is a probability that it may do much good. There
may be an illustration and confirmation of the inspired
writings, from reason and observation, which will greatly
add to their beauty and force.

The noble and eminent improvements in natural phil-
osophy, which have been made since the end of the last
century, have been far from hurting the interest of reli-
gion; on the contrary, they have greatly promoted it.
Why should it not be the same with moral philosophy,
which is indeed nothing else but the knowledge of human
nature? It is true, that infidels do commonly proceed
upon pretended principles of reason. But as it is impossi-
ble to hinder them from reasoning on this subject, the
best way is to meet them upon their own ground, and to
show from reason itself, the fallacy of their principles. I
do not know any thing that serves more for the support of
religion than to see from the diflferent and opposite sys-
tems of philosophers, that there is nothing certain in
their schemes, but what is coincident^ with the word of
God.

Some there are, and perhaps more in the present than
any former age, who deny the law of nature, and say, that
all such sentiments as have been usually ascribed to the
law of nature, are from revelation and tradition.

{after their manner of reasoning) to overturn Revelation, the best
way would he to meet them on their own ground & hy Reason to
demonstrate, there is nothing stable in their Arguments, & that
their principles are altogether fallacious. MSS. B and C omit It
is true that infidels in the next paragraph, and instead read : and yet
may be an illustration and confirmation of it.
*MS. C consistent.

Moral Philosophy 3

We must distinguish here between the hglit of nature
and the law of nature: by the first is to be understood
what we can or do discover by our own ixDwers, without
revelation or tradition : by the second, that which, when
discovered, can be made appear to be agreeable to reason
and nature.

There have been some very shrewd and able writers
of late, viz. Dr. Willson, of New Castle, and Mr. Ric-
calton of Scotland, who have written against the light of
nature, shewing that the first principles of knowledge
are taken from information. That nothing can be sup-
posed more rude and ignorant, than man without instruc-
tion. That when men have been brought up so, they
have scarcely been superior to brutes. It is very difficult
to be precise upon this subject, and to distinguish the dis-
coveries of reason from the exercise of it. Yet I think,
admitting all, or the greatest part, of what such contend
for, we may, notwithstanding, consider how far any thing
is consonant to reason, or may be proven by reason ;
though perhaps reason, if left to itself, would never have
discovered it.

Dr. Clark was one of the greatest champions for the
law of nature;^ but it is only since his time that the
shrewd^ opposers of it have appeared. The llutchinson-
ians (so called from Hutchinson of England) insist that
not only all moral, but also all natural knowledge comes
from revelation, the true system of the world, true chron-
ology, all human arts, &c. In this, as is usual with most

•MS. B light of nature. 'MS. A shrewdest. MSS. B and C
greatest.

4 Moral Philosophy

other classes of men, they carry their nostrum to extrav-
agance. I am of opinion that the whole Scripture
is perfectly agreeable to sound philosophy; yet certainly
it was never intended to teach us every thing. The poli-
tical law of the Jews contains many noble principles of
equity, and excellent examples to future lawgivers; yet
it was so local and peculiar, that certainly it was never
intended to be immutable and universal.

It would be more just and useful to say that all simple
and original discoveries have been the production of Pro-
vidence, and not the invention of man. On the whole,
it seems reasonable to make moral philosophy, in the sense
above explained, a subject of study. And indeed let
men think what they will of it, they ought to acquaint
themselves with it. They must know what it is, if they
mean ever to show that it is false.

The Division of the Subject.

Moral philosophy is divided into two great branches,
Ethics and Politics, to this some add Jurisprudence,
though this may be considered as a part of politics.

Ethics relate to personal duties, Politics to the consti-
tution, government, and rights of societies, and jurispru-
dence, to the administration of justice in constituted states.

It seems a point agreed upon, that the principles of
duty and obligation must be drawn from the nature of
man. That is to say, if we can discover how his Maker
formed him, or for what he intended him, that certainly
is what it ought to be.*

'MS. A adds Dr. Clarke; Piiffendorf de Officiis hominum, & Civ-
ium; Cicero de Officiis; Hutchinson; Shaftesbur^s Characteristics;

Moral J^hilosophy 5

The knowledge of human nature, however, is either
perplexed and difficult of itself, or hath been made so, by
the manner in which writers in all ages have treated it.
Perhaps this circumstance itself, is a strong presump-
tion^ of the truth of the Scripture doctrine of the depravi-
ty and corruption of our nature. Supposing this depravity,
it must be one great cause of difficulty and confusion in
giving an account of human nature as the work of God.

This I take to be indeed the case with the greatest part
of our moral and theological knowledge.'"

Those who deny this depravity, will be apt to plead for
every- thing, or for many things as dictates of nature,
which are in reality propensities of nature in its present
state, but at the same time the fruit and evidence of its
departure from its original purity. Tt is by the remaining
power of natural con.science that wc must endeavor to de-
tect and oppose these errors.

(i) We may consider man very generally in his species
as distinct from and superior to the other creatures, and
what it is, in which the difference truly consists. (2) .\s an
individual, what are the parts which constitute his na-
ture.^ ^

I. Philosophers have generally attempted to assign the
precise distinction between men and the other rinimals ; but

Mandavcl's Fable of the B£es; Walloson's Religion of Nature de-
lineated: and Kaime's Essay of the Principles of Morality, are the
Authors to be consulted in these lectures. The list is rcpi-atrd in
the "Recapitulation" at the end of the course.

•MSS. A and B strong proof: MS. C sufficient pruoj

"The MSS. omit the sentence.

"The MSS. omit the passa-Ji' ,nul u-hnt if is . constitute his
nature.

6 Moral Philosophy

when endeavoring to bring it to one peculiar incommu-
nicable characteristic, they have generally contradicted
one another and sometimes disputed with violence and
rendered the thing more uncertain.

The difficulty of fixing upon a precise criterion only
serves to show that in man we have an example of what
we see also every where else, viz. a beautiful and insen-
sible gradation from one thing to another, so that the
highest of the inferior is, as it were, connected and blend-
ed with the lowest of the superior class. Birds and beasts
are connected by some species so that you will find it hard
to say whether they belong to the one or the other — So in-
deed it is in the whole vegetable as well as animal king-
dom.^^ (i) Some say men are distinguished from brutes
by reason, and certainly this, either in kind or degree, is
the most honorable of our distinctions. (2) Others say
that many brutes give strong signs of reason, as dogs,
horses and elephants. But that man is distinguished by
memory and foresight : but I apprehend that these are up-
on the same footing with reason, if there are some glim-
merings of reason in the brute creation, there are also
manifest proofs of memory and some of foresight. (3)
Some have thought it proper to distinguish man from the
inferior creatures by the use of speech, no other creatures
having an articulate language. Here again we are obliged
to acknowledge that our distinction is chiefly the excel-
lence and fullness of articulate discourse ; for brutes have
certainly the art of making one another understand many
things by sound. (4) Some have said that man is not

"The preceding portion of this paragraph is not in the MSS.

Moral Pliilosoffltx 7

compleatly distinguished by any oi these, but by a sense of
rehgion. And I think it must be admitted that of piety or a
sense of a Supreme Being, there is not any trace to be seen
in the inferior creatures. The stories handed about by
weak-minded persons, or retailed by creckilous authors, of
respect in them to churches, or sacred persons, are to be
disdained as wholly fabulous and visionary. (5) There
have been some who have said that man is distinguished
from the brutes by a sense of ridicule.

The whole creation (says a certain author)'-* is grave
except man, no one laughs but himself. There is some-
thing whimsical in fixing upon this as the criterion, and it
does not seem to set us in a very resjjectable light. Perhaps
it is not improper to smile upon the occasion, and to say.
that if this sentiment is embraced, we shall be obliged to
confess kindred with the apes, who are certainly them-
selves possessed of a risible faculty, as well as qualified to
excite laughter in us. On the whole there seems no necessi-
ty of fixing upon some one critericjn to tiie exclusion of
others.

There is a great and apparent distinction between man
and the inferior animals, not only in the beauty of his
form, which the poet takes notice of. Os homini sublime
dedit. &c.'^ but also in reason, memory, refiection, and
the knowledge of God and a future state.

A general distinction, which deserves particularly to be
taken notice of in moral disquisitions, is. that man is evi-
dently made to be guided, and pnjtccted from dangers.

"MS. C adds footnote Shaftesbury. "MS. C adds footnote Ovid
and makes an attempt to complete the quotation (Metamorphoses I.
85-86).

8 Moral Philosophy

and supplied with what is useful more by reason, and
brutes more by instinct.

It is not ver^' easy and perhaps not necessary to explain
instinct. It is something previous to reason and choice.
When we say the birds build their nests by instinct, and
man builds his habitation by reflection, experience or
instruction, we understand the thing well enough, but if
we attempt to give a logical definition of either the one or
the other, it will immediately be assaulted by a thousand
arguments.

Though man is evidently governed by something else
than instinct, he also has several instinctive propensities,
some of them independent of, and some of them inter-
mixed with his moral dispositions. Of the first kind are
hunger, thirst, and some others; of the last is xhea-Topyrf
or parental tenderness towards offspring.

On instinct we shall only say farther, that it leads more
immediately to the appointment of the Creator, and
whether in man, or in other creatures, operates more early
and more uniformlv than reason.

LECTURE II.

Considering man as an individual, we discover the
most obvious and remarkable circumstances of his na-
ture, that he is a compound of body and spirit. I take this
for granted here, because we are only explaining the na-
ture of man. When we come to his sentiments and prin-
ciples of action, it will be more proper, to take notice of

MoraJ I'lnl(isof>li\ g

the spirituality and immortality of tlie soul, and how they
are proved.

The body and spirit have a great reciprocal influence
one upon another. The body on the temper and disposi-
tion of the soul, and the soul on the state anrl habit of the
body. The body is properly the minister of the soul, the
means of conveying perceptions to it. but nothing with-
out it.

It is needless to enlarge upon the structure of the body ;
this is sufficiently known to all, except we descend to ana-
tomical exactness, and then like all the other parts of na-
ture it shows the infinite wisdom of the Creator. With re-
gard to morals, the influence of the body in a certain
view may be very great in enslaving men to appetite,
and yet there does not seem any such connection with
morals as to require a particular description. I think'
there is little reason to doubt that there are great and es-
sential differences between man and man, as to the spirit
and its proper powers; but it seems plain that such are the
laws of union between the body and spirit, that many fac-
ulties are weakened and some rendered altogether incapa-
ble of exercise, merely by an alteration of the state of the
body. Memory is frequently lost and judgment weakened
by old age and disease. Sometimes by a confusion of the
brain in a fall the judgment is wholly disordered. The in-
stinctive appetites of hunger, and thirst, seem to reside di-
rectly in the body.- and the soul to have little more than a
a passive perception. Some passions, particularly fear and
rage, seem also to have their seat in the body, immediately

'The MSS. omit / think .... zJtolly disordered
' MS. P. omits to producing).

lO Moral Philosophy

producing a certain modification of the blood and spirits.^
This indeed is perhaps the case in some degree with all
passions whenever they are indulged, they give a modi-
fication to the blood and spirits, which make them easily
rekindled, but there are none which do so instantaneously
arise from the body, and prevent deliberation, will and
choice, as these now named. To consider the evil pas-
sions to which we are liable, we may say those that de-
pend most upon the body, are fear, anger, voluptuousness,
and those that depend least upon it, are ambition, envy,
covetousness.

The faculties of the mind are commonly divided into
these three kinds, the understanding, the will, and the
affections; though perhaps it is proper to observe, that
these are not three c|ualities wholly distinct, as if they were
three different beings, but different ways of exerting the
same simple principle. It is the soul or mind that un-
derstands, wills, or is affected with pleasure and pain. The
understanding seems to have truth for its object, the dis-
covering things as they really are in themselves, and in
their relations one to another. It has been disputed
whether good be in any degree the object of the under-
standing. On the one hand it seems as if truth and that
only belonged to the understanding ; because we can easily
suppose persons of equal intellectual powers and opposite
moral characters. Nay, we can suppose malignity joined
to a high degree of understanding and virtue or true good-
ness to a much lower. On the other hand, the choice
made by the will seems to have the judgment or deliber-
ation of the understanding as its very foundation. How

*The MSS. omit the rest of the paragraph.

Moral Philosophy i i

can this be, it will he said if the understanding lias notliing
to do with good or evil. A considerable opposition of
sentiments among philosophers, has arisen from this ques-
tion. Dr. Clark, and some others make understanding
or reason the immediate principle of virtue. Shaftsbury,
Hutchinson,^ and others, make affection the principle of it.
Perhaps neither the one nor the other is wholly right.
Probably both are necessar}-.

The connection between truth and goodness, between
the understanding and the heart, is a subject of great mo-
ment, but also of great difficulty. I think we may say with
certainty that infinite perfection, intellectual and moral,
are united and inseparable in the Supreme Being. There
is not however in inferior natures an exact proportion be-
tween the one and the other; yet I apprehend that truth
naturally and necessarily promotes goodness, and false-
hood the contrary ; but as the influence is reciprocal, ma-
lignity of disposition, even with the greatest natural pow-
ers, blinds the understanding, and prevents the perception
of truth itself.-'

Of the will it is usual to enumerate four acts; desire,
aversion, joy and sorrow. The two last. Hutchinson"
says are superfluous, in which he seems to be right.
All the acts of the will may be reduced to the two
great heads of desire and aversion, or in other words,
chusing and refusing.

The affections are called also passions because often
excited by external objects. In as far as they differ

*MS. B rearls correctly Hutcheson. 'The paragraph i.<; not in the
MSS. ' Hutcheson.

12 Moral Philosophy

from a calm deliberate decision of the judgment, or de-
termination of the will, they may be called strong pro-
pensities, implanted in our nature, which of themselves
contribute not a little to bias the judgment, or incline
the will.

The affections cannot be better understood than by
observing the difference between a calm dehberate gen-
eral inclination, whether of the selfish or benevolent
kind, and particular violent inclinations. Every man
deliberately wishes his own happiness, but this differs
considerably from a passionate attachment to particular
gratifications, as a love of riches, honors, pleasures.
A good man will have a deliberate fixed desire of the
welfare of mankind; but this differs from the love of
children, relations, friends, country.

The passions are very numerous and may be greatly
diversified, because every thing, however modified, that
is the object of desire or aversion, may grow by accident
or indulgence, to such a size as to be called, and deserved
to be called, a passion. Accordingly we express our-
selves thus in the English language. A passion for
horses, dogs, play.

However all the passions may be ranged under the
two great heads of love and hatred. To the first belong
esteem, admiration, good-will, and every species of ap-
probation, delight, and desire; to the other, all kinds of
aversion, and ways of expressing it, envy, malice, rage,
revenge, to whatever objects they may be directed.

Hope and fear, joy and sorrow, though frequently
ranked among the passions, seem rather to be states or
modifications of the mind, attending the exercise of every

Moral Philosophy i ^

passion, according as its object is probable" or inipntbaljlc
possest or lost.

Jealousy seems to be a passion of a middle nature, which
it is not easy to say whether it should be ranked under the
head of love or hatred. It is often said of jealousy be-
tween the sexes, that it springs from love; yet, it seem;-
plainly impossible, that it can have place without forming
an ill opinion of its object, at least in some degree. The
same thing may be said of jealousy and suspicion in
friendship.

The passions may be ranged in two classes in a different
way. viz. as they are selfish or benevolent, public or pri-
vate. There will be great occasion to consider this dis-
tinction afterwards, in explaining the nature of virtue,
and the motives that lead to it. What is observed now.
is only to illustrate our nature as it really** is. There is a
great and real distinction between passions, selfish and be-
nevolent. The first point directly, and immediately at
our own interest in the gratification ; the others point im-
mediately at the happiness of others. Of the first kind,
is the love of fame, power, property, pleasure. And of
the second, is family and domestic affection, friendshi|)
and patriotism. It is to no purpose to say, that ultimately,
it is to please ourselves, or becau.se we feel a satisfaction
in seeking the good of others ; for it is certain, that the di-
rect object in view in many cases, is to promote the happi-
ness of others ; and for this many have been willing to sac-
rifice every thing, even life itself.

After this brief survey of human nature, in one light,
or in one point of view, which may be called its capacity.

'MSS. A and V, impossible. ' M.S.S. A :iiui H usually.

14 Moral Philosophy

it will be necessary to return back, and take a survey of
the way, in which we become acquainted with the objects
about which we are to be conversant, or upon which the
above faculties are to be exercised.

On this it is proper to observe in general, that there are
but two ways in which we come to the knowledge of
things, viz. ist, Sensation, 2nd, Reflection.

The first of these must be divided again into two parts,
external and internal.

External arises from the immediate impression of ob-
jects from without. The external senses in number are
five; seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and smelling.

In these are observable the impression itself, or the
sensation we feel, and the supposition inseparable from it,
that it is produced by an external object. That our senses
are to be trusted in the information they give us, seems to
me a first principle, because they are the foundation of all
our after reasonings. The few exceptions of accidental
irregularity in the senses, can found no just objection to
this, as there are so many plain and obvious ways of dis-
covering and correcting it.

The reality of the material system I think, may be easily
established, except upon such principles as are subver-
sive of all certainty, and lead to universal scepticism ; and
persons who would maintain such principles, do not de-
serve to be reasoned with, because they do not pretend to
communicate knowledge, but to take all knowledge from
us.

The Immaterialists say, that we are conscious of no-
thing, but the impression or feeling of our own mind ; but
they do not observe that the impression itself, implies and

Moral Philosof^hy 15

supposes something external, that communicates it, and
cannot be separated from that supposition. Sometimes
such reasoners tell us, that we cannot shew the substance
separate from its sensible qualities ; no more can any man
shew me a sensible quality, separate fn^n a particular
subject. If any man will shew me whiteness, without shew-
ing- me any thing that is white, or nnmdness without any
thing that is round, I will shew him the substance without
either color or shape.

Immaterialism takes away the distinction between truth
and falsehood. I have an idea of a house or tree in a cer-
tain place, and I call this true, that is, I am of opinion,
there is really a house or tree in that place. Again, I
form an idea of a house or tree, as what may be in that
place; I ask what is the difference, if after all, you tell
me, there is neither tree, house nor place any where ex-
isting. An advocate for that system says, that truth con-
sists in the liveliness of the idea, than which nothing can
be more manifestly false. I can form as distinct an idea
of any thing that is not, as any thing that is, when it is al)-
sent from my sight. I have a much more lively idea of
Jupiter and Juno, and many of their actions, from Homer
and Virgil, though I do not believe that any of them ever
existed, than I have of many things that I know happened
within these few months.

The truth is, the immaterial system, is a wild and ridi-
culous attempt to unsettle the principles of common sense
by metaphysical reasoning, which can hardly produce any
thing but contempt in the generality of persons who hear
it, and which I verily believe, never produced conviction
even on the persons who pretend to espouse it.

1 6 Moral Philosophy

LECTURE III.

Internal sensation is what Mr. Hutchinson^ calls the
finer powers of perception. It takes its rise from exter-
nal objects, but by abstraction, considers something-
farther than merely the sensible qualities —

1. Thus with respect to many objects there is a sense
of beauty in the appearance, structure or composition,
which is altogether distinct from mere color, shape and
extention. How then is this beauty perceived ? It enters
by the eye, but it is perceived and relished by what may
be well enough called an internal sense, quality or capacity
of the mind.

2. There is a sense of pleasure in imitation, whence
the arts of painting, sculpture, poetry, are often called the
imitative arts. It is easy to see that the imitation itself
gives the pleasure, for we receive much pleasure from a
lively description of what would be painful to behold.

3. A sense of harmony.

4. A sense of order or proportion.

Perhaps after all, the whole of these senses may be con-
sidered as belonging to one class, and to be the particulars
which either singly, or by the union of several of them, or
of the whole, produce what is called the pleasures of the
imagination. If so, we may extend these senses to every
thing that enters into the principles of beauty and grace-
fulness.— Order, proportion, simplicity, intricacy, uni-
formity, variety — especially as these principles have any
thing in common that is equally applicable to all the fine

^ Hutcheson.

Moral Philosophy 17

arts, painting, statuary, architecture, music, poetry, ora-
tory.

The various theories upon the principles of beauty, or
what it is that properly constitutes it, are of much impor-
tance on the subject of taste and criticism, but of very
little in point of morals. Whether it be a simple percep-
tion that cannot be analysed, or a Je nc scai quoi, as the
French call it, that cannot be discovered, it is the same
thing to our present purpose, since it cannot be denied,
that there is a perception of beauty, and that this is very
different from the mere color or dimensions of the object.
This beauty extends to the form and shape of visible, or
to the grace and motion of living objects; indeed, to all
works of art, and productions of genius.^

These are called the reflex senses sometimes, and it is of
moment to observe both that they really belong to our na-
ture, and that they are very different from the grosser per-
ceptions of external sense.

It must also be observed, that several distinguished
writers have added as an internal sense, that of morality, a
sense and perception of moral excellence, and our obliga-
tion to conform ourselves to it in our conduct.

Though there is no occasion to join Mr. Hutchinson^ or
any other, in their opposition to such as make reason the
principle of virtuous conduct, yet I think it must be ad-
mitted, that a sense of moral good and evil, is as really a
principle of our nature, as either the gross external or re-
flex senses, and as truly distinct from both, as they are
from each other.

This moral sense is precisely the same thing with what,
*The MSS. omit this paragraph. 'Hutchoson.

1 8 Moral Philosophy

in scripture and common language, we call conscience.
It is the law which our Maker has written upon our hearts,
and both intimates and enforces duty, previous to all rea-
soning. The opposers of innate ideas, and of the law of
nature, are unwilling to admit the reality of a moral sense,
yet their objections are wholly frivolous. The necessity of
education and information to the production and exercise
of the reflex senses or powers of the imagination, is every
whit as great as to the application of the moral sense. If
therefore any one should say, as is often done by Mr.
Locke, if there are any innate principles, what are they?
enumerate them to me, if they are essential to man they
must be in every man ; let me take any artless clown and
examine him, and see if he can tell me what they are. — I
would say, if the principles of taste are natural they must
be universal. Let me tr}' the clown then, and see whether
he will agree with us, either in discovering the beauty of a
poem or picture, or being able to assign the reasons of his
approbation.

There are two senses which are not easily reducible to
any of the two kinds of internal senses, and yet certainly
belong to our nature. They are allied to one another.^ —
A sense of ridicule, and a sense of honor and shame. A
sense of the ridiculous is something peculiar; for though
it be admitted that everything that is ridiculous is at the
same time unreasonable and absurd ; yet it is as certain the
terms are not convertible, or any^ thing that is absurd is
not ridiculous. There are an hundred falsehoods in
mathematics and other sciences, that do not tempt any
body to laugh.

* MS. A omits the sentence. ''The MSS. read every.

Moral Philosophy iq

Shaftsbur>' has. through his whole writings, en-
deavored to estabHsh this principle that ridicule is the
test of truth: but the falsehood of tiial opinion a]ipears
from the above remark, for there is something really
distinct from reasoning in ridicule. It seems to be putting
imagination in the place of reason. — See P>ro\vn^ Fss;ays
on the Characteristics.''

A sense of honor and shame seems, in a certain view, to
subject us to the opinions of others, as they depend upon
the sentiments of our fellow-creatures. Vet, perhaps we
may consider this sentiment as intended to be an assistant
or guard to virtue, by making us apprehend rei)roach
from others for what is in itself worthy of blame. This
sense is very strong and powerful in its effects, whether
it be guided by true or false principles.

After this survey of human nature, let us consider how
we derive either the nature or obligation of duty from it.

One way is to consider what indications we have from
our nature of the way that leads to the truest hai)piness.
This must be done by a careful attention to the .several
classes of perceptions and affections, to see which of them
are most excellent, delightful, or desirable.

They will then soon appear to be of three great classes,
as mentioned above, easily distinguishable from one
another, and gradually rising above one another.

I. The gratification of the external senses. This af-
fords some pleasure. We are led to desire what is pleas-
ing."^ and to avoid what is disgustful to them.

'John Brown, 'Es.says on the Characteristics of the Earl of
Shaftesbury," London, 1751. Dr. Withcrspoon's copy is in the Li
brary of Princeton University. ' Rest of sentence omitt<d in MS. A.

20 Moral Philosophy

2. The finer powers of perception give a delight
which is evidently more excellent, and which we must
necessarily pronounce more noble. Poetry, painting,
music, &c. the exertion of genius, and exercise of the
mental powers in general, give a pleasure, though not so
tumultuous, much more refined, and which does not so
soon satiate.

3. Superior to both these, is a sense of moral excel-
lence, and a pleasure arising from doing what is dictated
by the moral sense.

It must doubtless be admitted that this representation
is agreeable to truth, and that to those who would calmly
and fairly weigh the delight of moral action, it must ap-
pear superior to any other gratification, being most noble,
pure and durable. Therefore we might conclude that it
is to be preferred before all other sources of pleasure —
that they are to give way to it when opposite, and to be no
otherwise embraced than in subserviency to it.

But though we cannot say there is any thing false in
this theory, there are certainly very essential defects. —
As for example, it wholly confounds, or leaves entirely
undistinguished, acting virtuously from seeking happi-
ness: so that promoting our own happiness will in that
case be the essence or definition of virtue, and a view to
our own interest will be the sole and complete obligation to
virtue. Now there is good ground to believe not only that
reason teaches us, but that the moral sense dictates to us,
something more on both heads, viz. that there are disin-
terested affections that point directly at the good of others,
and that these are so far from meriting to be excluded

Moral Philosophy 21

from the notion of virtue altogether, that they rather seem
to claim a preference to the selfish affections. I know
the friends of the scheme of self interest have a way of
coloring or solving this. They say, men only approve
and delight in benevolent affections, as pleasing and de-
lightful to themselves. But this is not satisfying, for it
seems to weaken the force of public affection very much,
to refer it all to self interest, and when nature seems to
be carrying you out of yourself, by strong instinctive pro-
pensities or implanted affections, to turn the current and
direction of these into the stream of self interest in which
experience tells us we are most apt to run to a vicious
excess.

Besides it is affirmed, and I think with good reason, that
the moral sense carries a good deal more in it than mere-
ly an approbation of a certain class of actions as beautiful,
praise worthy or delightful, and therefore finding our
interest in them as the most noble gratification. The moral
sense implies also a sense of obligation, that such and
such things are right and others wrong; that we are
bound in duty to do the one, and that our conduct is
hateful, blameable, and deserving of punishment, if wc
do the contrary ; and there is also in the moral sense or
conscience, an apprehension or belief that reward and
punishment will follow, according as we shall act in the
one way, or in the other.

It is so far from being true, that there is no more in
virtuous action than a superior degree of beauty, or a
more noble pleasure, that indeed the beauty and sweetness
of virtuous action arises from this very circumstance —

22 Moral Philosophy

that it is a compliance with duty or supposed obhgation.
Take away this, and the beauty vanishes, as well as the
pleasure. Why is it more pleasant to do a just or charit-
able action than to satisfy my palate with delightful
meat, or to walk in a beautiful garden, or read an exquisite
poem? only because I feel myself under an obligation
to do it, as a thing useful and important in itself. It is not
duty because pleasing, but pleasing because duty. — The
same thing may be said of beauty and approbation.^ I do
not approve of the conduct of a plain, honest, industrious,
pious man, because it is more beautiful than that of an idle
profligate, but I say it is more l^eautiful and amiable, be-
cause he keeps within the bounds of duty. I see a higher
species of beauty in moral action: but it arises from a
sense of obligation. It may be said, that my interest and
duty are the same, because they are inseparable, and the
one arises from the other; but there is a real distinction
and priority of order. A thing is not my duty, because
it is my interest, but it is a wise appointment of nature,
that I shall forfeit my interest, if I neglect my duty.

Several other remarks might be made to confirm this.
When any person has by experience found that in seek-
ing pleasure he embraced a less pleasing enjoyment, in
place of one more delightful, he may be sensible of mis-
take or misfortune, but he has nothing at all of the feeling
of blame or self-condemnation ; but when he hath done
an immoral action, he has an inward remorse, and feels
that he has broken a law, and that he ought to have done
otherwise.

^ The preceding passage Take a-way this .... beauty and appro-
bation is not fonnd in MSS. .A^ and B.

Moral Philosophy 23

LECTURE IV.
This therefore lays us under the necessity^ of search-
ing a little further for the principle of moral ac-
tion. In order to do this with the greater accuracy, and
give you a view of the chief controversies on this subject,
observe, that there are really three questions upon it,
which must be inquired into, and distinguished. I am
sensible, they are so intimately connected, that they are
sometimes necessarily intermixed ; but at others, not dis-
tinguishing, leads into error. ^ The questions relate to

1. The nature of virtue.

2. The foundation of virtue.

3. The obligation of virtue.

When we inquire into the nature of virtue, we do
enough, when we point out what it is, or show how we
may come to the knowledge of every particular duty,
and be able to distinguish it from the opposite vice. When
we speak of the foundation of virtue, we ask or answer the
question. Why is it so? Why is this course of action pre-
ferable to the contrary? What is its excellence? When
we speak of the obligation of virtue, we ask by what law
we are bound, or from what principles we ought to be
obedient to the precepts which it contains or prescribes.

After speaking something to each of these — to the con-
troversies that have been raised upon them — and the pro-
priety or importance of entering far into these controver-
sies, or a particular decision of them. I shall i)roceed to

* MS. C This scheme being found defective leaves under a neces-
sity, etc. 'MSS. A and B not being distinguishable they lead us

24 Moral Philosophy

a detail of the moral laws or the several branches of duty
according to the division first laid down.

I, As to the nature of virtue, or what it is; or, in
other words, what is the rule by which I must try every
disputed practice — that I may keep clear of the next ques-
tion, you may observe, that upon all the systems they must
have recourse to one or more of the following, viz. Con-
science, reason, experience. All who found virtue upon af-
fection, particularly Hutchinson,^ Shaftsbury and their
followers, make the moral sense the rule of duty, and
very often attempt to exclude the use of reason on this
subject. These authors seem also to make benevolence
and public affection the standard of virtue, in distinction
from all private and selfish passions.

Doctor Clark and most English writers of the last age,
make reason the standard of virtue, particularly as op-
posed to inward sentiment or affection. They have this
to say particularly in support of their opinion, that rea-
son does in fact often controul and alter sentiment ;
whereas sentiment cannot alter the clear decisions of
reason. Suppose my heart dictates to me anything to be
my duty, as for example, to have compassion on a per-
son detected in the commission of crimes; yet if, upon
cool reflection, I perceive that suffering him to go unpun-
ished will be hurtful to the community, I counteract the
sentiment from the deductions of reason.

Again : Some take in the air of experience, and chiefly
act upon it. All particularly who are upon the selfisli
scheme, find it necessary to make experience the guide,

' Hutcheson.

Moral Philosophx 2S

to show them what things are really conducive to happi-
ness and what not.

We shall proceed to consider the opinions upon the na-
ture of virtue, the chief of which are as follow :

1. Some say that virtue consists in acting agreeably to
the nature and reason of things. And that we are to
abstract from^ all affection, public and private, in deter-
mining any question upon it. Clark.

2. Some say that benevolence or public affection is
virtue, and that a regard to the good of the whole is the
standard of virtue.-^ What is most remarkable in this
scheme is, that it makes the sense of obligation in partic-
ular instances give way to a supposed greater good.
Hutchinson.^

3. One author (Wolloston Rel. of Nat. delineated")
makes truth the foundation of virtue, and he reduces the
good or evil of any action to the truth or falshood of a
proposition. This opinion differs not in substance, but
in words only from Dr. Clark's.

4. Others place virtue in self love, and make a well
regulated self love the standard and foundation of it.
This scheme is best defended by Dr. Campbel, of St. An-
drews.^

5. Some of late have made sympathy the standard of
virtue, particularly Smith in his Theory of Moral Sen-
timents. He says we have a certain feeling, by which we
sympathize, and as he calls it, go along with what ap-

*MS. C inserts it. 'MS. C adds footnote Hutcheson. * Hulctu
son. 'William Wollaston, "The religion of nature delineated,"
London 1722. ^Archibald Campbell, "An inquiry into the original
of moral virtue," London 1733.

26 Moral Philosophy

pears to be right. This is but a new phraseology for the
moral sense.

, 6. David Hume has a scheme of morals that is pecu-
liar to himself. He makes every thing that is agreeable
and useful virtuous, and vice versa, by which he entirely
annihilates the difference between natural and moral
viqualities, making health, strength, cleanliness, as really
virtues as integrity and truth.

7. We have an opinion published in this country, that
virtue consists in the love of being as such.®

Several of these authors do easily and naturally incor-
porate piety with their system, particularly Clark, Hut-
chinson,^^ Campbell and Edwards.

And there are some who begin by establishing natural
religion, and then found virtue upon piety. This amounts
to the same thing in substance; for reasoners upon the
nature of virtue only mean to show what the Author of
nature has pointed out as duty. And after natural re-
ligion is established on general proofs,^ ^ it will remain to
point out what are its laws, which, not taking in revela-
tion, must bring us back to consider our own nature, and
the rational deductions from it.

2. The opinions on the foundation of virtue may be
simimed up in the four following:

I. The will of God. 2. The reason and nature of
things. 3. The public interest. 4. Private interest.

I. The will of God. By this is not meant what was
mentioned above, that the intimations of the divine will
point out what is our duty ; but that the reason of the dif-

•MS. A adds Mr. Edwards. '" Hutcheson. ^^ MS. C principles.

.Moral Philosophy 27

ference between virtue and vice is to be sought no where
else than in the good pleasure of God. That there is no
intrinsic excellence^^ in any thing but as he commands or
forbids it. They pretend that if it were otherwise there
would be something above the Supreme Being, something
in the nature of things that would lay him under the law
of necessity or fate. But notwithstanding the difficulty
of our forming clear conceptions on this subject, it seems
vei-y harsh and unreasonable to say that the difference be-
tween virtue and vice is no other than the divine will.
This would be taking away the moral character even of
God himself. It would not have any meaning then to say
he is infinitely holy and infinitely perfect. But prob-
ably those who have asserted this did not mean any more
than that the divine will is so perfect and excellent that^**'
all virtue is reduced to conformity to it — and that we
ought not to judge of good and evil by any other rule.
This is as true as that the divine conduct is the standard
of wisdom.^''

2. Some found it in the reason and nature of things.
This may be said to be true, but not sufficiently precise
and explicit. Those who embrace this principle succeed
best in their reasoning Avhen endeavoring to show that
there is an essential difference l>etween virtue and vice.
But when they attempt to show wherein this difference
doth or can consist, other than public or private hap-
piness, they speak with very little meaning.

3. Public happiness. This opinion is that the founda-
tion of virtue, or that which makes the distinction be-

"^MS. C adds or evil. "MS. C omits following clause all virtue
. ... to it and that. "MSS. A and B religion.

28 Moral Philosophy

tween it and vice, is its tendency to promote the general
good; so that utihty at bottom is the principle of virtue,
even with the great patrons of disinterested affection.

4. Private happiness. Those who choose to place the
foundation of virtue here, would have us to consider no
other excellence in it than what immediately conduces to
our own gratification.

Upon these opinions I would observe, that there is
something true in every one of them, but that they may
be easily pushed to an error by excess.

The nature and will of God is so perfect as to be the
true standard of all excellence, natural and moral : and
if we are sure of what he is or commands, it would be pre-
sumption and folly to reason against it, or put our views
of fitness in the room of his pleasure; but to say that
God, by his will, might have made the same temper and
conduct virtuous and excellent, which we now call
vicious, seems to unhinge all our notions of the supreme
excellence even of God himself.

Again, there seems to be in the nature of things an
intrinsic excellence in moral worth, and an indelible im-
pression of it upon the conscience, distinct from produc-
ing or receiving^^ happiness, and yet we cannot easily il-
lustrate its excellence but by comparing one kind of hap-
piness with another.

Again, promoting the public or general good seems to
be so nearl)^ connected with virtue, that we must ne-
cessarily suppose that universal virtue could be of uni-
versal utility. Yet there are two excesses to which this
has sometimes led. — One the fatalist and necessitarian

" MSS. A and B meriting.

Moral Philosophy jg

schemes to which there are so many objections, and the
other, the making the general good the ultimate practi-
cal rule to every particular person, so that he may violate
particular obligations with a view to a more general
benefit.

Once more, it is certain that virtue is as really connect-
ed with private as with public hapj)iness, and yet to make
the interest of the agent the only foundation of it, seems
so to narrow the mind, and to be so destructive to the
public and generous affections as to produce the most
hurtful effects.

If I were to lay down a few propositions on the
foundation of virtue, as a philosopher, they should be the
following :

1. From reason, contemplation, sentiment and tradi-
tion, the Being and infinite perfection and excellence of
God may be deduced ; and therefore what he is, and com-
mands, is virtue and duty. Whatever he has implanted ^
in uncorrupted nature as a principle, is to be received as
his will. Propensities resisted and contradicted by the
inward principle of conscience, are to be considered as
inherent or contracted vice.

2. True virtue certainly promotes the general good,
and this may be made use of as an argument in doubtful
cases, to determine whether a particular principle is right
or wrong, but to make the good of the whole our imme-
diate principle of action, is putting ourselves in God's
place, and actually superseding the necessity and use of
the particular principles of dutv which he hath impressed
upon the conscience. As to the whole I believe the uni-

30 Moral Philosophy

verse is faultless and perfect, but I am unwilling to say
it is the best possible system, because I am not able to un-
derstand such an argument, and because it seems to me
absurd that infinite perfection should exhaust or limit
itself by a created production.

3. There is in the nature of things a difference be-
tween virtue and vice, and however much virtue and
happiness are connected by the divine law, and in the
event of things, we are made so as to feel towards them,
and conceive of them, as distinct. We have the simple
perceptions of duty and interest.

4. Private and public interest may be promoted by the
same means, but they are distinct views ; they should be
made to assist, and not destroy each other.

The result of the whole is, that we ought to take the
rule of duty from conscience enlightened by reason, ex-
perience, and every way by which we can be supposed
to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in creat-
ing us such as we are. And we ought to believe that it is
as deeply founded as the nature of God himself, being a
transcript of his moral excellence, and that it is produc-
tive of the greatest good.

LECTURE V.

3. It remains only that we speak of the obligation of
virtue, or what is the law that binds us to the perform-
ance, and from what motives or principles we ought to
follow its dictates.

The sentiments upon the subject differ, as men have

I

Moral P kilo sop liv 31

different views of the nature and foundation of virtue,
yet they may be reduced within narrower bounds.

The obhgation of virtue may be easily reduced to two
general kinds, duty and interest. The first, if real, im-
plies that we are under some law, or subject to some supe-
rior, to whom we are accountable. The other only im-
plies that nature points it out to us as our own greatest
happiness, and that there is no other reason why we
ought to obey.

Now I think it is very plain that there is more in the
obligation of virtue, than merely our greatest happiness.
The moral sentiment itself implies that it is duty inde-
pendent of happiness. This produces remorse and dis-
approbation as having done what is blameable and of
ill desert. We have two ideas very distinct, when we
see a man mistaking his own interest and not obtaining
so much happiness as he might, and when we see him
breaking through every moral obligation. In the first
case we consider him as only accountable to himself,
in the second we consider him as accountable to some
superior, and to the public. This sense of duty is the
primar}^ notion of law and of rights^ taken in their most
extensive signification as including every thing we think
we are entitled to expect from others, and the neglect or
violation of which we consider as wrong, unjust, vicious,
and therefore blameable. It is also affirmed with great
apparent reason by many, particularly Butler in his An-
alogy and his sermons, that we have a natural feeling of
ill desert, and merited punishment in vice. The patrons

'The MSS. read right.

32 Moral Philosophy

of the selfish ideas alone, are those who confine the obli-
gation of virtue to happiness.

But of those who are, or would be thought of the op-
posite sentiment, there are some who differ very consider-
ably from others. Some who profess great opposition to
the selfish scheme, declare also great aversion to founding
the obligation of virtue in any degree on the will of
a superior, or looking for any sanction of punishment, to
corroborate the moral laws. This they especially treat
with contempt, when it is supposed to be from the deity.
Shaftsbury speaks with great bitterness against taking
into view a future state of what he calls more extended
self-interest. He says men should love virtue for its own
sake, without regard to reward or punishment. In this he
has been followed by many reasoners, as far as their re-
gard to religion would permit them.

If however, we attend to the dictates of conscience, we
shall find evidently, a sense of duty, of self-approbration
and remorse, which plainly show us to be under a law, and
that law to have a sanction : what else is the meaning of
the fear and terror, and apprehension of guilty persons?
Quorum mentes se recludantur, &c, says Cicero.-

Nor is this all, but we have all certainly a natural sense
of dependance. The belief of a divine being is certainly
either innate and necessary, or has been handed down
from the first man, and can now be v^ ell supported by the
clearest reason. And our relation to him not only lays
the foundation of many moral sentiments and duties, but

" The quotation is not from Cicero, bnt is a misprinted adaptation
from Tacitus (Annals VI. 6). Each MS. attempts the quotation in
full and garbles it.

Moral Philosophy 33

compleats the idea of morality and law, by subjecting us
to him, and teaching us to conceive of him,^ not only as
our Maker, preserver and benefactor, but as our righteous
governor and supreme judge. As the being and perfec-
tions of God are irrefragably established, the obligation of
duty must ultimately rest here.

It ought not to be forgotten that the belief or appre-
hension of a future state of rewards and punishments, has
been as universal as the belief of a deity, and seems insep-
arable from it, and therefore must be considered as the
sanction of the moral law. Shaftsbury inveighs severely
against this as making man virtuous from a mercenary
view; but there are two ways in which we may consider
this matter, and in either light his objections have little
force. ( I ) . We may consider the primary obligations of
virtue as founded upon a sense of its own excellence,
joined with a sense of duty and dependance on the su-
preme being, and rewards and punishments as a second-
ary motive, which is found in fact, to be absolutely neces-
sary to restrain or reclaim men from vice and impiety. Or
(2.) We may consider that by the light of nature as well
as by revelation, the future reward of virtue is considered
as a state of perfect virtue, and the happiness is represent-
ed as arising from this circumstance. Here there is noth-
ing at all of a mercenary principle, but only an expectation
that true goodness, which is here in a state of imperfec-
tion and liable to much opposition, shall then be improved
to the highest degree, and put beyond any possibility of
change.

' MS. C omits this clause.

34 Moral Philosophy

We may add to these obligations the manifest tendency
of a virtuous conduct to promote even our present happi-
ness: this in ordinary cases it does, and when joined
with the steady hope of futurity, does in all cases produce
a happiness superior to what can be enjoyed in the prac-
tice of vice. Yet perhaps, the stoics of old, who denied
pain to be any evil, and made the wise man superior to
all the vicissitudes of fortune, carried things to a romantic
and extravagant height. And so do some persons in mod-
ern times, who setting aside the consideration of a future
state, teach that virtue is its own reward. There are many
situations in which, if you deprive a good man of the
hope of future happiness, his state seems very undesir-
able. On the contrary, sometimes the worst of men enjoy
prosperity and success to a great degree, nor do they seem
to have any such remorse, as to be an adequate punish-
ment of their crimes. If any should insist, that a good
man has always some comfort from within and a bad
man a self-disapprobation and inward disquiet, suited to
their characters, I would say that this arises from the ex-
pectation of a future state, and a hope on the one side, and
fear on the other, of their condition there.

Those who declaim so highly of virtue being its own
reward in this life, take away one of the most considerable
arguments, which from the dawn of philosophy, has al-
ways been made use of, as a proof of a future state, viz.
the unequal distribution of good and evil in this life.
Besides they do not seem to view the state of bad men
properly. When they talk of remorse of conscience, as
a sufficient punishment, they forget that this is seldom to

Moral Philosophy 35

a high degree, but in the case of some gross crimes.
Cruelty and murder, frequent acts of gross injustice, are
sometimes followed with deep horror of conscience; and a
course of intemperance or lust is often attended with such
dismal effects upon the body, fame and fortune, that those
who survive it a few years, are a melancholy spectacle,
and a burden to themselves and others. But it would be
very loose morality, to suppose none to be bad men, but
those who were under the habitual condemnation of con-
science. On the contrary, the far greater part are blinded
in their understandings, as well as corrupt in their prac-
tice'— They deceive themselves, and are at peace. Ignor-
ance and inattention keep the multitude at peace. And
false principles often produce self-justification and ill-
founded peace, even in atrocious crimes. Even common
robbers are sometimes found to justify themselves, and
say — I must live — I have a right to my share of provi-
sion, as well as that proud fellow that rolls in his chariot.

The result of the whole is that the obligation to virtue
ought to take in all the following particulars : A sense
of its own intrinsic excellence — of its happy consequences
in the present life — a sense of duty and subjection to the
Supreme Being — and a hope of future happiness, and
fear of future misery from his decision.

Having^ considered the reasonings on the nature, foun-
dation and obligation of virtue, I now proceed to a more
particular detail of the moral laws, and shall take them
under the three heads formerly mentioned, Ethics, Poli-
tics and Jurisprudence.

*The MSS. transfer this paragraph to the beginning of Lecture
VI.

36 Moral Philosophy

LECTURE VI.

As to the iirst we must begin with what is usually called
the states of man, or several lights or relations in
which he may be considered, as laying a foundation for
duty. These states may be divided into two kinds — (i.)
Natural. (2.) Adventitious.

The natural states may be enumerated thus: (i.) His
state with regard to God, or natural relation to him.
(2.) To his fellow-creatures. (3.) Solitude or society.
(4.) Peace or war. Perhaps we may add to these (5.)
His outward provision, plenty or want.

These are called natural states, because they are neces-
sary and universal. All men and at all times are related
to God. They were made by him, and live by his provi-
dence. We must also necessarily know our fellow-crea-
tures, and their state to be similar to ours in this respect
and many others. A man must at all times be independ-
ent or connected with society — at peace with others, or at
war — well provided, or in want.

The other states are called adventitious, because they
are the effect of choice and the fruit of industry, as mar-
riage— family — master and servant — particular^ volun-
tary societies — callings or professions — characters or
abilities natural and acquired — offices in a constituted
society — property, and many particular modifications of
each of these.

In prosecuting the subject farther, and giving an analy-
sis of the moral duties founded upon these states. I shall

' MSS. A and B insert and.

Moral Philosophy r^y

first take notice of our relation to God, with the proofs of
his being- and perfections, and then consider the moral
laws under three heads ; our duty to God. to our neighbor,
and to ourselves.

I. Our duty to God. To this place I have reserved
what was to be said upon the proof of the being of God,
the great foundation of all natural religion ; without which
the moral sense would be weak and insufficient.

The proofs of the being of God are generally divided
into two kinds, (i.) A priori. (2.) A posteriori. The
first is, properly speaking, metaphysical reasoning down-
ward from the first principles of science or truth, and
inferring by just consequence the being and perfections of
God. Clark's Demonstration, &c. (if there be any thing
that should be called a priori, and if this is a conclusive
method of reasoning) is as complete as any thing ever
published.^ perhaps he has carried the i)rinci])lc as far as
it will go.

This way of arguing begins by establishing our own ex-
istence from consciousness. That we are not necessarily
existent, therefore must have a cause; that something
must have existed from all eternity, or nothing ever could
have existed ; that this being must exist by an internal ne-
cessity of nature ; that what exists necessarily must exist
alike every where; must be perfect; act every where:
be independent, omnipotent, omniscient, infinitely
good, just, true — Because as all these are evidently
perfections or excellencies, that which exists by a neces-
sity of nature must be possessed of every perfection. And

* MS. A as anything can be established.

38 Moral Philosophy

the contrary of these virtues implying weakness or insuf-
ficiency, cannot be found in the infinite being.

The other medium^ of proof, commonly called a pos-
teriori, begins with contemplating the universe in all its
parts; observing that it contains many irresistible proofs
that it could not be eternal, could not be without a cause ;
that this cause must be intelligent ; and from the astonish-
ing greatness, the wonderful adjustment and complica-
tion of things, concludes that we can set no bounds to
the perfection of the Maker, because we can never ex-
haust the power, intelligence and benignity that we see
in his works. In this way of arguing we deduce the
moral perfections of the deity from the faint resemblances
of them that we see in ourselves. As we necessarily con-
ceive justice, goodness, truth, &c. to be perfections or
excellencies, we are warranted by the plainest reason to
ascribe them to the divine being in an infinite degree.

There is perhaps at bottom no difference between these
ways of reasoning, because they must in some degree,
rest upon a common principle, viz. that every thing that
exists must have a cause. This is equally necessary to
both the chains of reasoning, and must itself be taken
for an original sentiment of nature, or an impression nec-
essarily made upon us from all that we see and are con-
versant with. About this and some other ideas great stir
has been made by some infidel writers, particularly Da-
vid Hume, who seems to have industriously endeavored
to shake the certainty of our belief upon cause and effect,
upon personal identity and the idea of power. It is easy
to raise metaphysical subtleties, and confound the under-

' MS. C method.

Moral Philosophy 39

standing on such subjects. In opposition to this, some late
writers have advanced with great apparent reason, that
there are certain first principles or dictates of common
sense, which are either simple perceptions, or seen with
intuitive evidence. These are the foundation of all
reasoning, and without them, to reason is a word
without a meaning. They can no more be proved than
you can prove an axiom in mathematical science. These*
authors of Scotland have lately produced and supported
this opinion, to resolve at once all the refinements and
metaphysical objections of some infidel writers.

There is a different sort of argument often made use
of, or brought in aid of the others for the being of God,
viz. the consent of all nations, and the universal preva-
lence of that belief. I know not whether we must say that
this argument rests also upon the principle that nothing
can exist without a cause, or upon the plan just now men-
tioned. If it is an universal dictate of our nature, we
must take it as true immediately, without further exami-
nation.

An author I formerly mentioned has set this argument
in a peculiar light (Dr. Wilson of New Castle). He says
that we receive all our knowledge, as philosophers ad-
mit,^ by sensation and reflection. Now, from all that we
see, and all the reflection and abstraction upon it we are
capable of, he afiirms it is impossible we could ever fomi
the idea of a spirit or a future state. They have, however,
been early and universal, and therefore must have been
communicated at first, and handed down by information

* MSS. A and P. Three. MS. C The. "• M.S. C omits the phrase.

40 Moral Philosophy

and instruction from age to age. So that unless upon the
supposition of the existence of God, and his imparting the
knowledge of himself to men, it is impossible that any idea
of him could ever have entered into the human mind.
There is something ingenious and a good deal of proba-
bility in this way of reasoning.

As to the nature of God, the first thing to be observed
is the unity of God. This is sufficiently established
upon the reasonings both a priori and posteriori. If these
reasonings are just for the being of God, they are strictly
conclusive for the unity of God. There is a necessity for
the existence of one supreme being, the first cause, but
no necessity for more; nay, one supreme independent
being does not admit any more. And when we view
the harmony, order and unity of design in the created
system, we must be led to the belief of the unity of God.

Perhaps it may be thought an objection to this (espe-
cially if we lay any stress on the universal sentiments of
mankind,) that all nations have been so prone to the be-
lief and worship of a plurality of gods. But this argu-
ment is rather specious than solid ; as however prone
men were to worship local inferior deities, they seem
to have considered them only as intermediate divinities
and intercessors between them and the Supreme God.

The perfections of God may be divided into two kinds,
Natural and Moral.

I. The natural perfections of God are spirituality, im-
mensity, wisdom and power.

We call these natural perfections, because they can be
easily distinguished, and in idea at least separated, from

Moral F/iilosopliy 41

goodness of disposition. It is highly probable indeed that
supreme excellence, natural and moral, must always re-
side in the same subject, and are truly inseparable ; yet we
distinguish them not only because the ideas are distinct,
but because they are by no means in proportion to one
another in inferior natures. Great powers of mind and
perfection of body are often joined to malignity of dispo-
sition. It is not so however in God; for as his natural
perfections are founded on reason, so his moral excellence
is evidently founded in the moral sense or conscience
which he hath implanted in us.

Spirituality is what we may call the very nature of
God. It must be admitted that we cannot at present form
any complete or adequate idea of a spirit. And some,
as you have heard formerly, insist that without revelation
we could never have acquired the idea of it that we have.
Yet there are many who have reasoned in a very strong
and seemingly conclusive manner to show that mind or
intelligence must be a substance altogether distinct from
matter. That all the known properties of matter are in-
capable of producing thought, as being wholly of a dif-
ferent kind — that matter as such and universally is inert
and^ divisible ; thought or intelligence, active and uncom-
pounded. See the best reasoning on this subject in Bax-
ter's Immateriality of the Soul.'^

Immensity in the Divine Being is that by which he is

" MS. A omits inert and.

' Andrew Baxter, "An enquiry into the nature of the human soul ;
wherein the immateriality of the soul is evinced from the principles
of reason and philosophy", London, 1730 (?). Dr. Witherspoon's
copy is in the Library of Princeton University.

42 Moral Philosophy

every where, and equally present. Metaphysicians,
however, differ greatly upon this subject. The Cartesi-
ans will not admit that place is at all applicable to spirits.
They say it is an idea wholly arising from extension,
which is one of the peculiar and essential qualities of
matter. The Newtonians, however, who make so much
use of the idea of infinite space, consider place as essen-
tial to all substance, spirit as well as matter. The diffi-
culties are great on both sides. It is hard to conceive of
spirit at all, separating from it the qualities of matter,
and after we have attempted to do so it seems to be bring-
ing them back to talk of place. And yet it seems not
only hard but impossible to conceive of any real being
without supposing it in some place, and particularly upon
the immensity of the Deity, it seems to be putting cre-
ated spirits too much on a level with the infinite spirit to
deny his immensity. It is I think certain they are either
confined to a place, or so limited in their operations as is
no way so well expressed as by saying we are here and
no where else. And in this sense both parties must ad-
mit the divine immensity^ — that his agency is equal, uni-
versal and irresistible.

Wisdom is another natural attribute of God, imply-
ing infinite knowledge — that all things in all their rela-
tions, all things existing, and all things possible, are the
objects of the divine knowledge. Wisdom is usually
considered as respecting some end to be attained, and it
implies the clear discovery of the best and most eflPectual
means of attaining it.

Power is the being able to do all things without limit

Moral Philosophy 43

or restraint. The omnipotence of God is always consid-
ered as an essential perfection, and seems to arise imme-
diately from creation and providence. It is common to
say that God can do all things except such as imply a
contradiction — such as to make a thing to be and not to
be at the same time; but this is unnecessary and foolish
in the way of an exception, for such things are not the
objects of power at all. They are mere absurdities in
our conception^ and indeed we may say of our own cre-
ation. All things are possible with God — nothing can
withstand his power.

LECTURE VII.

2d. The moral perfections of God are holiness, justice,
truth, goodness and mercy.

Holiness is sometimes taken in a general and compre-
hensive sense, as being the aggregate, implying the pres-
ence of all moral excellence; yet it is sometimes used
and that both in the scripture revelation and by heathen
writers as a peculiar attribute. In this limited sense it is
extremely difficult to define or explain. Holiness is that
character of God to which veneration, or the most pro-
found reverence in us, is the correspondent affection. It
is sometimes also expressed by purity, and when we go
to form an idea of it perhaps we can scarce say any thing
better than that it is his being removed at an infinite dis-
tance from the grossness of material indulgence.

*MSS. A and B omit rest of sentence.

44 Moral Philosophy

Justice is an invariable determination to render to all
their due. Justice seems to be founded on the strong and
unalterable perception we have of right and wrong, good
and evil, and particularly that the one deserves reward,
and the other punishment. The internal sanction, or
the external and providential sanction of natural laws,
point out to us the justice of God. The chief thing that
merits attention upon this subject is the controversy about
what is called the vindictive justice of God. That is
to say, is there in God, or have we a natural sense of
the propriety^ of, a disposition to inflict punishment in-
dependent of the consequences, viz. the reformation of
the offender, or the example of others. This loose
moralists often declaim against. Yet it seems plain, that
the sense in our minds of good and ill desert, makes
guilt the proper object of punishment simply in itself.
This may have a relation to general order and the good
of the whole, which however is out of our reach.

The truth of God is one of his perfections, greatly
insisted upon in Scripture, and an essential part of nat-
ural religion. It is inseparable from infinite perfection;
for any departure from truth must be considered as aris-
ing from weakness or necessity. What end could be
served to a self sufficient and all sufficient being by false-
hood or deception.

Goodness in God is a disposition to communicate hap-
piness to others. This is easily understood. The crea-
tion is a proof of it — Natural and moral evil no just ob-
jection to it, because of the preponderancy of happiness.

' MS. A propensity.

Moral Philosophy 45

Mercy, as distinguished from goodness or benignity, is
his being of a placable nature — Ready to forgive the
guilty, or to remit deserved punishment. It has been dis-
puted how far mercy or placability is discoverable by
reason. It is not mercy or forgiveness, unless it would
have been just at the same time to have punished. There
are but two ways by which men from reason may infer the
attribute of mercy to belong to the Deity. ( i ) Because we
ourselves are sensible of this disposition, and see in it a
peculiar beauty. (2) From the forbearance of Providence
that sinners are not immediately overtaken with punish-
ment, but have space given them to repent. — Yet as all
the conclusions drawn from these principles must be
vague and general, the expectations of the guilty found-
ed upon them, must be very uncertain. We must con-
clude therefore, that however stable a foundation there is
for the other attributes of God in nature and reason,
the way in which and the terms on which, he will shew
mercy, can be learned from Revelation only.-

Having considered the being and perfections of God.
we proceed to our duty to him.

This may be considered in two views, as general and
special, i. By the first I understand our duty to obey
him and submit to him in all things. This you see in-
cludes every branch of moral duty to our neighbor and
ourselves, as well as to God, and so the particular parts
of it will be considered afterwards. But in this place,
considering every good action as an act of obedience to

^ MS. C adds see Dr. Leland's inews of Deistical Zifriters, i.e. John
Leland, "A view of the principal deistical writers that have appeared
in England during the last and present century", ( 1754-56.)

46 Moral Philosophy

God, we will a little attend to the divine sovereignty and
the foundation of it.

In speaking of the foundation of virtue I took in a
sense of dependance and subjection to God.' — But as
men are not to be deterred from bold inquiries, a further
question is raised by some — what is properly the founda-
tion of the divine dominion? (i) Some found it directly
upon Omnipotence. It is impossible to resist his power.
This seems to lay us under a necessity, rather than to
convince us of duty. We ought however, to think and
speak of this subject with reverence, and certainly Om-
nipotence seems to oblige us to actual, if it should not
bring us to willing obedience. It is somewhat remark-
able, that in the book of Job,^ composed on purpose to
resolve some difficulties in providence, where God is
brought in as speaking himself out of the whirlwind, he
makes use of no other argument than his tremendous
majesty and irresistible power. Yet to rest the matter
wholly upon this, seems much the same as founding vir-
tue on mere will; — therefore (2) some found the divine
dominion on his infinite excellence, they say it is the
law of reason that the wisest should rule, and therefore
that infinite perfection is entitled to universal sway.
Even this, taken separate and alone, does not seem wholly
to satisfy the mind. If one person is wiser than another,
it seems reasonable that the other should learn of him and
imitate him ; but it scarcely seems a sufficient reason that
the first should have absolute authority. But perhaps the
weakness of the argument, taken in this view, may arise

'MS. C adds see Job chapters 38 and 40 verse 6th, and omits
composed .... providence.

Moral Philosophy 47

from the inconsiderable difference between man and man,
when compared to the superiority of universal and un-
changeable perfection. (3) Some found it upon creation.
They say, that God has an absolute property in all his
creatures, he may therefore do what he will with his
own. This no doubt, goes a good way, and carries con-
siderable force with it to the mind, the rather that, as you
will afterwards see, it is something similar to this in us,
that lays the foundation of our most perfect rights, viz.
That the product of our own industry is properly at
our own disposal.

As upon the foundation of virtue I thought it necessary
to unite the principles of different writers, so upon this
subject, I think that all the three particulars mentioned,
ought to be admitted, as the grounds of the divine do-
minion. Omnipotence, infinite excellence, and the origi-
nal production and continual preservation of all creatures.

2. Our duty to God may be considered more specially,
as it points out the duties we owe immediately to himself.

These may be divided into internal and external.^ —
1st. The internal are all included under the three follow-
ing, love, fear, and trust.

The love of God, which is the first and great duty
both of natural and revealed religion, may be explained
in a larger and more popular, or in a more precise and
stricter way.

In the first, love may be resolved into the four follow-
ing acts, (i) esteem, (2) gratitude, (3) Benevolence, (4)
desire.

These four will be found inseparable from true love;

48 Moral Philosophy

and it is pretty much in the same order, that the acts
succeed one another. Love is founded on esteem, on the
real or supposed good quahties of the object. You can
no more love that which you despise than that which you
hate. Gratitude is also inseparable from it, to have a
lively sense of favors received, and to esteem them for
the sake of the person from whom they came. Benevo-
lence or rejoicing in the happiness and wishing well to the
object. And lastly, a desire of a place in his esteem.^
Whatever we love, we desire to possess, as far as it is suit-
ed to our faculties.

The stricter, and more precise method of considering
the love of God, is to divide it into two branches, benev-
olence and desire. And indeed our affections to God
seem to be capable of the same division as our affection to
our fellow-creatures, benevolent and selfish. I think it
undeniable, that there is a disinterested love of God, which
terminates directly upon himself, without any immediate
view to our own happiness — as well as a discovery of our
great interest in his favor.

The second great duty to God, is fear; but here we
must carefully distinguish this affection from one which
bears the name, and is different from it — at least in a
moral view it is altogether opposite.' — Dutiful fear is what
may be otherwise called veneration, and hath for its ob-
ject the infinity of the divine perfection in general, but
particularly his majesty and greatness. The other is
merely a fear of evil or punishment from him : these are
called sometimes a filial and a servile fear. The first in-
creases, as men improve in moral excellence, and the

^MS. -A is more explicit his or her esteem, male or female.

Moral Philosophy 49

other is destroyed. Perfect love casteth out fear. Per-
haps however opposite, as they have the same name, they
may be said to be the same natural affection, only as it
takes place in innocent or holy, and in guilty creatures.
The same majesty of God, which produces veneration in
the upright, produces horror and apprehension of punish-
ment in the guilty.

The third great duty is trust. This is a continual de-
pendance on God for every thing we need, together with
and approbation of, and absolute resignation to his prov-
idence.

2. The external duties to God, I shall briefly pass over,
being only, all proper and natural expressions of the in-
ternal sentiments.

It may be proper however, to take notice in general of
the worship due to God, that whether we consider the na-
ture of things, or the universal practice of mankind, in
all ages, worship, and that not only private, but public
and social worship is a duty of natural religion.

Some of the enemies of revealed religion, have spoken
with great virulence against this, as unreasonable, and
even dishonorable to the Divine Being. The substance of
what they say, is this, is that as it would be no part of the
character of an eminent and good man, to desire and take
pleasure in others praising him and recounting his good
qualities, so it is absurd to suppose, that the Supreme Be-
ing is pleased with incense, sacrifices and praises. But it
ought to be observed, that he does not require these acts
and exercises as any gratification to himself, but as in
themselves just and necessary and suited to the revelation

50 Moral Philosophy

we stand in to him, and useful for forming our temper
and universal practice. We ought also to remember, that
we must not immediately and without discrimination, rea-
son from what would be praise and blame-worthy among
men, to what would be just or unjust in God, because the
circumstances are very different. Besides, though for any
man to desire the applause of his fellow-creatures, or be
pleased with adulation, would be a mean and contempti-
ble character, because indeed there is such unspeakable
imperfection in the best of men, yet when any duty or
sentiment is fully and manifestly due from man to man,
there is nothing improper or dishonorable in requiring or
expecting it. Thus a parent requires respect and submis-
sion from his children, a master from his servants ; and
though the injury is merely personal, he thinks himself
entitled to punish every expression of contempt or disre-
gard. Again, every man who has bestowed signal favors
upon another, expects to see evidence of a grateful and
sensible mind, and severely condemns every sentiment or
action that indicates a contrary disposition.

On the whole then, we see that if the worship of God
be what is due from us to him in consequence of the
relation we stand in to him, it is proper and necessary that
he should require it. To honor God is to honor supreme
excellence; for him not to expect and demand it, would
be to deny himself.

One other difficulty I shall touch upon a little. It re-
spects the duty of prayer; and the objections lie equally
against it on the footing of natural religion and revealed.
The objections are two. ( i.) Why does God who perfectly

Moral Philosophy 3 r

knows all our wants, require and expect prayer before he
will supply them? To this I would answer that he sup-
plies great multitudes of our wants without asking it;
and as to his requiring the duty of prayer, I say the same
thing as of worship in general ; it is reasonable and neces-
sary to express, and to increase upon our minds, a sense of
dependance, and thereby lay us under an obligation of
properly improving what we receive. (2.) The other ob-
ligation^ is with regard to the force or efficacy of prayer.
Why it is said should we pray when the whole system
of divine providence is fixed and unalterable ? Can we pos-
sibly suppose that God will change his purposes, from a
regard to our cries or tears? To this some answer no
otherwise than as before, that without having any effect
upon the event, it has only an effect upon our minds, in
bringing us to a right temper. Dr. Leechman of Glasgow,
in his discourse on prayer, makes no other answer to this
difficulty. But I think to rest it here, and admit that it
has no influence in the way of causality upon the event,
would in a great measure break the force and fervency of
prayer. I would therefore say further, that prayer has
a real efficacy on the event, and just as much as any other
second cause. The objection arises from going beyond
our depth, and reasoning from the unchangeable purpose
of God to human actions, which is always unjust and falla-
cious.— However unable we may be to explain il, not-
withstanding the fixed plan of providence, there is a real
influence of second causes both natural and moral, and I
apprehend the connection between cause and effect is sim-

' MSS. A and C objection, an obviously correct reading not found
in any of the editions.

vy

52 Moral Philosophy

ilar in both cases. If it is fixed from eternity that there
shall be a plentiful crop upon a certain field I know that
nothing whatsoever can prevent it, if otherwise the efforts
of the whole creation cannot produce it; yet I know as
certainly that, hypothetically, if it is not ploughed and
sown there will be no grain upon it, and that if it be prop-
erly manured and dressed it will probably be fruitful.
Thus in moral matters, prayer has as real an influence in
procuring the blessing as ploughing and sowing has in
procuring the crop ; and it is as consistent with the estab-
lished order of nature and the certainty of events in the
one case, as in the other : for this reason the stoical fate
of old, was called the ignava ratio of the stoics, as they
sometimes made use of the above fallacious reasoning.

LECTURE VIII.

2. We come now to our duty to man. This may be
reduced to a short sum, by ascending to its principle.
Love to others, sincere and active, is the sum of our
duty.

Benevolence, I formerly observed, ought not to be con-
sidered as the whole of virtue, but it certainly is the prin-
ciple and sum of that branch of duty which regards
others.

We may distinguish between ( i ) particular kind affec-
tion, and (2) a calm and deliberate good-will to all. — The
particular kind affections, as to family, friends, country,
seem to be implanted by nature, to strengthen the general

Moral Philosophy 53

principle, for it is only or chiefly by doing good to those
we are particularly related to, that we can promote the
general happiness.

Particular kind affections should be restrained and di-
rected by a calm good-will to all. Wherever our attach-
ments to private persons prevents a greater good, they be-
come irregular and excessive.

Some think that a calm and settled good will to others,
is an improvement of the particular affections, and arises
from the more narrow to the more extensive; from
family, friends, country, to all our fellow creatures. But
it seems more reasonable to say, that the general affection
is a dictate of our conscience of a superior kind. If it
were only an increase and extension of the private affec-
tion it would grow more weak, as the distance from our-
selves increased, whereas in fact the more enlarged affec-
tions are intended to be more powerful than the confined.

When we are speaking of kind affections, it will not
be improper to observe that some unbelievers have ob-
jected against the gospel, that it does not recommend
private friendship and the love of our country. But if
fairly considered, as the Scripture, both by example and
precept, recommends all particular affections, so it is to
its honor that it sets the love of mankind above them
every one, and by so much insisting on the forgiveness
of injuries and the love of enemies, it has carried benev-
olence to its greatest perfection. The parable of the
Samaritan in answer to the question, who is my neigh-
bor? is one of the greatest beauties in moral painting
any where to be seen.

54 Moral Philosophy

The love of our country to be sure, is a noble and
enlarged affection, and those who have sacrificed private
ease and family relations to it, have become illustrious,
yet the love of mankind is still greatly superior. Some-
times attachment to country appears^ in a littleness of
mind, thinking all other nations'^ inferior, and foolishly
believing that knowledge, virtue and valor are all confined
to themselves. As the Romans long ago made the Punka
fides to mean deceit, so there are not wanting among us
those who think that all the French are interested,
treacherous and cowardly.

On the great law of love to others, I shall only say
further that it ought to have for its object their greatest
and best interest, and therefore implies wishing and
doing them good in soul and body.

It is necessary now to descend to the application of
this principle to particular duties, and to examine what
are the rights or claims that one man has upon another.
Rights and obligations are correlative terms. Whatever
others have a just right or title to claim from me. that is
my duty, or what I am obliged to do to them.

Righf^ in general may be reduced, as to its source, to
the supreme law of moral duty ; for whatever men are in
duty obliged to do, that they have a claim to, and other
men are considered as under an obligation to permit them.
Again, as our own happiness is a lawful object or end,
we are supposed to have each a right to prosecute this;
but as our prosecutions may interfere we limit each others
rights, and a man is said to have a right or power to

*MS. C inserts to have its foundation. "MSS. A and B relations.
*MS. B omits this paragraph.

Moral Philosophy 55

promote his own happiness by those means which are not
in themselves criminal or injurious to others.

Rights may be divided or classed in several different
ways; an attention to all of which is of use on this sub-
ject. Right may be (i) natural or acquired. Natural
rights are such as are essential to man, and universal. —
acquired are those that are the fruits of industry, the ef-
fects of accident or conquest."* A man has a natural right
to act for his own preservation and to defend himself
from injury, but not a natural right to domineer,^ to riches
(comparatively speaking) or to any particular office in a
constituted state.

(2.) Rights are considered as j)erfect and imperfect.
Those are called perfect rights which can be clearly as-
certained in their circumstances, and which we may make
use of force to obtain when they are denied us. Imper-
fect rights are such as we may demand, and others ought
to give us, yet we have no title to compel them. Self-
preservation is a perfect right, but to have a grateful re-
turn for a favor is not a perfect right.

All the duties of justice are founded on the perfect
rights ; those of mercy generally on the imperfect rights.

The violation of an imperfect right is often as great
an act of immorality as that of a perfect right. It is often
as immoral, or more so, to refuse to supply the neces-
sitous, or to do it too sparingly, as to commit a small in-
jury against a man's person or fortune. Yet the last is
the breach of perfect right, and the other of an imper-
fect.

* The MSS. read compact. " MSS. A and B dominion, and MS. C
omits to domineer.

56 Moral Philosophy

Human^ laws reach only, in ordinary cases, to the per-
fect rights. Sometimes imperfect rights by being car-
ried far become perfect, as humanity and gentleness in
a parent to a child may be so grossly violated as to war-
rant the interposition of human authority.

(3.) Rights are alienable and unalienable. The first
we may, according to justice and prudence, surrender or
give up by our own act ; the others we may not. A man
may give away his own goods, lands, money. There
are several things which he cannot give away, as a right
over his own knowledge, thoughts, &c. Others''^ which he
ought not, as a right to judge for himself in all matters
of religion, his right to self-preservation, provision, &c.
Some say that liberty is unalienable, and that those who
have even given it away may lawfully resume it.

The distinction between rights as alienable and unalien-
able is very different from that of natural and acquired.
Many of the rights which are strictly natural and univer-
sal may be alienated in a state of society for the good of
the whole as well as of private persons; as for example,
the right of self-defence; this is in a great measure given
up in a state of civil government into the hands of the
public — and the right of doing justice to ourselves or to
others in matters of property, is wholly given up.

(4.) Rights may be considered as they differ with re-
gard to their object, i. Rights we have over our own
persons and actions. This class is called liberty. 2.
Rights over things or goods which belong to us. This is
called property. 3. Rights over the persons and actions
of other men. This is called authority. 4. Rights in the
•MS. C omits sentence. ''MSS. B and C omit this sentence.

Moral Philosophy 57

things which are the property of others, which are of
several sorts.

When we come to the second great division of moral
philosophy, politics, the above distinctions will be more
fully explained — at present it is sufficient to point at them
in order to show what are the great lines^ of duty from
man to man.

Our duty to others, therefore, may be all comprehend-
ed in these two particulars, justice andmercy.

Justice consists in giving or permiting others to enjoy
whatever they have a perfect right to — and making such
an use of our own rights as not to encroach upon the
rights of others. There is one writer, David Hume,
who has derided'^ the duty of justice, resolving it wholly
into power and conveniency, and has affirmed that prop-
erty is common, than which nothing can be more con-
trary to reason; for if there is anything clear as a dictate
of reason, it is, that there are many rights which men
severally possess, which others ought not to violate. The
foundation of property in goods, I will afterwards show
you is plainly laid in the social state.

Another virtue which this author ridicules is chastity.
This however will be found to be included in justice,
and to be found in the sentiments of all nations, and to
have the clearest foundation both in nature and public
utility.

Mercy is the other great branch of our duty to man,
and is the exercise of the benevolent principle in general,
and of the several particular kind affections. Its acts,
generally speaking, belong to the class of imperfect rights,

•MS. A laivs; MS. C kinds. 'MS. C denied.

(^

58 Moral Philosophy

which are strongly binding upon the conscience, and ab-
solutely necessary to the subsistence of human society ; yet
such as cannot be enforced with rigor and precision by
human laws.

Mercy may be generally explained by a readiness to do
all the good offices to others that they stand in need of,
and are in our power, unless they are opposed to some
perfect right, or an imperfect one of greater moment.

LECTURE IX.

3. The third class of moral duties is what contains
our duty to ourselves.

This branch of duty is as real and as much founded in
the moral principle, as any of the former — Conscience as
clearly testifies the evil of neglecting it — and vicious con-
duct in this respect does generally lead us directly not
only to misery, but to shame.

We may, I think, divide our duties to ourselves into
two heads, which will be both distinct and comprehensive,
(i.) Self-government. (2.) Self-interest.

The first of these is to keep our thoughts, desires and
affections, in due moderation. If it be asked what is due
moderation, I answer it may be discovered three ways,
(i.) When the indulgence interferes with our duty to
God, (2.) To ourselves, and, (3.) To our neighbor.

When our thoughts or desires are such as to be contra-
ry to the love, fear, or trust we owe to God, then they are
to be restrained and brought into subjection. — Thus are

Moral Philosophy 59

generated the virtues of humility, contentment, patience,
and such as are allied to them.

When our thoughts and inward temper are such as to
I>e any way injurious to others, they must be governed
and restrained; hence arises the obligation to guard
against all the immoraP passions, which will produce
meekness and composure of spirit.

And when we have got but a little experience we shall
speedily find that an excessive indulgence of any passion,
love, hatred, anger, fear, discomposes us exceedingly,
and is an evil instead of a blessing. We shall therefore
perceive the necessity of continence, self-denial, forti-
tude, restraint, and moderation in every thing how good
soever. (2.) The other general branch of duty to our-
selves may be called sd.f-intere^t"This, taking in natural
religion, includes our relation to the Divine Being, and
attending particularly to that'-^ of procuring his favor.
Therefore it is a prime part of our duty to ourselves, to
guard against any thing that may be hurtful to our moral l^'
^character, or religious hopes.

2. We ought to be active and diligent in acquiring
every thing necessary for life and comfort. Most of our
duties to ourselves, resemble the duties of justice and
mercy to others. If there are certain offices due to them,
and if they have rights and claims in consequence of
their state and relations, the same is the case with our-
selves. We are therefore to take all proper methods
to preserve and acquire the goods both of mind and body.

'MSS. A and C irascible; MS. B invisible. 'The MSS. read the

ii>ay.

6o Moral Philosophy

To acquire knowledge, to preserve health, reputation,
possessions.

The whole must be kept within some limits; chiefly
we must guard against interfering with the rights of
others.

It will be proper before concluding this part of the sub-
ject, to take notice of the opinions of the ancients, par-
ticularly their enumeration of what are called the cardi-
nal virtues.

Their cardinal virtues were justice, temperance, prur-
dence, and fortitude. Justice included the whole of our
duty to our neighbor. Humanity or benevolence you
see is kept out of view, though a virtue of the first ciass;
but all its exercises are with them ranked under the heads^
of justice; temperance was by them considered as much
more extensive than being moderate in the use of meats
and drink, to which the English word is chiefly confined.
The EvKpareia of the Greeks signified not only abstinence
in meats and drink, but continence or purity, and a moder-
ation of all our desires of whatever kind, of fame and
riches, as well as pleasures. Prudence, even in the way
they generally explain it, seems scarcely to be a moral, or*
so much as a natural quality. Prudence they say is taking
the wisest course to obtain some good end. The placing
this among the cardinal virtues will show how matters
stood among them. Great parts or talents were in high
esteem among them. They did not very fully distinguish
between a good man, and a great man. Prudence seems
rather an embellishment of an illustrious character, than
a moral virtue. Another reason why Prudence seems to

'The MSS. read head. * Omitted in the MSS.

Moral Philosophy 6i

have held such a place among the ancients was, that
their chief foundation for virtue was interest, or what will
produce happiness. The inquiry upon this subject was,
what is the summum bonum. Now to this, prudence is
very necessary. Agreeably to all this they commonly
called the virtuous man, the wise man, and he was al-
ways an hero.

Fortitude is easily understood, and may be considered
in two lights, as active and passive, which gives^ the two
great virtues of patience and valor.

One of the most remarkable qualities'^ in morals among
the ancients, was the debate upon the Stoical position,
that pain is no evil, nor pleasure any good. This arises
fiom comparing external things with the temper of the
mind, when it appears without doubt that the latter is of
much more consequence to happiness than the former.
They used to reason thus, — Outward possessions when
bestowed upon a bad man, make him no better but worse,
and finally more miserable. How then can these be
goods''' in themselves which become good or evil, accord-
ing to the state of him that uses them. They were there-
fore called the things indifferent. There was something
strained and extravagant in some of their writings, and
perhaps ostentatious, yet a great deal of true and just
reasoning. The most beautiful piece of antiquity in the
moral way, is the Tablature of Cebes.

Let us now recapitulate what we have gone through,

^MSS. A and B joins.

•The MSS. read questions which is obviously correct; but the error
is repeated in all the editions. 'MS. C good.

62 Moral Philosophy

and then add some observation or corrolaries on the mo-
rality of actions. We have considered,

1. The nature of man.

2. The nature, foundation, and obhgation of virtue.

3. Have given a sort of general analysis of the
moral laws as pointing out our duty to God, to our neigh-
bor, and ourselves.

We must now consider all morality in general as con-
formity to a law. We have seen above whence this law
is collected, and derives its authority. Men may differ,
not only as to the foundation but as to the import or
meaning of the law in some particulars, but it is always
supposed that the law exists.

The morality of actions may be considered in two dif-
ferent lights but these very nearly related to each other,
(i.) As they are ranked and disposed of by the law
itself (2) in the conformity or opposition of the actions
to the law.

Under the first view an action is either commanded,
forbidden, or permitted.

Commanded duties oblige absolutely, and as casuists
used to say, semper non vero ad semper, that is to say,
they are obligatory upon all persons, at the seasons that
are proper for them, but not upon every person at every
time ; because then there could be but one moral duty,
all men are obliged to worship God, but this only at
certain times, other duties have also their place and sea-
son.

Prohibitions oblige semper ad semper, all persons at
all times. — We must not lie — this obliges every man

Moral Philosophy 63

at every moment, because no time or circumstances can
make it lawful.

On permission we may observe several things.

1. There is (as some say,) a two-fold permission, the
one full and absolute, which not only gives us a right to
certain things with impunity, but implies a positive ap-
probation of the legislator, and the other implies only
that the action is left at large, being neither commanded
nor forbidden.

2. Permission in natural laws always implies the ap-
probation of the legislator, and whatever is done in con-
sequence of it, is innocently done, for God and con-
science does not permit or pass uncondemned^ any bad
action.

3. It is otherwise in human laws, if they leave any
action open, it may be done with impunity, and yet by
no means with approbation. I may have a right by
human laws to say things in a covered or couched man-
ner, which yet may carry in them the highest degree of
malignity.

4. The truth is when we consider the morality of
action in a strict or proper manner, the whole class of
permitted actions vanishes. They become by their in-
tention and application either good or bad.

Considering actions in their conformity to the laws, a
distinction arises^ similar to the former, into ^^ood or just,
bad and indifferent.

A good action must be wholly conformable to the law
in its substance, and in all its circumstances. It is not

' MS. C unpunished. " MSS. A and B insert sometimes.

64 Moral Philosophy

enough that it be materially good, the time must be
proper, and the intention laudabh.

A bad action is that which either in substance or in
any circumstance is contrary to the law.

In consequence of this, strictly and properly speaking,
all truly good or just actions are equally so, arising from
a perfect conformity to the law, as all straight lines are
equally straight, but all bad actions are not equally bad,
as lines may be bent in a different degree from the straight
direction.

Indifferent actions, (if there are any truly such,) are
those that are permitted, and neither commanded nor
forbidden by the law, but when we consider the spirit
and principles of true morality, we shall find no actions
wholly indift'erent, because we are under an obligation
to promote the happiness of ourselves and others, to
which every action may be applied immediately or re-
motely; and subjection to the Divine will may make a
part of our design in doing or forbearing any thing what-
ever.

In estimating the morality of actions several circum-
stances must be considered, (i) the good done (2) the
principle from which it flows, — self-interest of the con-
tracted kind, benevolence or hope of reward. (3) The
hindrances or opposition that must be surmounted, as
interest, inclination, difficulty. An objection seems to
arise from this, not easily solved. If an action is the more
virtuous, the more opposition, internal and external, that
is overcome, then the longer man has had the habit of
virtue, and the more completely it is formed, the less

Moral Philosophy 65

merit in his actions. It seems also to take away all moral
excellence from the Deity, who cannot be supposed
to have the least opposition to encounter either from with-
in or without. This objection cannot be easily removed,
but by saying, that the opposition is in no other respect an
evidence of the good moral temper, but as it shows the
strength of that inclination that overcomes it, and there-
fore, when a moral habit is so strong as to overcome and
annihilate all opposition, it is so much the more excel-
lent.

An action good in itself, may be made criminal by an
evil intention.

But no action, in itself evil, can be made lawful or
laudable by a good intention.

A man is obliged to follow the dictates of conscience;
yet a mistaken conscience does not wholly absolve from
guilt, because he ought to have been at more pains to ob-
tain information.

An action is not virtuous in proportion to its opposite
being vicious. It is no high degree of virtue to love our
offspring, or provide for a family ; but to neglect either is
exceedingly vicious.

One phenomenon in human nature, nearly connected
with the moral feelings, has been particularly considered
by some writers, viz. that there is such a disposition in
the generality of men to croud to see objects of distress,
as an extraordinary public execution. What is the de-
sire that prompts to it? Is the sight of misery a pleasant
feeling? Some resolve it merely into curiosity, which
they consider as a natural and original impression. But

66 Moral Philosophy

there seems to be something in it different from novelty. ,
Others say it arises from benevolence, and is an exer-
cise of compassion, and that we have a strong natural im-
pulse to the aft'ection of pity, and really feel a pleasure in
indulging it. But though every well disposed mind is
highly susceptible of pity, at least of all the benevolence
and help that pity suggests when the object presents itself,
we can scarcely say that the feeling is pleasant, or that we
have a desire after such objects, in order to the gratifica-
tion.

They who reason on the selfish scheme, as usual, resolve
all into private interest; they say we delight to see objects
of distress, because it gives a secret satisfaction in reflect-
ing upon our own different situation. I believe there is
such a satisfaction in narrow and contracted minds ; but to
those tolerably disposed it has an opposite effect ; it makes
them rather consider the calamities which they themselves
are subject to, than those from which they are free.

Perhaps it would be best to take more than one princi-
ple to account for this effect — curiosity must make a part,
and probably humanity and compassion, also contribute
to it. It seems to be thought some little alleviation to the
sufferer's misery when others pity him^ — Yet prudent
persons knowing how unavailing this pity is, often choose
to be absent.

Sympathy is a particular affection in aid of benevolence
— Yet like all other private affections, when it is not mod-
erated, it prevents its own effect — One deeply affected
with the view of an object of distress, is often thereby
incapacitated to assist him.

Another question is sometimes subjoined to the above.

Moral Philosophy 67

why men have pleasure in seeing Tragedy, which is a
striking representation of a melancholy catastrophe. As
far as the subject differs from Comedy, it may be account-
ed for on the same principles with the desire to see objects
of distress — But one powerful principle leads both to
Comedy and Tragedy — a pleasure in the imitative arts,
an exact portrait of any object whatever gives the highest
pleasure, even though the object itself were originally
terrible or disgusting.

We see plainly, that an indulgence of the pleasure
given by a fine performance is what crowds the theatre.
Unhappily, to give greater pleasure to a corrupt mind,
they often invent such scenes, and conduct the matter
so, as to make the stage^*^ the greatest enemy to virtue and
good morals.

LECTURE X.

Of Politics.

Politics contain the principles of social union, and
the rules of duty in a state of society. — This is but
another and more complete view of the same things
drawn out more fully, and applied to particular cases.

'" MS. C to make the greatest hero a enemy. Dr. Withcrspoon's
hostile attitude toward the stage is more strongly expressed in his
"Serious inquiry into the nature and effects of the stage" (Glasgow
1757), and in his "Letter respecting play-actors," both of which may
be found in his "Works." The "Letter" was dictated late in 1793 or
early in 1794 in criticism of a complimentary reference by Philip
Freneau in the National Gazette to the condition of the theatre in
America, and was so severe that no newspaper would publish it. Tt
appeared posthumously in the "Works."

68 Moral Philosophy

/ Political law is the authority of any society stampt
upon moral duty.

The first thing to be considered, in order to see upon
what principles society is formed, is the state immediately
previous to the social state. This is called the state of
nature — Violent and unnecessary controversies have been
made on that subject. Some have denied that any such
thing ever existed, that since there were men, they have
always been in a social state. And to be sure, this is so
far true, that in no example or^ fact, could it ever last
long. Yet it is impossible to consider society as a voluntary
union of particular persons, without supposing those per-
sons in a state somewhat different, before this union took
place — There^ are rights therefore belonging to a state of
nature, different from those of a social state.

And distinct societies or states independent, are at this
moment in a state of nature, or natural liberty, with re-
gard to each other.

Another famous question has been, Is the state of na-
ture a state of war or peace? Hobbes, an author of consid-
erable note, but of very illiberal sentiments in politics, is a
strenuous advocate for a state of nature being a state of
war. Hutchinson^ and Shaftsbury plead strongly, that a
state of nature is a state of society. However opposite
and hostile their opinions seem to be with regard to each
other, it seems no hard matter to reconcile them. That
the principles of our nature lead to society — that our hap-
piness and the improvement of our powers are only to be
had in society, is of the most undoubted certainty — and
that in our nature, as it is the work of God, there is a real

'MS. A in. "MS. C omits this sentence. ^ Hutcheson.

Moral Philosophy 69

good-will and benevolence to others : but on the other
hand, that our nature as it is now, when free and inde-
pendent, is prone to injury, and consequently to war, is
equally manifest, and that in a state of natural liberty,
there is no other way but force, for preserving security
and repelling injury. The inconveniences of the natural
state are very many.^

One class of the above-mentioned writers say, that na-
ture prompts to society, and the other, that necessity and
interest obliges to it — both are equally true.

Supposing then the state of natural liberty antecedent
to society to be a reality, let us consider the perfect and
imperfect rights belonging to that state, that we may see
more distinctly how, and why they differ in a social state.

The perfect rights in a state of natural liberty, are
(i.) a right to life. (2.) A right to employ his faculties
and industry for his own use. (3.) A right to things that
are common and necessary, as air, water, earth. (4.) A
right to personaP liberty. (5.) A power over his own life,
not to throw it away unnecessarily, but for a good reason.
(6.) A right of private judgment in matters of opinion.
(7.) A right to associate, if he so incline, with any person
or persons, whom he can persuade (not force) — Under
this is contained the right to marriage. (8.) A right
to character, that is to say, innocence (not fame) — It is
easy to perceive that all these rights belong to a state of
natural liberty, and that it would be unjust and unequal
for any individual to hinder or abridge another in any
one of them, without consent, or unless it be in just re-
taliation for injury received.

^ MS. C omits sentence. ° MS. A natural.

70 Moral Philosophy

The imperfect natural rights are very numerous, but
they are nearly the same in a state of nature as in a state
of society, as gratitude, compassion, mutual good offices —
if they will be no injury to the person performing them —
Indeed they must be the same in a natural and in a social
state, because the very definition of an imperfect right is
such as you cannot use force to obtain. Now, what you
ought not to use force to obtain in a state of natural
liberty, human laws in a well constituted state will not
give you.

Society I would define to be an association or compact
of any number of persons, to deliver up or abridge some
part of their natural rights, in order to have the strength
of the united body, to protect the remaining, and to be-
stow others.

Hobbes and some other writers of the former age, treat
with great contempt, this which is generally called the
social compact. — He insists that monarchy is the law of
nature. Few are of his sentiments now, at least in
Britain, yet it is proper to trace them to the foundation.

It is to be admitted, that society began first insensibly
by families, and almost necessarily. Hence parental au-
thority was the first law, and perhaps it extended for two
or three generations in the early ages. Though the pat-
rons of monarchy use this as an argument, it does not
favor their scheme — This which they call the patriarchal
government, could not extend far ; or supposing it could,
there would be but one rightful king in all the earth, the
lineal descendant of Adam's eldest son,^ not to mention

* MS. A omits eldest son.

Moral Philosophy 71

that the very order of succession in hereditary right, has
never been uniform, and is but of late, settled in the
European nations.

The truth is, though man for wise reasons, afterwards
to be noticed, continues longer in a family dependance,
than other animals, yet in time he becomes sui juris, and
when their numbers are increased, when they either con-
tinue together or remove and form distinct societies, it is
plain that there must be supposed an expressed or implied
contract.

Some say there is no trace or record of any such con-
tract in the beginning of any'^ society. But this is no ar«
gument at all, for things inseparable from, and essential
to any state, commonly take place so insensibly, that their
beginning is not observed.

When^ persons believe themselves upon the whole,
rather oppressed than protected in any society, they think
they are at liberty, either to rebel against it, or fly from
it; which plainly implies that their being subject to it.
arose from a tacit consent.

Besides in migrations and planting of colonies, in all
ages, we see evident traces of an original contract and
consent taken to the principles of union.

From this view of society as a voluntary compact, re-
sults this principle, that men are originally and by nature
equal, and consequently free.

Liberty either cannot, or ought not to be given up in

' MS. A every; MS. C bcginniny of society.

"MS. C Yet I believe there are some signs of such contracts in
early ages, when persons, etc., and punctuates with a semi-colon
after society. MS. A Many persons believe, etc.

^2 Moral Philosophy

the social state — The end of the union should be the pro-
tection of liberty, as far as it is a blessing. The definition
of liberty in a constituted government, will be afterwards
explained.

Some observe, that few nations or societies in the world
have had their constitutions formed on the principles of
liberty : perhaps not one twentieth of the states that have
been established since the beginning of the world have
been settled upon principles altogether favorable to liberty.
This is no just argument against natural liberty and the
rights of mankind ; for it is certain, that the public good
has always been the real aim of the people in general, in
forming and entering into any society. It has also con-
stantly been at least the professed aim of legislators.^
Therefore the principle seems to have been admitted, only
they have failed or been disappointed in practice, by mis-
take or deceit. Though perhaps not one twentieth part of
mankind have any tolerable skill in the fine arts, it does
not follow that there are no such arts, or that the princi-
ples of them are not founded in nature.

Reason teaches natural liberty, and common utility re-
commends it. Some nations have seen this more clearly
than others, or have more happily found the means of
establishing it.

Here perhaps we should consider a little the question,
whether it is lawful to make men or to keep them slaves,
without their consent? This will fall afterwards to be
considered more fully : in the mean time, observe that in
every state there must be some superior and others in-

" MS. A pretence of Legislature.

Moral Philosophy 73

ferior, and it is hard to fix the degree of subjection that
may fall to the lot of particular persons. Men may be-
come slaves, or their persons and labor be put wholly in
the power of others by consent. They may also some-
times in a constituted state, be made slaves by force, as
a punishment for the commission of crimes. But it is
certainly unlawful to make inroads upon others, unpro-
voked, and take away their liberty by no better right than
superior power.

It has sometimes been doubted, whether it is lawful to
take away the liberty of others for life, even on account
of crimes committed. There can be no strong reason given
against this, except that which is supposed to operate in
Great Britain against making malefactors slaves, that it
would be unfavorable to rationaF^ liberty to see any rank
of men in chains. But setting this aside, it seems plain
that if men may forfeit their lives to the society, they may
also forfeit their liberty, which is a less precious blessing.

It seems also more agreeable both to equity and^'
public utility to punish some sorts of crimes, with hard
labor, than death. Imprisonment for life, has been ad-
mitted and practised^- by all nations — Some have pleaded
for making slaves of the barbarous nations, that they are
actually brought into a more eligible state, and have
more of the comforts of life, than they would have had
in their own country. This argument may alleviate, but
does not justify the practice. It cannot be called a more
eligible state, if less agreeable to themselves.'^

Upon'^ the whole, there are many unlawful ways of

" MS. A natural; MSS. B and C national. " MS. A omits both to
equity and, and inserts to. "MSS. A and B omit and practised.
"MS. A omits this sentence. "MSS. .A and R Upon the whole

74 Moral Philosophy

making slaves, but also some that are lawful — And the
practice seems to be countenanced in the law of Moses,
where rules are laid down for their treatment, and an es-
timation of injuries done to them, different from that of
free men. I do not think there lies any necessity on
those who found men in a state of slavery, to make them
free to their own ruin. But it is very doubtful whether
any original cause of servitude can be defended, but
legal punishment for the commission of crimes. Human-
ity in the manner of treating them is manifestly a dictate
of reason and nature, ^^ and I think also of private and
public utility, as much as of either.

The next step in opening the principles of the social
state, is to consider the foundation, establishment and
extent of Property. Some begin this by considering the
property of man in general in the inferior creatures.
Has he any right to use the lower irrational animals for^
labour, or food, or both ?

It is needless to refine too much upon this subject.

there are many ways of making slaves unlawfully, but supposing
the title just the practise seems to be countenanced by the Law of
Moses. I do not think, etc. In this connection it may be noted that
in 1790 President Witherspoon, while a member of the New Jersey
Legislature, was chairman of a committee on the abolition of slavery
in the state, and brought in a report advising no action, on the
ground that the law already forbade the importation of slaves and
encouraged voluntary manumission. He suggested, however, that the
state might enact a law that all slaves born after its passage should
be free at a certain age — e.g. 28 years, as in Pennsylvania, although
in his optimistic opinion the state of society in America and the
progress of the idea of universal liberty gave little reason to believe
that there would be any slaves at all in America in 28 years' time,
and precipitation therefore might do more harm than good.
" MS. A omits rest of paragraph.

Moral Philosophy 75

To use them for labor seems evidently lawful, as they
are inferior, with strength fitted for it."' and strength
which they could not employ for the improvement and
cultivation of the earth without the direction of man.
They seem to be to man, some how as the body to mind.
They help to produce food for themselves and so increase
their number and receive much more sensuaF^ pleasure,
sharing in all respects with their masters the fruit of
their toil.

To use them for food is thus argued^*^ to be lawful. — If
suffered all to live, they would become too numerous, and
could not be sustained, ^^ so that death to many of them in
a much worse way must be the certain consequence.
Further, nature seems to dictate the use of them for food
in the plainest manner, for they are food for one another
in a regular gradation, the insects to the birds and fishes,
many of them to the beasts,^" and the smaller to the
greater, or the tamer to the more rapacious of every
order.

If we take tradition or Revelation for our guide, the
matter is plain, that God made man lord of the works
of his hands, and puts under him all the other creatures.
Only it appears that the grant of animal food was made
no earlier than to Noah after^^ the flood.

Let us next consider the establishment of private
l)roperty. Private property is every particular person's
having a confessed^^ and exclusive right to a certain por-

"MS. A omits rest of sentence. "MS. A essential. "The MSS.
read agreed. "MSS. A and B omit rest of sentence. "MSS. A
and B omit this clause. ^' MS. A omits to Noah after. '^ MSS. A
and B clear.

76 Moral Philosophy

tion of the goods which serve for the support and con-
veniency of life.

In a very imperfect state of society community of
goods may subsist in a great degree,-^ and indeed its sub-
sisting is one of the surest signs of an imperfect state of
society. Some attempts have been made in civiHzed states
to introduce it,-^ but without any considerable effect,
except in Sparta, the constitution of which was very sin-
gular. In small voluntary societies, especially of the
religious kind, it may be established,^^ and will continue
so long as the morals of the society are pure. But in
civil society fully formed, especially if the state is at all
extensive or intended to be so,^^ private property is essen-
tially necessary, and founded upon the reason^'^ of things
and public utility. The reasons of it are (i) without
private property no laws would be sufficient to compel
universal industry. There never was such a purity of
manners and zeal for the public in the individuals of a
great body, but that many-^ would be idle and slothful
and maintain themselves upon the labor of others.

2. There is no reason to expect in the present state of
human nature, that there would be a just and equal dis-
tribution to every one according to his necessity, nor any
room for distinction according to merit.

3. There would be no place for the exercise of some

^MS. A omits rest of sentence. "' MSS. A and B omit rest of
sentence. ^MSS. A and B has been established and omit rest of
sentence. " MSS. A and B intended to grow. "' MS. A upon reason,
and the nature of things. MSS. B and C upon the reason and na-
ture of things. ^^ MSS. A and B omit preceding part of the sen-
tence and read numbers would be idle, etc.

Moral Philosophy yy

of the noblest affections of the human mind, as charity,
compassion, beneficence, &c.

4. Little or no incitement to the active virtues, la-
bor, ingenuity, bravery, patience, &c.

Some have laid down schemes for making property
common, as Sir Thomas Moore-® in his Utopia; but in
general they are chimerical and impracticable.^" There
is no instance in fact where any state that made a figure
in the social life, had their goods wholly in common.
Sparta had the most of it, but it was a very small state,
and limited in its views; besides there was something
so singular in the whole constitution of the Spartan gov-
ernment, that its subsisting so long, remains a phenome-
non for politicians and reasoners yet to account for.

Supposing private property to be essential, or at least
useful in the social state, the next question is,^^ how does
this property take its rise, or by what ways is it ac-
quired.

The original ways of acquiring property may be re-
duced to these two (i) Prior occupation (2) our own
industry.

As to the first of these, it may be analysed thus. Of
the things that lay in common for the use of man, I have
a right to take what is convenient for me,^- and after I
have taken it no body can have a better right nor conse-
quently any title to take it from me.

But many questions difficult to be resolved arise from

"The spelling of Sir Thomas More's name remains uncorrected
in all the editions. '*MS. A omits and impracticable.
" MSS. A and B the next question is, how it is acquired?
"MS. B omits the rest of sentence.

78 Moral Philosophy

the application of this principle. How far does this
right extend ? Must I take only what is sufficient for the
present moment, or may I provide for future necessities
and enjoyment. In vacant lands must I take only what
I and my present followers can sufficiently occupy, or
may I touch a continent and call it mine, though I shall
not be able to fill it in many ages. I answer common
utility must be the rule in all these cases, and any thing
more particular, must be reserved till we come to the law
of nations.

Some say that the water in large bays and rivers
ought to be common to all,^^ because it is inexhaustible
and one's using it cannot waste or spoil it for the use of
others. But the security of societies will point out the
measure of property that must be in all those things.

The extent or object of property contains three par-
ticulars ( I ) a right to the fullest use. Whatever is a
person's property he has a right to do with it as he pleases,
with this single exception, if it may be called so, that he
may not use it to the injury of others. Full property has
no other exception, unless you call this an exception,
that if any man would wantonly destroy the fruits of the
earth, or his habitation; in that case though they were
his own, people would hinder him, as supposing him to
be mad,"^ and deprive him not only of that liberty, but of
all others.

2. Property implies a right of exclusion. We may
hinder others from any way intermedling with what is

''MSS. A and B omit rest of sentence.
** MSS. A and B omit rest of sentence.

Moral Philosophy 79

our property. This seems essential to the idea. Giving-'^'
a full right to one.'''" implies that others have none.

3. It implies a power to alienate. That is to say, a
right of alteration, commutation, donation, during life,
and disposal at deatli. Thus property is said to he per-
petual.

There are certain things called by Civilians Res nul-
lius, such as temples, public edifices, gates and walls of
cities, &c. Temples used to be said to be given to God,
and in the laws of civilized states, attention is paid to this
circumstance. But as to the property or use, the case of
them and of all the other things mentioned, is very clear.
They are under the inspection of the magistrate, or such
persons as represent the community, and are by them kept
for common use.^'^

LECTURE XI.

In the social life in general we may consider, (i) do-
mestic, (2) civil society.

The first of these we must consider as implying and
made up of several relations, the chief of which are ( i )
the relation of marriage, (2) That of parents and chil-
dren, (3) that of master and servant.

In marriage we ought to observe that though all crea-

" MSS. A and C /lawig;. '" MSS. A and C oh/- /»ro/'cr/y. "The
MSS. read They belong to the public and are for common use, and
the particular administration of them, is in the Magistrates, Rulers,
or such Persons as represent the community. MS. B adds and are
by them kept for common use.

8o Moral Philosophy

tures may be said to be propagated in a way in a great
degree similar, yet there is something pecuharly distin-
guished, dignified and solemn in marriage among men.
This distinction is necessary and founded in reason and
nature.

Human creatures at their birth are in a state weaker
and more helpless than any other animals. They also
arrive much more slowly at maturity, and need by far
most assistance and cultivation. Therefore a particular
union of the parents is absolutely necessary,^ and that
upon such powerful principles as will secure their com-
mon care. Marriage is a relation expressly founded
upon this necessity and must be so conducted as to ascer-
tain the property of the offspring, and to promise the
most assiduous, prudent and extensive care.-^

This is the foundation of marriage drawn from the
public good. But we ought also to observe that man- is
manifestly superior in dignity to the other animals, and
it was intended that all his enjoyments and even his in-
dulgence of instinctive propensities should be of a more
exalted and rational kind than theirs. Therefore the
propensity of the sexes to one another,^ is not only reined
in by modesty, but is so ordered as to require that reason
and friendship, and some of the noblest aft'ections should
have place. And it is certain that they have if not a
more violent, at least a more lasting and uniform in-
fluence in the married state than sensual desire.

It is further observed by moral writers, that though
beauty and personal attraction may be considered as the
* MSS. A and C omit rest of sentence.
^MSS. A and C omit to was mtcnded.
^ MSS. A and C omit to is so ordered.

Moral Philosophy 8i

first motives, yet these are always supposed to be indica-
tions of something excellent in the temper within. So
that even love of beauty in man is an attachment to moral
excellence. Let a person attend with seriousness, and
he will find that the utmost perfection of form in an
idiot, or one thoroughly known to be of a very bad tem-
per, is really no object of desire. Though in those who
are little known it is apt to prejudice the ignorant and un-
wary to judge favorably of the person.

The particulars which reason and nature point out re-
lating to the marriage contract are as follow :

1. That it be between one man and one woman. Poly-
gamy is condemned by nature; for it is found that the
males born, are to the females as 13 to 12, or as some say,
as 20 to 19, the overplus being to supply the greater waste
of the male part of the species by war and dangerous
occupations,^ hard labor, and travelling by land and sea.

2. The fundamental and essential part of the contract
is fidelity and chastity. This must immediately appear
to be essential to the purpose of the union. Some writers
say that this is especially binding upon the woman, in
order to ascertain the offspring ; but every body must see
the absurdity of any distinction, because the contract
would neither be equal, nor likely to be steadily observed
if it were not mutual. Besides, as a late author has well
observed, if chastity be a female virtue, how can men
be unchaste without infringing upon it?

3. The contract should be for life — otherwise it would
be short, uncertain, and mutual love and industry greatly
weakened.

*The MSS. omit rest of sentence.

82 Moral Philosophy

4. If superiority and authority be given to the man, it
should be used with so much gentleness and love as to
make it a state of as great equality as possible. Hutchin-
son and some other writers say there should be no super-
iority, and that their property being common, should not
be alienated by the one without the other. Others think
that perfect equality of power in two persons is not con-
sistent with order, and the common interest, and therefore
give authority to the man, and the laws of most nations
give the man the disposal of property, with the reserva-
tion of particular rights to the woman.

Some heathen writers gave the man power of life and
death over the woman, a thing evidently barbarous and
unjust. ^

5. Marriages are sometimes dissolved by divorces,
which our law permits only on three accounts — adultery,
wilful and obstinate desertion, and incapacity. The first
two of these founded on the New Testament, and the last
on reason, being not so properly a dissolution of a mar-
riage, as a declaration that it was void from the beginning,
and never took place.

Some writers of moral philosophy add as causes of di-
vorce contrariety of temper, incurable diseases, and such
as would infect the offspring. But none of them seem
of sufficient moment. The first would be an evident
temptation to causeless^ and wanton separations — and
all the three may be guarded against by previous caution.

Hutchinson*^ observes that in all nations, marrying in
near degrees of consanguinity or affinity has been avoid-
ed and abhorred ; and he adds, that the natural and gen-

"MS.C careless. 'MSS. B and C Hutcheson.

Moral Philosophy 83

eral abhorrence of it has been greater than reason seems
to dictate. Hence it has been conjectured to have been
early tradition or revelation — and men have exercised
their invention in finding out the true reason or ground of
the prohibition.

One reason assigned is, because if marriage were lawful
to near relations, their frequent intercourse would be
a strong temptation to uncleanness.

Another; that if permitted it would frequently con-
found or invert the duties of relations by setting some
above others whom they formerly used to obey.

A third reason, and perhaps the best is, that abstaining
from blood relations in this voluntar}^ contract extends
the social ties, and produces a greater number of family
relations.

Whatever be the moral reasons, it seems to have a
strong sanction in nature ; for it is observed that marriage
between near relations, especially if repeated, greatly
weakens the human race.

As to the extent of this prohibition, it has been vari-
ous in different nations, but the most prevailing has been
to forbid all within three degrees. The degrees are reck-
oned by the steps of descent between the parties and the
common parent. Parent and child is the first — child and
child, the second' — child and grand-child, the third — and
two grand-children or first cousins the fourth — when it
becomes lawful.

Relation of Parents and Children.

The first thing to be observed is, that this relation is
distinguished by the strongest instinct of parental affec-

84 Moral Philosophy

tion. This seems necessary, as the education of children
is a duty requiring so much time, care and expense, which
nothing but the most rooted affection would submit to.

The rights of the parent may be summed up in these
two: I. Authority, which requires subjection in the chil-
dren. 2. A right to a grateful return in due time from
the children. The first is a perfect right, as far as it ex-
tends, but must be limited.

Some nations have given parents the power of life and
death over their children, and Hobbs insists that children
are the goods and absolute property of their parents, and
that they may alienate them and sell them either for a
time, or for life. But both these seem ill founded, be-
cause they are contrary to the end of this right, viz. in-
struction and protection. Parental right seems in most
cases to be limited by the advantage of the children.

Children are no doubt to judge for themselves in mat-
ters of religion when they come to years, though the par-
ents are under the strongest obligation to instruct them
carefully to the best of their judgment. Those who in-
sist, that to leave them their judgment free they ought not
to be taught any principles, ought to consider that their
scheme is impracticable and absurd. If the parents do
not instruct them, they will imbibe prejudices and con-
tract habits perhaps of the worst kind from others.

Children in most nations are considered as having a
right exclusive of their parents to property given them by
others.

Many nations have given the parents a right to dis-
pose of their children in marriage; but this seems to be
carrying parental authority too far, if it be made abso-

Moral Philosophy 85

lute, because it puts in the power of the parent to dispose
of what is most essential to their happiness through the
whole of their future life. Yet it seems very contrary to
reason and nature that children in early life should dispose
of themselves in marriage without consulting their
parents.

Since we have denied the power of life and death to
parents, it will be asked what is the sanction of their au-
thority? I answer, moderate correction in early life, and
as the very highest punishment, expulsion from their
family, or a forfeiture of the privileges which they
despise.^

As to the right to a grateful return, it is an imperfect
right, but of the strongest kind — sometimes the civil au-
thority interposes, and obliges children to maintain their
aged parents.

To the disgrace of human nature it is often observed,
that parental affection is much stronger than filial duty.
We must indeed acknowledge the wisdom of Providence
in making the instinctive impulse stronger in parents to-
wards their children, than in children towards their par-
ents; because the first is more necessary than the other
to the public good ; yet when we consider both as im-
proved into a virtuous disposition by reason and a sense
of duty, there seems to be every whit as much baseness
in filial ingratitude, as in want of natural affection.

Relation of Master and Servant.
This relation is first generated by the difference which
God hath permitted to take place between man and man.

' MS. C enjoy.

86 Moral Philosophy

Some are superior to others in mental powers and intel-
lectual improvement — some by the great increase of their
property through their own, or their predecessors indus-
try, and some make it their choice, finding they cannot
live otherwise better, to let out their labor to others for
hire.

Let us shortly consider (i.) How far this subjection
extends. (2.) The duties on each side.

As to the first it seems to be only that the master has a
right to the labors and ingenuity of the servant, for a lim-
ited time, or at most for life.^He can have no right either
to take away life, or to make it insupportable by excessive
labor. The servant therefore retains all his other natural
rights.

The practice of ancient nations, of making their pris-
oners of war slaves, was altogether unjust and barbarous ;
for though we could suppose that those who were the
causes of an unjust war deserved to be made slaves ; yet
this could not be the case of all who fought on their side ;
besides, the doing so in one instance, would authorise
the doing it in any other ; and those who fought in defense
of their country, when unjustly invaded, might be taken
as well as others. The practice was also impolitic, as
slaves never are so good or faithful servants, as those who
become so for a limited time by consent.

Moral Philosophy 87

LECTURE XII.
Of Civil Society.

Civil society is distinguished from domestic, in the
union of a number of families in one state, for their mu-
tual benefit.

We have before affirmed, that society always supposes
an expressed or implied contract or agreement. Let us
now see what this agreement necessarily implies.

( I.) The consent of every individual to live in, and be a
member of that society. (2,) A consent to some particu-
lar plan of government. (3.) A mutual agreement be-
tween the subjects and rulers; of subjection on the one
hand, of protection on the other — These are all implied in
the union of every society, and tliey compleat the whole.

Any objections that may be raised against this, are
easily solved. Ex. Gr. Though every individual has not
given an actual consent, yet his determination to live with
any society implies it. Again, if it be asked how chil-
dren come to be members of a society ; it is answered,
they receive the benefits and partake of the rights of the
society during the whole time of their education, and as
they come to the use of reason, they both claim the privi-
lege, and acquiesce in the duty of citizens — And if they
find any thing insupportable in their condition, they may
alter it at their pleasure.

Have then all subjects a right when they see fit, to re-
move from the society in which they are ? I answer that
in all ordinary cases they ought to have, at least in time of
peace. Perhaps it may be affiiTned with justice, that they

88 Moral Philosophy

who have enjoyed the privileges of any society in time of
peace, if war or danger to the pubHc should arise, they
may be hindered from emigrating at that time, and com-
pelled to contribute their share in what is necessary to the
common defence.

Whatever is the form of government in any society,
the members may be divided into two classes, the rulers
and the ruled ^ the magistrates and subjects.

The rights of rulers may be divided into essential and
accidental : the essential, suclj as in general must be vested
in rulers in every society; the accidental, such as may be
given to the rulers in some societies, but not in others.

The essential rights of rulers, are what require most to
be enumerated, and these again by some good writers are
divided into greater and lesser essentials.

Of the first kind are, (i.) Legislation. (2.) Taxation
for the public expence. (3.) Jurisdiction, or the adminis-
tration of justice. (4.) Representation, or appearing and
acting in name of the whole, in all transactions, with ad-
jacent independent states, chiefly for the purpose of mak-
ing war or peace.

The less essential rights of rulers are many, and they
are called less essential, because they may be more varied
than the others; such as, coining of money — possessing
or managing public edifices — conferring honors on offi-
cers,^ &c.

The rights of subjects in a social state, cannot be enu-
merated, but they may be all summed up in protection,
that is to say, those who have surrendered part of their

' MSS. B and C conferring offices.

Moral Philosophy 89

natural rights, expect the strength of the pubhc arm to
defend and improve what remains.

It has been often said, that government is carried on by
rewards and punisliments ; but it ought to be observed,
that the only reward that a state can be supposed to bestow
upon good subjects in general, is protection and defence.
Some few who have distinguished themselves in the public
service, may be distinguished by particular rewards; but
to reward the whole is impossible, because the reward
must be levied from those very persons to whom it is to be
given.

After what has been said on the foundation of society,
viz. consent, perhaps it may be necessary to mention two
exceptions.

1. It is said by some with apparent reason, that a few
persons if accidentally armed with power, may constrain
a large ignorant rabble to submit to laws which will
be for their good. This I would admit in some cases,
when there is an evident madness and disorder in the
multitude, and when there is a moral certainty that they
will afterwards be pleased with the violence done them.
But in general it is but a bad maxim that we may force
people for their good. All lovers of power will be dis-
posed to think that even a violent use of it is for the
public good.

2. Though people have actually consented to any
form of government, if they have been essentially deceiv-
ed in the nature and operation of the laws, if they art-
found to be pernicious and destructive of the ends of
the union, they may certainly break uj) the society, re-

90 Moral Philosophy

call their obligation, and resettle the whole upon a better
footing.

Of the different forms of government.

As soon as men began to consider and compare forms
of government, they divided them into three general
and simple kinds, (i) monarchy, (2) aristocracy, (3)
democracy. These are called simple, because they are
clearly distinguishable from each other in their nature
and effects. The ancieats generally divided the forms
of government in this manner, because most of their
governments were of one or other of these kinds with
very little mixture. -

Monarchy is when the supreme power is vested in a sin-
gle person. Mr. Hutchinson^ says, monarchy may be either
absolute or limited; but this is an inaccuracy, for limit-
ed" monarchy is one of the mixed kinds of govern-
ment.

But monarchy may be either temporary or for life.
The Roman dictators were absolute for a time, and so long
as they continued, the government was purely monarchi-
cal, all other powers being dormant.

Monarchy may also be either hereditary or elective.

Aristocracy is that form of government in which the
supreme power is lodged with a small number of nobles.
This is capable of the same variations as monarchy, and
it may be either temporaiy or perpetual, hereditary or
elective, with this difference, that a temporary or elec-
tive aristocracy always puts some power in the hands of
the people. The most complete aristocracy is when the

'MS. C alteration. 'MS. B Hutcheson.

Moral Philosophy 91

ruling party have the power of cooptation within them-
selves, and can fill up as they please, the vacancies made
by deaths or resignation.

Democracy is when the supreme power is left in the
multitude. But as in large governments the people in
a collective body cannot well meet together, nor could
they transact business with any convenience if they did,
they may meet by representatives chosen either by the
whole, or by particular districts.

From those simple forms are generated many complex
forms ; two of them may be compounded together, either
in equal or in different proportions, or all these may be
united, as in the British* government.

After pointing out the simple forms of government, it
will be proper to make some general observations upon
government, and apply them to the various forms, to
show whether any of them is preferable to the other, and
the advantages and defects of each in particular.

I. There are four things that seem to be requisite in a
system of government and every form is good in pro-
portion as it possesses or attains them, (i) wisdom to
plan proper measures for the public good. (2) Fidelity to
have nothing but the public interest in view. (3) Secre-
cy, expedition, and dispatch in carrying measures into
execution, and (4) unity and concord, or that one branch
of the government may not impede, or be a hindrance to
another.

Monarchy has plainly the advantage in unity, secrecy,
and expedition.^ Many cannot so easily nor so speedily
* MSS. A and C our own; so also in MS. B hut corrected by later
hand to ^British. ° MS. C omits sentence.

92 Moral Philosophy

agree upon proper measures, nor can they expect to keep
their designs secret; therefore say some, if a man could
be found wise enough, and just enough for the charge,
monarchy would be the best form of government. Ac-
cordingly we find that in the command of a ship, fleet or
army, one person is commonly intrusted with supreme
power; but this does not apply to states, for many rea-
sons. No man can be found who has either skill suffic-
ient, or if he had, could give attention to the whole de-
partments of a great empire. Besides, in hereditary
monarchies there is no security at all for either wisdom
or goodness, and an elective monarchy, though it may
seem to promise ability, has been always found in experi-
ence worse than the other, because there is no reason to
expect that an elected monarch will have the public good
at heart, he will probably mind only private or family
interest.

Aristocracy has the advantage of all the others for
wisdom in deliberations, that is to say, a number of per-
sons of the first rank must be supposed by their consul-
tations to be able to discover the public interest. But it
has very little, or no prospect of fidelity or union. The
most ambitious projects, and the most violent and im-
placable factions often prevail in such states.

Democracy has the advantage of both the others for
fidelity; the multitude collectively always are true in
intention to the interest of the public, because it is their
own.^ They are the public. But at the same time it

' MS. C The multitude are always faithful to their interest because
they are the public. MS. B reads attention for intention.

Moral Philosophy 93

has very little advantage for wisdom, or union, and
none at all for secrecy, and expedition. Besides, the
multitude are exceeding apt to be deceived by dema-
gogues'^ and ambitious persons. They are very apt to
trust a man who serves them well, with such power as
that he is able to make them serve him.

If the true notion of liberty is the prevalence of law
and order, and the security of individuals, none of the
simple forms are favorable to it.

Monarchy, every one knows is but another name for
tyranny, where the arbitrary will of one capricious man
disposes of the lives and properties of all ranks.

Aristocracy always makes vassals of the inferior ranks,
who have no^ hand in government, and the great, com-
monly rule with greater severity than absolute monarchs.
A monarch is at such a distance from most of his subjects,
that he does them little injury; but the lord of a petty
seignory is a rigorous task master to his unhappy depen-
dants. The jealousy with which the members of an aris-
tocratical state defend their own privileges is no security
at all for humanity and easy treatment to their infer-
iors. Example — the Spartans; their treatment of the
Helots — and the barons in all the feudal governments, in
their treatment of their vassals.

Pure democracy cannot subsist long, nor be carried
far into the departments of state — it is very subject to
caprice and the madness of popular rage. They are also
very apt to chuse a favorite and vest him with such power
as overthrows their own liberty, — examples, Athens and
Rome.

^MS. B dangerous. 'MS. C any.

94 Moral Philosophy

r*" Hence it appears that every good form of government

\ must be complex, so that the one principle may check the

j^other. It is of consequence to have as much virtue
among the particular members of a community as pos-
sible; but it is folly to expect that a state should be up-
held by integrity in all who have a share in managing it
They must be so balanced, that when every one draws
to his own interest or inclination, there may be an over
poise upon the whole.®

V II. The second observation upon the forms of govern-
ment is, that where there is a balance of different bodies,

/ as in all mixed forms, there must be always some

, ^ I nexus imperii, something to make one of them necessary

r y . to the other. If this is not the case, they will not only

draw different ways, but will often separate altogether

I from each other. ^^ In order to produce this nextis, some

of the great essential rights of rulers must be divided and

^, distributed among the different branches of the legisla-

\^_llire. Example in the British government, the king has
the power of making war and peace, — but the parliament
have the levying and distribution of money, which is a
sufficient restraint.

III. The third observation is that the ruling part of
any state must always have considerable property, chiefly
of lands. The reason is, property has such an invariable
influence, that whoever possesses property must have
power. Property in a state is also some security for
fidelity, because interest then is concerned in the public
welfare.

For this reason did men in every state live entirely by
• Lecture XIII. begins here in MS. A. '" MS. C omits sentence.

\

Moral Philosophy 95

agriculture, an agrarian law would be necessary to liberty,
because if a vast proportion of property came into a few
hands, they would soon take all power to themselves.
But trade and commerce supercede the necessity of this,
because the great and sudden fortunes accumulated by
trade cause a rotation of property.

IV. In a well formed state the subjects should not be
too numerous nor too few. If very numerous, the
principles of government cannot exert their force over
the whole. The Roman empire fell by its own weight.
If the subjects are too few, they are not sufficient to sup-
press internal insurrections, or repel attacks from with-
out.

V. It is frequently observed, that in every government
there is a supreme irresistible^^ power lodged some where,
in king, senate, or people. To this power is the final
appeal in all questions. Beyond this we cannot go.
How far does this authority extend ? We answer as far
as authority in a social state can extend,^- it is not ac-
countable to any other tribunal, and it is supposed in the
social compact that we have agreed to submit to its decis-
ion. There is however an exception, if the supreme ])ower
wherever lodged, come to be exercised in a manifestly
tyrannical manner, the subjects may certainly if in their
power, resist and overthrow it. But this is only when
it becomes manifestly more advantageous to unsettle
the government altogether, than to submit to tyranny.
This resistance to the supreme power however, is subvert-
ing the society altogether, and is not to be attempted till
the government is so corrupt as that anarchy and the un-

"MS. C omits. "MS. C omits IVe answer .... extend.

V

96 Moral Philosophy

certainty of a new settlement is preferable to the continu-
ance as it is.

This doctrine of resistance even to the supreme power
\^ is essentially connected with what has been said on the
social contract, and the consent necessary to political
union. If it be asked who must judge when the govern-
ment may be resisted, I answer the subjects in general,
every one for hihiself. This may seem to be making
them both judge and party, but there is no remedy. It
would be denying the privilege altogether, to make the
oppressive ruler the judge.

It is easy to see that the meaning of this is not, that
any little mistake of the rulers of any society will justify
resistance. We must obey and submit to them always, till
the corruption becomes intolerable, for to say that we
might resist legal authority every time we judged it to
be wrong, would be inconsistent with a state of society,
and to the very first idea of subjection.

The once famous controversy on passive obedience and
non-resistance, seems now in our country to be pretty
much over; what the advocate for submission used to
say was, that to teach the lawfulness of resisting a gov-
ernment in any instance, and to make the rebel the judge,
is subversive of all order, and must subject a state to per-
petual sedition; to which I answer, to refuse this inher-
ent right in every man, is to establish injustice and ty-
ranny, and leave every good subject without help, as a
tame prey to the ambition and rapacity of others. No
doubt men may abuse the privilege, yet this does not
make it void. Besides it is not till a whole people rise,

Moral Philosophy 97

that resistance has any effect, and it is not easy to suppose
that a whole people would rise against their governors,
unless when they have really received very great provo-
cation. Whereas on the other hand, nothing is more
natural than for rulers to grasp at power, and their
situation enables them to do it successfully by slow and
insensible encroachments. In experience there are many
instances of rulers becoming tyrants, but compara-
tively, very few of causeless and premature rebellions.
There are occasional and partiaP^ insurrections in every
government. These are easily raised by interested per-
sons, but the great majority continues to support order.

VI. Dominion, it is plain from all that has been said
can be acquired justly only one way, viz. by consent.
There are two other ways commonly mentioned, both
of which are defective,^* inheritance and conquest. He-
reditary power which originally rose from consent and is
supposed to be founded upon the continuance of consent,
(as that of the hereditary power in a limited monar-
chy) is as lawful as any, but when they pretend such a
right from nature, is^^ independent of the people, it is ab-
surd.

That which is called the right of conquest ought to be
exploded altogether. We shall see by and by what is the
right of a conqueror in a just war. It was his right before,
and he obtains possession of it by conquest. But to found
any claim merely on conquest is not a right, but robbery.

Upon the whole, I will conclude with a few remarks

"MSS. B and C personal. "MS. A defended. " MSS. A and C
and.

98 Moral Philosophy

upon the spirit and tendency of different fonns of govern-
ment.

1. Monarchical government has a tendency to polite-
ness and elegance of manners, and generally to luxury
The submission and obsequiousness practised at the court
of a monarch, diffuses itself through the whole state.

2. Aristocracy narrows the mind exceedingly, and
indeed cannot long submit in a large state. A small^^
aristocracy however may submit as a form of government,
as long as any other method, or longer.

3. Democracy tends to plainness and freedom of
speech, and sometimes to a savage and indecent ferocity.
Democracy is the nurse of eloquence, because when the
multitude have the power, persuasion is the only way to
govern them.

Let us now ask this short question, what is the value
and advantage of civil liberty?

Is it necessary to virtue? This cannot be supposed.
A virtuous mind and virtuous conduct is possible, and
perhaps equally possible in every form of government.

Is it necessary to personal private happiness? It may
seem so. We see the subjects of arbitrary governments
however not only happy, but very often they have a great-
er attachment to their form of government than those of
free states have to theirs. And if contentment be neces-
sary to happiness, there is commonly more impatience
and discontent in a free state than in any other. The
tyranny even of an absolute monarch does not affect with
personal injury any of his subjects but a few, and chiefly
those who make it their choice to be near him. Perhaps

^* MS. C general.

Moral Philosophy gg

in free governments the law and the mob do more mis-
chief to private property than is done in any absolute
monarchy.

What then is the advantage of civil liberty? I suppose
it chiefly consists in its tendency to put in motion all the
human powers. Therefore it promotes industry, and in
this respect happiness, — produces every latent quality,
and improves the human mind. — Liberty is the nurse of
riches, literature and heroism. ^'^

LECTURE Xm.
Of the Law of Nature and Nations

The next thing in order, is to treat of what is called
the law of ii^ture_^ and t^aiions. It has been before
observed, that separate and independent states are with
regard to one another in a state of natural liberty, or
as man to man before the commencement of civil soci-
ety. On this several questions arise. ( i ) Is there any
such law? (2) What is the law? (3) What is its sanc-
tion, or how is it to be enforced ?

That there is such a law is plain from the reasons that
show the obligation which one man lies under to an-
other. If there are natural rights of men, there are na-
tural rights of nations. Bodies politic in this view, do
" MS. A persuasion. MS. B omits the entire sentence. The
views here summarised are more fully stated in a "Dialogue on Civil
Liberty" delivered in Nassau Hall in January 1776 by undergradu-
ates as an oratorical exercise, and revised if not actually prepared
by Dr. Witherspoon. It was printed in the Pennsylvania Magazine
for April 1776.

lOO Moral Philosophy

not differ in the least from individuals^ Therefore as be-
fore, reason, conscience, and common utility, show that
there is a law of nature and nations.

The question what it is? Must be considered in the
same manner. I am not able to recollect any perfect or
imperfect right that can belong to one man, as distin-
guished from another, but what belongs to nations, save
that there is usually less occasion for the imperfect rights.
If we read over the perfect rights, in a state of natural
liberty, we shall see they all apply to nations.^

It will also appear that the imperfect rights apply ; but
the occasions of exerting them are much more rare. For
example, it is more rare to see a nation in a state of
general indigence, so as to require a supply. Yet this
sometimes happens. It did so in the case of Portugal, at
the time of the great earthquake at Lisbon. And the
other nations of Europe lent them assistance. It is also
from this principle that ships of different nations, meeting
at sea, will do acts of humanity to one another. Some
times also there are national^ favors that deserve national^
gratitude. But this is seldom merited, and I believe,
still seldomer paid.

As to the sanction of the law of nature and nations, it
is no other than a general sense of duty, and such a sense
of common utility, as makes men fear that if they noto-
riously break these laws, reproach and infamy among all
nations will be the effect, and probably resentment and
indignation by common consent.

The violation of the natural rights of mankind being a
transgression of the law of nature, and between nations as

' MS. C omits this sentence. ^ MS. A natural.

Moral Plj^lo^cphy lor

in a state of natural liberty, there being no method of re-
dress but force, the law of nature and nations has as its
chief or only object the manner of making war and peace.

In war it is proper to consider distinctly (i.) The cau-
ses for which a just war may be carried on. (2.) The time
of commencing. (3.) The duration. (4.) The means
by which it may be carried on.

As to the first, the causes of commencing war are ac-
cording to the principles above laid down, the violation
of any perfect right — as taking away the property of the
other state, or the lives of its subjects, or restraining them
in their industry, or hindering them in the use of things
common, &c. There is only one perfect right, the viola-
tion of which does not seem to be a cause of war; I mean
that by which we have a right to character. NationaP ca-
lumny is scarcely a cause of war,^ because it cannot be
frequent or of great effect. The violation of imperfect
rights cannot usually be a cause of war between nations ;
yet a case may be supposed, in which even these would be
a just cause of war. Suppose a ship of any nation should
go into a port of another, in the greatest distress, and not
only the people in general, but the governing part of the
societ)' should deny them all assistance — This would be an
act of such notorious inhumanity, and of such evil exam-
ple, that it may justify national resentment; and yet even
here, I think there should first be a demand of justice upon
the offending persons, before vengeance should be taken
upon the state.

These are the just and legitimate causes of making war.
Some add to them, that when a nation is seen to put it-

' MS. A natural.

*MS. B oinits to bctivecn nations.

I02 Moral Philosophy

self in such a situation as to defence, or as to the means of
annoying others, that it seems to threaten hostiHties, then
we are not obhged to wait till it hath committed actual
injury, but may put it in a state of incapacity : but there
is no other truth in this, but what is founded upon the
other; for the preservation of our property implies, that
if others take such measures as are not to be accounted for
but upon the supposition of an intention of wronging me,
it is often easier and safer to prevent and disarm the rob-
ber, than to suffer him to commit the violence, and then
to strip and rob him of his prey.

One thing more is to be added, that every nation has a
right to join which it pleases of two contending parties.
This is easily resolved into the general principles ; for the
injured party may be supposed to go to war in defence of
some perfect right; and the cause being just, the imper-
fect right of humanity, as well as general and common
utility, calls for assistance to the oppressed. So that if we
have a right to associate with any nation, we may be en-
titled to protect their property and rights.

2. As to the time of commencing war, it seems to be
no way contrary to naturaP law to say it is at any time the
injured party pleases, after having received an injury; but
accident or utility, or a desire in each party to manifest
the equity of their cause, has introduced universally the
custom of declaring war. This begun very early, and
though not of absolute right, having been generally intro-
duced, must be continued, though there is often more of
form than of substance in it ; for nations do often begin
both attack and defence before declaration, as well as

*MS. B national.

Moral Philosophy 103

make all the necessary preparations for striking the most
effectual blow. The meaning of a declaration of war
seems to be, to call upon the injured^ party to prevent it by
reparation — Likewise to manifest to all other states, the
justice of the cause.

3. '''The duration of a war should be according to natu-
ral equity, till the injury be completely redressed, and rea-
sonable security given against future attacks: therefore
the practice too common of continuing a war for the ac-
quisition of empire is to be condemned. Because one state
has done some injury to another, it seems quite unreason-
able that they should not only repair the injury, but sub-
vert and ruin the offending state altogether^ — this would
be unreasonable between man and man, if one had
wronged another, not only to repair the wrong but to
take all the rest that he had, and reduce his family to
beggary. It is even more unreasonable in states, because
the offenders in states are not to be supposed to be the
whole people, but only the rulers or perhaps only some
individuals.

Perhaps it may be asked what is reasonable .security
against future injury. I answer, between equal indepen-
dent nations, solemn treaties ought to be considered as
security, but if faith has been often broken, perhaps some-
thing more may be required. The mutual complaints
of nations against each other for breach of faith, makes
conquerors often demand such a degree of security, as
puts the conquered altogether in their power.

4. As to the legitimate means of carrying on the war, in

• MSS. A and B injuring, and so corrected in the third and sub-
sequent editions. 'Lecture XIV, begins here in M,S. A.

104 Moral Philosophy

general it may be said in one word by force or open vio-
lence. It is admitted on all hands, that this force may be
used against the person and goods not only of the rulers,
but of every member of the hostile state. This may seem
hard, that innocent subjects of the state should suffer for
the folly and indiscretion of the rulers, or of other mem-
bers of the same state, but it is unavoidable. The whole
individuals that compose a state, are considered but as one
body ; it would be impossible for an enemy to distinguish
the guilty from the innocent ; and when men submit to a
government, they risk their own possessions on the same
bottom with the whole, in return for the benefits of
society.
.3*1^ Open violence may be said to have no bounds, and
^ therefore every method that can be invented and the most
deadly weapons of annoyance may seem to be permit-
ted— But from what has been said above and upon the
principles of general equity, all acts of cruelty and inhu-
manity are to be blamed, — and all severity that has not an
immediate effect in weakening the national strength of the
enemy is certainly inhumanity — Such as killing prisoners
whom you can keep safely — killing women and children
— burning and destroying everything that could be of
use in life.

The use of poisoned weapons has been also generally
condemned — the poisoning of springs or provisions.

To the honor of modern times, and very probably I
think the honor of Christianity, there is much more hu-
manity in the way of carrying on war than formerly.

To aim particularly at the life of a leader or person of

Moral Philosophy 105

chief note, seems to have nothing in it unjust or im-
proper, because the more important the life, it does more
towards the finishing of the war; but what many seem to
admit, the bribing of his own people to assassinate him
privately, I cannot think honorable or fair.

A question is often moved in morals, how far it is law-
ful to deceive an enemy, especially if we hold the general
and universal obligation of truth. To this it may be an-
swered, in the first place that we may certainly with great
justice conceal our own designs from an enemy — as in-
deed we may generally from friends by silence and guard-
ing against every circumstance that may betray them.
Neither do I think there is any thing at all blame-worthy
in a general of an army using ambiguous signs, as feigned
marches of a part or the whole, putting up lights or such
things, because after a declaration of war he does not pre-
tend to give information to his enemy of his motions, nay
it is expected on both sides that they will do the best they
can to over-reach one another in point of prudence. Yet
I can scarce think it right to employ people to go to the
enemy and professing to be sincere, tell direct falsehoods,
and deceive them by that false intelligence.

It is the custom of all to send spies to discover the ene-
my's designs, and also to bribe some of the enemies them-
selves to discover the designs of their leaders — The last of
which is, I think, at least of a doubtful nature, or rather
unjust^ — Though sending spies is by all approved, yet
(what may seem a little unaccountable) .such spies are al-
ways punished with instant death by the opposite side
when detected. The reason probably is, that pretending

io6 Moral Philosophy

friendship they have a right to consider them as traitors
— Or as they are in an act of hostility they kill them as
they would do an enemy in battle when in their power.

These circumstances apply to all war in general; but
there is a distinction of wars by civilians into two kinds,
solemn and civil. The first includes all wars between
states formerly independent, the other internal insurrec-
tions of a part of one government against another.

There has generally been a great difference in the be-
havior of the opposite parties in these different ways. In
solemn wars there is a presumption of integrity in the
plurality on both sides, each believes his own cause to be
just. On this account they are to be treated with the
more humanity. In civil wars the insurgents are con-
sidered as making unjust resistance to the ruling part of
the society,^ and therefore guilty of the greatest crimes
against society. Therefore they are often treated with
great rigor, and when taken in battle, reserved to solemn
trial and public execution. There is some reason for
this in many cases, when it is indeed an unreasonable
or unprovoked insurrection of disorderly citizens; but
there are many cases in which the pretences on both sides
are so plausible, that the war should be in all respects
considered as solemn.

It should be observed, notwithstanding the hostile dis-
position, there are occasions, both in a treaty for peace and
during the continuance of the war, when enemies are
under the strongest obligations to sincerity in their behav-
ior to each other. — When proposals are made for accom-

" MSS. B and C omit rest of sentence.

Moral [Philosophy 107

modating the differences, for a suspension of arms, for
an exchange of prisoners,^ or any thing similar.

It is worth while to inquire, whether the greatest honor
and candor in war, with a strict adherence to all the
laws above laid down, would give any party a great ad-
vantage who should take the libert}^ of transgressing them
— as for example, who should use poisoned weapons —
should send people to tell false stories — should bribe sub-
jects to assassinate a hostile prince — I answer, that they
would have no advantage at all, but probably the contrary.
There is something powerful in magnanimity, which sub-
dues the hearts of enemies; nay, sometimes terrifies them,
and particularly inspires a general's army with invincible
courage. Besides these, sinister arts are not so terrible as
may be imagined — telling false news is as easily discov-
ered as any trick whatsoever.

Prudence and integrity have no need of any assistance
from fraud — acts even of generosity from enemy to
enemy are often as useful as any acts of hostility. There
was something very handsome in the Roman general,
who refused to avail himself of the treachery of a school-
master, as well as whimsical in the way in which he pun-
ished the traitor.

Of Making Peace.

As already hinted all proposals tending to this purpose
ought to be made with the utmost sincerity. Of all de-
ceits in war the most infamous is that of making a treaty,
or seeking a conference, only to take advantage of the
security of one party to destroy him — by assassination or
by breaking a truce to fight with advantage.

'MS. C inserts for burying the dead.

io8 Moral Philosophy

The terms of peace ought to be agreeable to the end
of making war. Damages should be repaired, and se-
curity given against future injury.

We have often said that nation to nation is as man to
man in a state of natural liberty; therefore treaties of
peace between nations should in general proceed upon
the same principles as private contracts between man and
man. There is however an exception, that contracts be-
tween individuals are (at least by war) always void when
they are the effect of constraint upon one side. Now this
must not hold in treaties between nations, because it
would always furnish a pretext for breaking them. On
the side of the conquered a treaty is always in a great de-
gree the effect of necessity.

It is generally however laid down in most authors as
a principle, that the terms imposed^ '^ and submitted to
may be sometimes so rigorous and oppressive, as to
justify the injured party in revolting when they are
able. This seems to me to be very lax in point of
morals. It would be better I think to say, that the
people who made the treaty should not recede from it.
Their posterity however, at some distance cannot, be
supposed bound to unjust servitude by the deeds of
their fathers.

Let us conclude this subject by a few remarks on the
situation of neutral states.

1. Every state has a right when others are contending
to remain neuter, and assist neither party.

2. They have a right to all their former privileges
with both the contending parties — may carry on their

" MS. B proposed.

Moral Philosophy 109

traffic with both, and may show all the usual marks of
friendship to both — only it has been generally agreed
upon that they are not to trade with any of them in cer-
tain articles supposed to be of consequence in carrying
on war, particularly provisions and arms.

3. Neutral powers should keep their harbors alike open
to both for common refreshment, and as an asylum to fly
to. And it is held necessary that the contending powers
must not carry on their quarrel nor exercise any hostilities
within the territories of a neutral state.

4. Neutral states may purchase moveable goods from
any of the contending parties which have been taken
from the other. But not so with respect to lands or forts,
because if the other party are able they will re-take their
possessions.

5. Deeds of a violent possessor are held to be valid,
that is to say, if a conqueror prevails for a time, and levies
tribute from any country, and afterwards the rightful
[)Ossessor prevails, it would be unjust to demand the
tribute again, because the true owner was not able to
give protection to the subjects, and what was paid was
lost through his weakness. The same thing may be said
of a dependant state; if it owes any money and service to
a supreme state, and an enemy exact it by force, the
proper creditor cannot justly demand it again.

On the whole, those things that have been generally
received as the law of nature and nations, are founded
on the principles of equity, and when well observed do
greatly promote general utility.

no Moral Philosophy

LECTURE XIV. 1
Jurisprudence.

Jurisprudence is the method of enacting and adminis-
terirrg civil laws in any constitution.

We cannot propose to go through a system of civil
laws, and therefore what I have in view is to make some
preliminary remarks, and then to point out the object of
civil laws, and the manner of their operation.

I. The first preliminary remark is, that a constitution
is excellent when the spirit of the civil laws is such as to
have a tendency to prevent offences and make men good,
as much as to punish them when they do evil.

This is necessar}- in some measure; for when the gen-
eral disposition of a people is against the laws, they can-
not long subsist even by a strict and rigorous execution on
the part of the rulers. There is however more of this
in some constitutions than in others. Solon and Xeno-
phon, as well as Lycurgus, seem to have formed their
plan very much with this view, to direct the manners of
the people in the first place, which will always make the
observation of particular laws easy.

But how shall the magistrate manage this matter, or
what can be done by law to make the people of any state
virtuous? If, as we have seen above, virtue and piety are
inseparably connected, then to promote true religion is
the best and most effectual way of making a virtuous and
regular people. Love to God, and love to man, is the
substance of religion; when these prevail civil laws will
.'lave little to do.
» Lecture XV. in MS. A.

Moral Philosophy i i i

But this leads to a ver}- important disquisition how
far the magistrate ought to interfere in matters of re-
ligion. Religious sentiments are very various — and we
have given it as one of the perfect rights in natural liberty,
and which ought not to be alienated even in society,
that every one should judge for himself in matters of re-
ligion.

What the magistrate may do on this subject seems to be
confined to the three following particulars:

(i.) The magistrate (or ruling part of any society)
ought to encourage piety by his own example, and by en-
deavoring to make it an object of public esteem. When-
ever the general opinion is in favor of any thing it will
have many followers. Magistrates may promote and en-
courage men of piety and virtue, and they may dis-
countenance those whom it would be improper to punish.

(2.) The magistrate ought to defend the rights of con-
science, and tolerate all in their religious sentiments that
are not injurious to their neighbors. In the ancient
heathen states there was less occasion for this, because in
the system of polytheism the different gods and rites
were not supposed to be opposite, but co-ordinate and con-
sistent ; but when there is believed to be but one God, the
sentiments about his nature and worship will often be con-
sidered as essentially repugnant one to another.

The pretence of infidels, that persecution only belongs
to the Christian religion, is absurd ; for the Christian was
the first religion that was persecuted,^ and it was the
necessary consequence of saying, that the gods of the
heathens were no gods.

*MS. C omits rest of sentence.

112 Moral Philosophy

At present as things are situated, one of the most im-
portant duties of the magistracy is to protect the rights
of conscience.

It is commonly said, however, that in case any sect
holds tenets subversive of society and inconsistent with
the rights of others that they ought not to be tolerated.
On this footing Popery is not tolerated in Great Britain ;
because they profess entire subjection to a foreign power,
the see of Rome; and therefore must be in opposition to
the proper interest of their own state; and because vio-
lence or persecution for religion is a part of their relig-
ion, which makes their prosperity threaten ruin to others
— as well as the principle imputed to them, which they
deny, that faith is not to be kept with heretics. But how-
ever just this may be in a way of reasoning, we ought in
general to guard against persecution on a religious ac-
count as much as possible, because such as hold absurd
tenets are seldom dangerous. Perhaps they are never
dangerous, but when they are oppressed. Papists are
tolerated in Holland without danger to liberty. And
though not properly tolerated, they are now connived
at in Britain.

In ancient times, in great states the censorial power was
found necessary to their continuance, which inspected the
manners of men. It seems probable, that supporting the
religious sects in modern times answers this end, for the
particular discipline of each sect, is intended for the cor-
rection of manners.

(3.) The magistrate may enact laws for the punish-
ment of acts of profanity and impiety. The different
sentiments of men in religion, ought not by any means

Moral Philosophy 113

to encourage or give a sanction to such acts as any of
them count pi o fane.

Many are of opinion that besides all this, the magis-
trate ought to make public provision for the worship of
God, in such manner as is agreeable to the great body of
the society ; though at the same time all who dissent f rorrx
it, are fully tolerated. And indeed there seems to be a
good deal of reason for it, that so instruction may be pro-
vided for the bulk of common people, who would, many
of them, neither support nor employ teachers, unless they
were obliged. The magistrates right in this case, seems
to be something like that of a parent, they have a right
to instruct, but not to constrain.

(2) The second preliminary remark is, that laws
should be so framed as to promote such principles in
general, as are favorable to good government, and par-
ticularly that principle, if there be one, that gave rise to
the constitution, and is congenial to it.

Such a principle as I have in view, is generally the
point of honor in a country, and this lawgivers and ad-
ministrators of law should endeavor to preserve in its full
vigor, for whenever it is undermined the constitution
goes to ruin.

Of these principles, sobriety, industry, and public spirit
are the chief. Some states are formed to subsist by
sobriety and parsimony, as the Lacedemonians.

Industry is the prevailing principle, in others, as in
Holland. Public spirit in others, as in Greece, ancient
Rome, and Britain. Only public spirit may be diversi-
fied, sometimes it is a passion for acquiring glory and

114 Moral Philosophy

dominion, as in Rome, and sometimes for preserving
liberty, as in Gr< 2ce and Britain.

When I say that in the management of a state, the
utmost attention should be given to the principle of the
constitution to preserve it in its vigor, I mean that
though all other crimes are bad and ni part tend to the
ruin of a state, yet this is much more the case with
crimes against that principle than any other. Any act
of immorality was bad at Sparta, but to make poverty
and parsimony reproachful, and to introduce fine houses
and furniture and delicate entertainments, would have
been instant ruin.

Any act of immorality would be hurtful in Holland,
but to make fraudulent bankruptcy less infamous than it
is, would immediately destroy them.

Sobriety, industry, and public spirit are nearly allied,
and have a reciprocal influence upon one another. Yet
there may be a great degree of some of them in the
absence of the others. In Sparta there was much sobriety
and public spirit, but little industry. In Athens, industr)^
and public spirit, with veiy little parsimony.

In opposition to the whole of this, Mandeville wrote a
book called The fable of the Bees, which seems to be
levelled against sobriety, industry and public spirit, all at
once ; his position is, that private vices are public benefits,
and that the waste and luxury of one man supplies the
wants of another; but it is easy to overthrow his reason-
ing, for though sober and industrious persons spend each
less than a profuse person, yet sobriety and industry tend
much more to population, and by that means they are
mutually serviceable to each other. Luxury and vice

Mo ral Phil osopli y 1 1 5

only waste and destroy, they add nothing to the common
stock of property or of happiness. Experience fully
justifies this, for though from the luxury of one man
another may reap some gain, the luxury of a nation al-
ways tends to the ruin of that nation.

(3) A third preliminary remark is, that laws may be
of two kinds, either written or in the breasts of magis-
trates. In every constitution of note, there is something
of each of these kinds. It is uncertain whether it is betr
ter to have many or few special laws. On the one hand
it seems to be the very spirit of a free constitution to have
every thing as strictly defined as possible, and to leave
little in the power of the judge. But on the other hand,
a multiplicity of laws is so apt to lead to litigation and
to end in ambiguity, that perhaps judges of equity chosen
by the district in which they live and are to act, and
chosen but for a time, would be a more just and equitable
method of ending differences. But the difficulty of set-
tling a constitution so as always to secure the election of
impartial judges, has made modern states, where there is
liberty, prefer a • multiplicity of writ ^n laws.

(4) The last preliminary remark is that no human
constitution can be so formed, but that there must be ex-
ceptions to every law. So that there may be in every
nation oppression under form of law, according to the
old maxim, summum jus, summa injuria. This further
shows the necessity of forming the manners of a people.

After having laid down these preliminaries, we may
observe that the objects of civil laws may be divided into
the three following particulars.

I. To ratify the moral laws by the sanction of the so-

ii6 Moral Philosophy

ciety. The transgression of such laws are called crimes
as profanity, adultery, murder, calumny, &c. And they
are prosecuted and punished by order of the public ac-
cording to the spirit of every constitution.
" 2. To lay down a plan for all contracts in the com-
merce or intercourse between man and man. To show
when a contract is valid, and how to be proved. The
transgressions of such laws are called frauds. They
chiefly regard the acquisition, transmission, or alienation
of property.

3. To limit and direct persons in the exercise of
their own rights, and oblige them to show respect to the
interfering rights of others. This contains the whole of
what is called the police of a country. — And the trans-
gression of such laws are called trespasses.^ A number of
things in this view may become illegal which before were
not immoral.

Of the Sanction of the Moral Laws.^

In all polished nations, there are punishments annexed
to the transgression of the moral laws, whether against
God, our neighbor, or ourselves f in the doing of which,
the three following things are chiefly necessary.

(i.) To determine what crimes and what degree of
the same crime, are to be inquired into by the civil
magistrate. It is of necessity that in a free state crimes
should be precisely defined, that men may not be ignor-
antly or rashly drawn into them. There are degrees of
every crime — profanity, impurity, violence, slander, that

' MSS. B and C omit this sentence. * Lecture XVI begins here in
MS. A. ' MS. B omits or ourselves.

Moral Philosophy 117

are blameable in point of morals, nay, even such as may-
fall under the discipline of a religious society — that if
they were made cognisable by the civil magistrate,
would multiply laws and trials beyond measure.

(2.) To appoint the methods of ascertaining the com-
mission of crimes. This is usually by testimony, in which
we are to consider the number and character of the
witnesses. Generally through Christendom, and indeed
most other parts of the world two witnesses have
been esteemed necessary to fix crimes upon an accused per-
son; not but that the positive evidence of one person
of judgment and untainted character is in many cases
sufficient to gain belief, and often stronger than two of
unknown or doubtful credit, but it was necessary to
lay down some rule, and two are required to guard
against the danger of hired evidence, and to give an op-
portunity of trying how they agree together. To have
required more would have made a proof difficult or im-
possible in many cases.

It seems to be a maxim in law, and founded on reason,
that in the case of what are called occult crimes, such
as murder, adultery, forgery, and some others where the
nature of the thing shows that there must be a penury
of evidence, they sometimes content themselves with
fewer witnesses, if there are corroborating circumstances
to strengthen their testimony.

It seems to be a matter not easily decided, whether it be
agreeable to reason and justice, in the case of very atro-
cious crimes, that on account of the atrocity, less evidence
should be sufficient for conviction, or that more should be
required. On the one hand, the more atrocious the crime,

ii8 Moral Philosophy

the greater the hurt to society, and the more need of
pubHc vengeance. On the other hand, the more atrocious
the crime, and the heavier the punishment, it seems
agreeable to justice that the conviction should be upon the
more unquestioned evidence. Lawyers are seen to take
their common places, sometimes the one way, sometimes
the other. It is often thought that in practice, less evi-
dence is sufficient to convict a man of murder, forgery,
rape, and other crimes of a deep dye. But I am per-
suaded that the appearance is owing to the greater and
more general eagerness to discover the perpetrators of
such crimes. Others are suffered to escape more easily,
not that more evidence is necessar>', but that it is more
difficult to get at the evidence.

Evidence may be distinguished into two kinds, direct
and circumstantial. Direct evidence is when the wit-
nesses swear to their sight or knowledge of the accused
committing the crime. Circumstantial when they only
swear to certain facts which cannot be supposed to have
existed unless the crime had been committed. As a
man found dead, — another found near the place — with a
weapon bloody, — or clothes bloody, &c. Some have
affirmed that circumstantial evidence is stronger than
direct, but it must be taken with ver>' great caution and
judgment.

(3.) The law is to proportion and appoint the punish-
ment due to every crime when proven.

Punishment in all regular states, is taken wholly out
of the hands of the injured persons, and committed to
the magistrate, though in many or most cases the injured

Moral Philosophy 1 19

party is suffered to join tlie magistrate in the prosecution,
and to have a certain claim, by way of reparation, as far
as that is practicable.

Therefore the punishment in general must consist of
two parts, (i) reparation to the sufferer. (2) the vin-
dicta publica, which has sometimes two ends in view,
to be an example to others, and to reclaim and reform
the offenders,^ as in corporal punishment less than death.
Sometimes but one, the good of others in the example,
as in capital punishments, and banishment.

The kind of punishment and the degree, is left wholly
to different lawgivers, and the spirit of different constitu-
tions. Public utility is the rule. Punishment is not al-
ways proportioned to the atrociousness of the crime in
point of morals, but to the frequency of it, and the dan-
ger of its prevailing.

Some nations''^ require, and some will bear greater seve-
rity in punishments than others.

The same or similar conduct often produces opposite
effects. Severe laws and severe punishments, sometimes
banish crimes, but very often the contrary. When laws
are very' sanguinary, it often makes the subjects hate the
law more than they fear it, and the transition is very
easy from hating the law to hating those who are entrust-
ed with the execution of it. Such a state of things
threatens insurrections and convulsions, if not the dis-
solution of a government.

Another usual effect of excessive .severity in laws is.

• MS. C omits rest of sentence. ' MSS. A and B natures. MS. C
In some nations men voluntarily learn and some require greater pun-
ishment tfian others.

I20 Moral Philosophy

that they are not put in execution. The public is not
willing to lend its aid to the discovery and conviction of
offenders; so that in time the law itself becomes a mere
brutum fulmen and loses its authority.

I may make one particular remark, that though many
things are copied from the law of Moses into the laws of
the modern nations, yet so far as I know none of them
have introduced the lex talionis in the case of injuries, an
eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, &c. and yet per-
haps there are many instances in which it would be very
proper. The equity of the punishment would be quite
manifest, and probably it would be as effectual a restraint
from the commission of injury as any that could be
chosen.

The concluding remark shall be, that it is but seldom
that very severe and sanguinary laws are of service to the
good order to a state ; but after laws have been fixed with
as much equity and moderation as possible, the execution
of them should be strict and rigorous. Let the laws be
'\^ just and the magistrate inflexible.

LECTURE XV.

The second object of civil laws being to regulate the
making of contracts, and the whole intercourse between
man and man relating to the acquisition, possession and
alienation of property, we must consider carefully the
nature of

Moral Philosophy 121

Contracts.

A contract is a stipulation between two parties before
at liberty, to make some alteration of property, or to bind
one or both parties to the performance of some service.

Contracts are absolutely necessary in social life. Every
transaction almost may be considered as a contract, either
more or less explicit.

The principal thing which constitutes a contract is,
consent. But in some kinds of contracts, viz. the gratu-
itous, the consent of the receiver is presumed. In the
transmission of estates by donation or testament this is
presumed — and those who are incapable of giving their
consent through infancy, may notwithstanding acquire
property and rights. When a man comes into a settled
country and purchases property, he is supposed, besides
every other part of the bargain, to purchase it under such
conditions, and subject himself to such laws as are in
force in that country.

Contracts are said to be of three degrees in point of
fulness and precision — (i.) A simple affirmation of a de-
sign as to futurity — as when I say to any one that I
shall go to such a place to-morrow : this is not pro-
perly binding, and it is supposed that many things may
occur to make me alter my resolution — yet a frequent al-
teration of professed purposes gives the character of
levity ; therefore a prudent man will be cautious of declar-
ing his purposes till he is well determined. (2.) A gra-
tuitous promise of doing some favor to me. This is not
made binding in law, nor does it usually convey a perfect
right, because it supposes that the person who was the oh-

122 Moral Philosophy

ject of good will, may, by altering his behaviour, forfeit
his title to it, or that the person promising may find it
much more inconvenient, costly or hurtful to himself, than
he supposed ; or, lastly, that what was intended as a service
"if perfoiTned appears plainly to be an injury. In the last
case every one must see, that it cannot be binding; but
in the two former, I apprehend that in all ordinary cases
a distant^ promise is binding in conscience, though it may
not be necessary to make it binding in law. I say all or-
dinary cases, because it is easy to figure a case in which I
may make a promise to another, and such circumstances
may afterwards occur as I am quite confident, if the per-
son knew, he would not hold me to my promise.

3. The third degree is a complete contract, with con-
sent on both sides, and obligation upon one or both.

The- essentials of a contract which render it valid, and
any of which being wanting, it is void, are as follow :

That it be, (i.) Free. (2.) Mutual. (3.) Possible.
(4.) Careful.^ (5.) With a capable person. (6.) For-
mal.

First. It must be free. Contracts made by unjust force
are void always in law, and sometimes in conscience. It
must however be unjust force, because in treaties of peace
between nations, as we have seen before, force does not
void the contract; and even in private life sometimes
men are forced to enter into contracts by the order of a
magistrate, sometimes by the threatening of legal prosecu-
tion, which does not make them void.

'The MSS. read distinct. ^Lecture XVII begins here in MS. A.
' MS. B Lawful, obviously the correct reading, but the correction
was not made until the 1822 edition.

Moral Pliilosopkx 123

2. They must be mutual, that is, the consent of the
one as well as that of the other must be had. Contracts
in this view become void either by fraud on one side, or by
essential error. If any man contrives a contract so as to
bind the other party, and keep himself free, this fraud
certainly nullifies the agreement — or if there is an essen-
tial error in the person or the thing, as if a person should
oblige himself to one man supposing him to be another.

3. Contracts should be of things evidently possible, and
probably in our power. Contracts by which men oblige
themselves to do things impossible, are no doubt void from
the beginning; but if the iinpossibility was known to the
contracting party, it must have been either absurd or
fraudulent. When things engaged for become impossible
by the operation of Providence without a man's own fault,
the contract is void, and he is guiltless — as if a man
should covenant to deliver at a certain place and time a
number of cattle, and when he is almost at the place of
destination they should be killed by thunder, or any other
accident, out of his power.

4. Contracts must be of things lawful. All engage-
ments to do things unlawful, are from the beginning
void; but by unlawful must be understood the violation
of perfect rights. If a man oblige himself for a reward
to commit murder, or any kind of fraud, the engagement
is void; but it was criminal in the transacting, and the
reward ought to be returned, or given to public uses.
There are many contracts, however, which are very
blameable in making, that must, notwithstanding, l)e
kept, and must not be made void in law — as rash and

124 Moral Philosophy

foolish bargains, where there was no fraud on the other
side. If such were to be voided, great confusion would
be introduced. The cases of this kind are numerous,
and may be greatly diversified.

"5. Contracts must be made with a capable person, that
is to say, of age, understanding, at liberty, &c. It is part
of the civil law, or rather municipal law, of every country,
to fix the time of life when persons are supposed capable
of transacting their own affairs. Some time must be
fixed, otherwise it would occasion numberless disputes,
difficult to be decided. A man at the age of fourteen,
and a woman at twelve, may choose guardians, who can
alienate their property, and at the age of twenty-one
they have their estate wholly in their own hand.

6. Contracts must be formal.

The laws of every country limit a great many circum-
stances of the nature, obligation, extent and duration of
contracts.

Having pointed out something of the essential charac-
ters of all lawful contracts; I observe they may be di-
vided two different ways, ( i ) contracts are either absolute
or conditional. The absolute are such as are suspended
upon no condition, but such as are essential to every con-
tract, which have been mentioned above. Such as when
a person makes a settlement upon another, without re-
serve, then whether he behave well or ill, whether it be
convenient or inconvenient, it must be fulfilled. Con-
ditional contracts are those that are suspended on any
uncertain future contingency, or some performance by
the opposite party. Of this last sort are almost all trans-

Moral PJiilosophy 125

actions in the way of commerce, — which leads to the (2)
way of dividing contracts into beneficent and onerous.
The first is when one freely brings himself under an ob-
ligation to bestow any favor or do any service, as dona-
tions or legacies, and undertaking the ofiice of guardian
of another person's estate.

The onerous contract is when an equal value is sup-
posed to be given on both sides, as is the case for the most
part in the alienation of property — and the transactions
between man and man, and between society and soci-
ety.

To this place belongs the question about the lawful-
ness of lending money upon interest. If we consider
money as an instrument of commerce and giving an op-
portunity of making profit, there seems plainly to be noth-
ing unjust, that the lender should share in the advantage
arising from his own property.

The chief thing necessary is that the state or govern-
ing part of the society, should settle the rate of interest
and not sufifer it to depend upon the necessity of the poor
or the covetousness of the rich. If it is not settled by law,
usury will be certain consequence.

The law of Moses does not seem to have admitted the
taking of interest at all from an Israelite. It is thought
however, that the main reason of this must have been
drawn from something in their constitution as a state,
that rendered it improper, for if it had been in itself im-
moral they would not have been permitted to take it of
strangers.

126 Moral Philosophy

Of the Marks or Sigfis of Contracts.

All known and intelligent^ marks of consent, are the
signs and means of compleating contracts. The chief of
these however are words and writing, as being found the
most easy and useful. Words are of all others the most
natural and proper for giving immediate consent, and
writing to perpetuate the memory of the transaction.
There are however many other signs that may be made
use of, and wherever there is a real purpose of signify-
ing our intention by which others are brought to depend
upon it, the engagement is real, and we are bound in
conscience, though the law in every country must of
necessity be more limited. The whole rests ultimately on
the obligation to sincerity in the social life.

This obligation arises from the testimony of conscience,
and from the manifest utility and even necessity of sinceri-
ty to social intercourse.

Signs are divided into natural, instituted and cus-
tomary. Natural signs are those which have either a real
likeness to the thing signified, or such a known and uni-
versal relation to it, that all men must naturally be led
from the one to the other — As a picture is a natural sign.
because a representation of the thing painted. An in-
flamed sullen countenance and fiery eyes, are natural signs
of anger, because they are the universal effects of that
Passion.

Instituted signs are those that have no other connection
with the thing signified, than what has been made by
agreement, as if two persons shall agree between them-

* The MSS. read intelligible.

Moral Philosophy 127

selves, that if the one wants to signify to the other at
a distance, that he wishes him to come to his assistance,
he will kindle a fire upon a certain hill, or hang out a
flag upon a certain pinnacle of his house, or some part of
his ship. Words and writing are properly instituted
signs, for they have no relation to the thing signified
but what original agreement and long custom has given
them.

Customaiy signs are no other than instituted signs
which have long prevailed, and whose institution has
either been accidental or has been forgotten. It is also
usual to apply the word customary to such signs as de-
pend upon the mode and fashion of particular countries.
There are some signs and postures, which though they
may seem perfectly arbitrary have obtained very gen-
erally, perhaps universally, as bending down the body, or
prostration, as a sign of respect and reverence ; kneeling
and lifting up the hands as a sign of submission and sup-
plication.— Perhaps both these are natural, as they put
the person into the situation least capable of resistance.

Sometimes there is a mixture of natural and instituted
signs, as if a man sends a pair of wings, or the figure of
them, to a friend, to intimate his danger and the necessity
of flying.

In the use of signs, the great rule of sincerity is, that
wherever we are bound, and whatever we profess to
communicate our intention, we ought to use the signs in
the least ambiguous manner possible. When we have no
intention, and are under no obligation to communicate
any thing to others, it is of small moment what appear-

128 Moral Philosophy

ances are ; it is their business not to make any unnecessary
or uncertain inferences. A light in a house, in the middle
of the night, will perhaps suggest most probably, to a
traveller accidently passing, that there is somebody sick in
that house ; yet perhaps it is extraordinary study or busi-
ness that keeps some person awake.

Nay when there is no obligation to give, nor any rea-
son for the party to expect true information, it is held
generally no crime at all, to use such signs as we have
reason to suppose will be mistaken; as when one who
does not desire to be disturbed, keeps his chamber close
shut, that people may conclude he is not there. When
a general of an army puts a fire in the camp, to con-
ceal his march or retreat. And probably none would
think it faulty when there was an apprehension of thieves,
to keep a light burning in a chamber to lead them to sup-
pose the whole family is not at rest.

There are some who place in the same rank, evasive
phrases, when there is an apparent intention to speak
our mind, but no right in the other to obtain it. Such
expressions may be strictly true, and yet there is all prob-
ability that the hearer will misunderstand them. As if
one should ask if a person was in any house, and should
receive for answer, he went away yesterday morning;
when perhaps he returned the same evening. I look upon
these evasions however, as very doubtful, and indeed,
rather not to be chosen, because they seem to contain a
profession of telling our real mind.

Some mention ironical speech as an exception to
the obligation to sincerity. But it is properly no objec-

Moral Philosophy 1 29

tion at all, because there is no deception. Truth lies not
in the words themselves, but in the use of them as signs.
Therefore if a man speaks his words in such a tone and
manner as the hearer immediately conceives they are to
be taken in an opposite sense, and does really take them
in the sense the speaker means them, there is no falsehood
at all.

Mr. Hutchinson^ and some others allow a voluntary
intended departure from truth, on occasion of some great
necessity for a good end. This I apprehend is
wrong, for we cannot but consider deception as it itself
base and unworthy, and therefore a good end cannot
justify it. Besides to suppose it were in men's power on
a sufficient occasion to violate truth, would greatly des-
troy its force in general, and its use in the social life.

There are two sorts of falsehood, which because no
doubt they are less aggravated than malicious interested^
lies, many admit of but, I think without sufficient reason.

( 1 ) Jocular lies, when there is a real deception intend-
ed, but not in any thing material, nor intended to con-
tinue long. However harmless these may seem, I reckon
they are to be blamed, because it is using too much free-
dom with so sacred a thing as truth. And very often such
persons, as a righteous punishment in Providence, are
left to proceed further, and either to carry their folly to
such excess, as to become contemptible, or to go beyond
folly into malice.

(2) Officious lies, telling falsehoods to children, or sick
persons for their good. These very seldom answer the
end that is proposed. They lessen the reverence for

•MS. B Hutcheson. 'MS. C intended.

130 Moral Philosophy

truth; and particularly with regard to children, are ex-
ceedingly pernicious, for as they must soon be discover-
ed, they loose their force, and teach them to deceive.
Truth and authority are methods infinitely preferable in
dealing with children, as well as with persons of riper
years.

LECTURE XVI.i
Of Oaths and Vows.

Among the sig^s and appendages of contracts, are
oaths and vows.

An oath is an appeal to God, the searcher of hearts,
for the truth of what we say, and always expresses or
supposes an imprecation of his judgment upon us, if we
prevaricate.

An oath therefore implies a belief in God, and his
Providence, and indeed is an act of worship, and so
accounted in Scripture, as in that expression, Thou shall
fear the Lord thy God, and shalt swear by his name. Its
use in human affairs is very great, when managed with
judgment. It may be applied and indeed has been com-
monly used ( I ) in the contracts of independent states,
who have no common earthly superior. In ancient times
it was usual always to close national treaties by mutual
oaths. This form is not so common in modern times, yet
the substance remains ; for an appeal is always supposed to
be made to God, against the breach of public faith.

(2.) It has been adopted by all nations in their admin-

'MS. A Lecture XVIII.

Moral Philosophy i :; i

istration of justice, in order to discover truth. The most
common and universal appHcation of it has been to add
greater solemnity to the testimony of witnesses. It is also
sometimes made use of with the parties themselves, for
conviction or purgation. The laws of every country point
out the cases in which oaths are required or admitted in
public judgment. It is however lawful and in common
practice, for private persons, voluntarily, on solemn occa-
sions, to confirm what they say, by oath. Persons enter-
ing on public offices, are also often obliged to make oath,
that they will faithfully execute their trust.

Oaths are commonly divided into two kinds, asserta-
tory and promissory — Those called purgatory fall under
the first of these divisions. There is perhaps little neces-
sity for a division of oaths, for they do not properly stand
by themselves ; they are confirmations and appendages of
contracts, and intended as an additional security for sin-
cerity in the commerce between man and man.

Therefore oaths are subject to all the same regulations
as contracts; or rather oaths are only lawful, when they
are in aid or confirmation of a lawful contract. What
therefore voids the one, will void the other, and nothing
else. A contract otherwise unlawful, cannot be made
binding by an oath : but there must be a ver>' great cau-
tion used not to make any unlawful contract, much less
to confirm it by an oath.

It is easy to see the extreme absurdity of our being
obliged to fulfil a criminal engagement by oath, for it
would imply, that out of reverence to God we ought to
break his commands: but nothing can be more abomin-

132 Moral Philosophy

able, than the principle of those who think they may
safely take an unlawful oath, because it is not binding:
this is aggravating gross injustice by deliberate profanity.

I have said that oaths are appendages to all lawful con-
tracts; but in assertatory oaths which are only confirma-
tions of our general obligation to sincerity, it is necessary
not only that what we say be true, but that the occasion
be of sufficient moment to require or justify a solemn
appeal to God. Swearing on common occasions is un-
necessary, rash, profane and destructive of the solemnity
of an oath and its real use.

From the general rule laid down, that oaths are lawful
when applied to lawful contracts, it will follow that they
become unlawful only when the fulfilling of them would
be violating a perfect right ; but perhaps an additional ob-
servation is necessary here. Contracts must be fulfilled,
when they violate an imperfect right ; whereas some oaths
may be found criminal and void, though they are only
contrary to imperfect rights : as for example, some per-
sons bind themselves rashly by oath, that they will never
speak to or forgive their children who have offended them.
This is so evidently criminal, that nobody will plead for
its being obligatory, and yet it is but the violation of an
imperfect right. The same persons however, might in
many ways alienate their property to the prejudice of their
children, by contracts which the law would oblige them
to fulfil.

In vows, there is no party but God and the person
himself who makes the vow : for this reason, Mr. Hutch-
inson^ relaxes their obligation very much — Supposing,

'MS. B Hutcheson.

Moral Philosophy 133

any person had solemnly vowed to give a certain part of
his substance to public or pious uses, he says if he finds it
a great inconvenience to himself or family, he is not
bound; this I apprehend is too lax. Men ought to be
cautious in making such engagements ; but I apprehend
that when made, if not directly criminal, they ought to
be kept.

Of the use of Symbols in Contracts.
Besides promises and oaths, there is sometimes in con-
tracts a use of other visible signs called symbols ; the most
common among us are signing and sealing a written deed.
There is also, in some places, the delivery of earth and
stone in making over land — and sundry others.^ In an-
cient times it was usual to have solemn symbols in all trea-
ties— mutual gifts — sacrifices — feasts — setting up pillars.
— The intention of all such things, whenever and wherever
they have been practised is the same. It is to ascertain
and keep up the memory of the transaction. They were
more frequent and solemn in ancient times than now, be-
cause before the invention of writing they were more
necessary.

Of the Value of Property.
Before we finish the subject of contracts, it may be
proper to say a little of the nature and value of property,
which is the subject of them. Nothing has any real value
unless it be of some use in human life, or perhaps we
may say, unless it is supposed to be of use, and so
becomes the object of human desire — because at particu-

^ MS. C omits the next two sentences, In ancient times ....
is the same.

1 34 Moral Philosophy

lar times, and in particular places, things of very little
real importance acquire a value, which is commonly tem-
porary and changeable. Shells and baubles are of great
value in some places; perhaps there are some more*
baubles highly valued in every place.

But though it is their use in life that gives things their
value in general, it does not follow that those things that
are of most use and necessity, are therefore of greatest
value as property, or in commerce. Air and water, per-
haps we may add fire, are of the greatest use and ne-
cessity ; but they are also in greatest plenty, and therefore
are of little value as a possession or property. Value is
in proportion to the plenty of any commodity, and the
demand for it. The one taken in the inverse, and the
other in the direct proportion.

Hence it follows that money is of no real value. It is
not wealth properly, but the sign of it, and in a fixed
state of society the certain means of procuring it. In
early times traffic was carried on by exchange of goods —
but being large, not easily divided or transported, they be-
came very troublesome. Therefore it soon became nec-
essary to fix upon some sign of wealth, to be a standard
by which to rate different commodities.

Anything that is fit to answer the purpose of a com-
mon sign of wealth, must have the following properties :
It must be (i)^ valuable, that is, have an intrinsic com-
mercial value, and rare, otherwise it could have no com-
parative value at all. (2.) Durable, otherwise it could not
pass from hand to hand. (3.) Divisible, so that it might
be in larger or smaller quantities as are required. (4.)

* MSS. A and B mere. MS. C omits. "' The MSS. omit to rare.

Moral Philosophy 135

Portable, it must not be of great size, otherwise it would
be extremely inconvenient.

Gold and silver were soon found to have all these prop-
erties, and therefore are fixed upon as the sign of wealth.
But besides being the sign of the value of other commo-
dities, they themselves are also matters of commerce, and
therefore increase or decrease in their value by their
plenty or scarceness.

It may seem to belong to the ruling part of any society
to fix the value of gold and silver as signs of the value
of commodities — and no doubt they do fix it nominally
in their dominions. But in this they are obliged to be
strictly attentive to the value of these metals as a com-
modity from their plenty or scarceness, otherwise their
regulations will be of little force — other nations will pay
no regard to the nominal value of any particular country,
and even in internal commerce the subject would fix a
value upon the signs according to their plenty.

It is as prejudicial to commerce to make the nominal
value of the coin of any country too small as too great.*

We shall close this part of the subject by speaking a
little of the

Rights of Necessity, and commoti Rights.

These are certain powers assumed both by private per-
sons and communities, which are supposed to be author-
ised bv the necessity of the case, and supported by the
great law of reason.

There will remain a great number of cases in which
'Lecture XIX begin.s here in MS. A.

136 Moral Philosophy

these rights of necessity are to be used even in the best
regulated civil society, and often'^ the most mature de-
liberation and foresight of probable events, and provision
for them by specific laws.

Were a man perishing with hunger, and denied food
by a person who could easily afford it him, here the rights
of necessity would justify him in taking it by violence.
Were a city on fire, and the blowing up of an house
would save the far greater part, though the owner was
unwilling, men would think themselves justified in do-
ing it whether he would or not. Much more would men
in cases of urgent necessity make free with the property
of others without asking their consent, but presuming
upon it.

In our own government, where, by the love of liberty
general among the people, and the nature of the constitu-
tions as many particulars have been determined by spe-
cial laws as in any government in the world — yet in-
stances of the rights of necessity occur every day. If I
see one man rob another upon the highway, or am in-
formed of it, if I have courage and ability I pursue the
robber, and apprehend him without any warrant, and
carry him before a magistrate to get a warrant for what I
have already done. Nothing is more common in Britain
than to force people to sell their inheritance or a part
of it, to make a road or street straight or commodious.
In this instance it is not so much necessity as great utility.

The question of the greatest moment here is, whether
the establishing these rights of necessity does not derogate

' The MSS. read after, and it is so corrected in the subsequent edi-
tions.

Moral Philosophy 137

from the perfection and immutability of the moral laws.
If it be true, that we may break in upon the laws of justice
for the sake of utility, is not this admitting the ex-
ploded maxim, that we may do evil that good may come.
I answer, that these rights of necessity have in general
property as their object, or at most the life of particular
persons — and it seems to be inseparable from the estab-
lishment of property in the social state, that our property
is to be held only in such manner, and to such a degree, as
to be both consistent with, and subservient to, the good
of others. And therefore these extraordinary cases are
agreeable to the tacit or implied conditions of the social
contract.

In rights of necessity we are to consider not only the
present good or evil, but for all time to come, and par-
ticularly the safety or danger of the example. Where the
repetition of the thing in similar circumstances would
have a fatal effect, it ought not to be done. If a city were
under all the miseries of famine, and a ship or two should
arrive with grain, the owner of which would not sell it
but at a most exorbitant price, perhaps equity might ad-
mit that they should be compelled; but if any such thing
were done it would prevent others from going near that
place again.

It would be of no consequence to determine these rights
of necessity by law. If the law described circumstan-
tially what might be done, it would be no longer a right
of necessity, but a legal right. To forbid them by law
would be either ineffectual or it would abolish them alto-
gether, and deprive the society of the benefit of them

138 Moral Philosophy

when the cases should occur. Things done by the rights
of necessity are by supposition illegal, and if the necessity
does not excuse, the person who pretends them may be
punished. If I am aiding in pulling down a man's house
on pretence of stopping a fire, if he afterwards makes it
appear that there was not the least occasion for it, or that
I, being his enemy, took the opportunity of this pretence
to injure him, he will obtain reparation.

As property, or at most life is concerned in the rights
of necessity — Still the moral laws continue in force.
Whatever expresses an evil disposition of mind does not
fall under the rule, because it can never be necessary to
the doing of any good. The pretence of its being neces-
sary in some cases is generally chimerical, and even were
it real, the necessity could not justify the crime — as sup-
pose a robber very profane should threaten a man with
death unless he would blaspheme God or curse his par-
ents, &c.

There are certain things called common rights, which
the public is supposed to have over every member: the
chief of them are (i) diligence. As a man must eat
the community have a right to compel him to be useful —
and have a right to make laws against suicide. (2.) They
have a right to the discovery of useful inventions, pro-
vided an adequate price be paid to the discoverer. (3.)
They have a right to insist upon such things as be-
long to the dignity of human nature. Thus all nations
pay respect to dead bodies, though there is no other rea-
son for it but that we cannot help associating with the
body, even dead, the ideas which arise from it, and be-
longed to the whole person when alive.

Moral Philosophy 139

3. The third and last object of civil laws is. limiting-
citizens in the exercise of their rights, so as they may
not be injurious to one another, but the public good may
be promoted.

This includes the giving directions in what way arts
and commerce may be carried on, and in some states
extends as far as the possessions of private persons.

It includes the whole of what is called the police of a
community. — the manner of travelling, building, market-
ing, time and manner of holding all sorts of assemblies —
In arts and commerce particularly the police shows its
power.

It will only be necessary here to make a few remarks
on the nature and spirit of those laws.

1. Those things in themselves are arbitrary and mu-
table, for there is no morality in them but what arises
from common utility. We may sometimes do things in
a way better than that appointed by law, and yet it is not
allowed.

2. Men in general have but a very light sense of the
malignity of transgressing these laws, such as running^ of
goods, breaking over a fence, &c.

3. In the best constitutions some sanctions are ap-
pointed for the breach of these laws. Wherever a state is
founded upon the principles of liberty, such laws are
made with severity and executed with strictness.

Finally, a man of real probity and virtue adopts these
laws as a part of his duty to God and the society, and is
subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.

"MS. B destroying. MS. C ruining, evidently the correct read-
ing, but the error remains in all the editions.

140 Moral Philosophy

RECAPITULATION.

Having gone through the three general divisions of
this subject, Ethics, PoHtics, and Jurisprudence, I shall
conclude with a few remarks upon the whole, and mention
to you the chief writers who have distinguished them-
selves in this branch of science.

1. You may plainly perceive both how extensive and
how important moral philosophy is. As to extent, each
of the divisions we have gone through might have been
treated at far greater length. Nor would it be unprofit-
able to enter into a fuller disquisition of many points ; but
this must be left to every scholar's inclination and oppor-
tunities in future life. Its importance is manifest from
this circumstance, that it not only points out personal
duty, but is related to the whole business of active life.
The languages, and even mathematical and natural
knowledge, are but hard words^ to this superior science.

2. The evidence which attends moral disquisitions is
of a different kind from that which attends mathematics
and natural philosophy; but it remains as a point to be
discussed, whether it is more uncertain or not. At first
sight it appears that authors differ much more, and more
essentially on the principles of moral than natural phil-
osophy. Yet perhaps a time may come when men, treat-
ing moral philosophy as Newton and his successors have
done natural, may arrive at greater precision. It is al-
ways safer in our reasonings to trace facts upwards, than
to reason downwards upon metaphysical principles. An

*The MSS. read hand-maids, an obviously correct reading not
found, however, in any of the editions.

Moral Philosophy 141

attempt has been lately made by Beatty,- in his Essay on
Truth, to establish certain impressions of common sense
as axioms and first principles of all our reasonings on
moral subjects.

3. The differences about the nature of virtue are not
in fact so great as they appear : they amount to nearly the
same thing in the issue, when the particulars of a virtuous
life come to be enumerated.

4. The different foundations of virtue are many of
them, not opposite or repugnant to each other, but parts
of one great plan — as benevolence and self-love, &c.
They all conspire to found real virtue : the authority of
God — the dictates of conscience — public happiness and
private interest all coincide.

5. There is nothing certain or valuable in moral phil-
osophy, but what is perfectly coincident with the scrip-
ture ; where the glory of God is the first principle of action
arising from the subjection of the creature — where the
good of others is the great object of duty, and our own
interest the necessary consequence.

In the first dawn of philosophy, men began to write
and dispute about virtue. The great inquiry among the
ancients was, what was the summimi honiim by which it
seems they took it for granted, that virtue and happiness
were the same thing. The chief combatants here, were
the stoics and epicureans. The first insisted that vir-
tue was the summum bonum, that pleasure was no good,
and pain no evil : the other said that the summum bonum
consisted in pleasure, or rather that pleasure was virtue:

' MS. A does not contain this reference to James Beattie's "Essay".

142 Moral Philosophy

the academists and Platonists went a middle way be-
tween these.

I am not sensible that there is any thing among the an-
cients, that wholly corresponds with the modern dispute
upon the foundation of virtue.

Since the disputes arose in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, some of the most considerable* authors,
chiefly British are, Leibnitz, his Theodicaes and his let-
ters* Clark's demonstration and his letters. Hutcheson's
inquiries into the ideas of beauty and virtue, and his sys-

^ MS. C laudable. * In the bibliography that follows, MS. C cites
by name Clarke, Hutcheson, Wollaston, Collins, Nettleton, Hume,
Kame, Smith and Reid, omitting, however, the titles of their works,
and proceeding to the next paragraph. MSS. A and B also end
the bibhography with Reid, but give the titles of works.

In order to permit some control of Dr. Witherspoon's authorities,
it has seemed worth while to give the titles and first-edition dates
of works he mentions, editions known to have been in his private
library being so indicated. That he endeavored to be catholic and
fair in his biblio'graphy is shown by the fact that Leibnitz, Shaftes-
bury, Collins, Hutcheson and Hume had all been named by him in
his satire "Ecclesiastical Characteristics" in the catalogue there
drawn up ''of the most necessary and useful books, the thorough
understanding of which" would make a "truly learned moderate
man," — the type he was satirizing.

Samuel Clarke, "Demonstration of the being and attributes of
God, more particularly in answer to Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, and their
followers," etc., London, 1705. His "Discourse concerning the being
and attributes of God," 4th edition, London, 1716, is in Wither-
spoon's library at Princeton. The "Letters" would seem to be
either "Letters written in 1725 to Dr. Clarke relating to an argu-
ment in his Demonstration of the being and attributes of God, with
the Doctor's answers," London, 1745, or his various "Letters to
Mr. Dodwell" on the immortality of the soul ; Francis Hutcheson,
"Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue," Lon-
don, 1725. and his "System of moral philosophy," London, 1725:

Moral Pkilusopiiy 143

tern. Wollaston's religion of nature delineated. Collins
on human liberty. Nettleton on virtue and happiness.
David Hume's essays. Lord Kaim's essays. Smith's
theory of moral sentiments. Reed's inquiry. Balfour's
delineation of morality. Butler's analogy and sermons.
Balzuy's tracts. Theory of agreeable sensations from
the French. Beatty on truth. Essay on virtue and har-
mony.

To these may be added the whole deistical writers, and
the answers written to each of them in particular, a brief
account of which may be seen in Lelands view of the
deistical writers.^

William Wallaston, "The religion of nature delineated," London,
1722; Anthony Collins, "Philosophical inquiry concerning human
liberty," London, 1717; Thomas Nettleton, "Treatise on virtue and
happiness," London (?) 1729; David Hume, "Essays moral and
political," Edinburgh, 1741 ; Lord Kames, "Essay on the principles
of morality and natural religion," Edinburgh, 1751 (Witherspoon
library) ; Adam Smith, "Theory of moral sentiments," London,
1759; Thomas Reid, "Inquiry into the human mind on the princi-
ples of common sense," London, 1764 (4th edition, London, 1785,
Witherspoon library) ; James Balfour, "Delineation of the nature
and obligation of morality, with reflexions upon Mr. Hume's book
entitled An inquiry concerning the principals of morals," Edin-
burgh(?) 1753: Joseph Butler, "The analogy of religion, natural
and revealed, to the constitution and course of nature," London,
1736; and his "Fifteen sermons," London, 1726, (2d edition, Lon-
don, 1729, Witherspoon library) ; John Balguy, "A collection of
tracts, moral and theological, with notes and a supplement concern-''
ing rectitude," London, 1734; L. J. Levesque de Pouilly. "Theory
of agreeable sensations ... to which is subjoined ... a dissertation
on harmony of stile. Translated from the French", London, 1749
(an edition was published at Edinburgh in 1766) ; James Beattie,
"Essay on the nature and immutability of truth in opposition to
sophistry and scepticism," Edinburgh, 1770; the "Essay on virtue
and harmony" has eluded identification.

144 Moral Philosophy

Some of the chief writers upon government and poli-
tics, are, Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbyrac, Cumberland,
Selden, Burlamaque, Hobbs, Machiavel, Harrington,
Locke, Sydney, and some late books, Montesquieu's spirit
of laws; Ferguson's history of civil society;® Lord
Kaime's political essays; Grandeur and decay of the
Roman empire; Montague's rise and fall of ancient re-
publics; Goguet's rise and progress of laws, arts and
sciences.

' See page 45, Note '2. •

•In the MSS. the bibliography ends here. The titles and dates of
the "late books" are: Montesquieu, "Spirit of laws . . . translated by
Mrs. Nugent," 2d edition, 2 vols., London, 1752; Adam Ferguson,
"Essays on the history of civil society," London, 1766; by Lord
Karnes' "political essays" is possibly meant his "Essays upon several
subjects in Law," etc., London, 1732; Montesquieu, "Reflections on
the causes of the grandeur and declension of the Romans," London,
1734 (Witherspoon library) ; Edward W. Montagu, "Reflections on
the rise and fall of the ancient republicks. Adapted to the present
state of Great Britain," London, 1759; A. Y. Goguet, "Origin of
laws, arts, and sciences. From the French," 3 vols., Edinburgh,
1761 (Witherspoon library.)